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Abstract 
 
The hologenome concept of evolution is a hypothesis about the evolution of 
animals and plants. It asserts that the evolution of animals and plants was 
partially triggered by their interactions with their symbiotic microbiomes. In that 
vein, the hologenome concept posits that the holobiont (animal host + 
symbionts of the microbiome) is a unit of selection.  
 
The hologenome concept has been severely criticized on the basis that 
selection on holobionts would only be possible if there were a tight 
transgenerational host-genotype-to-symbiont-genotype connection. As our 
current evidence suggests that this is not the case for most of the symbiont 
species that compose the microbiome of animals and plants, the opportunity for 
holobiont selection is very low in relation to the opportunity for selection on each 
of the species that compose the host microbiome. Therefore, holobiont 
selection will always be disrupted ‘from below’, by selection on each of the 
species that compose the microbiome. 
 
This thesis constitutes a conceptual effort to defend philosophically the 
hologenome concept. I argue that the criticism according to which holobiont 
selection requires tight transgenerational host-genotype-to-symbiont-genotype 
connection is grounded on a metaphysical view of the world according to which 
the biological hierarchy needs to be nested, such that each new level of 
selection includes every entity from below. Applied to hologenomes, it entails 
that the hologenome is a collection of genomes, and selection of hologenomes 
is assumed to entail cospeciation of the host with the species that constitute its 
microbiome. 
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Against that interpretation, I propose the ‘stability of traits’ account, 
according to which hologenome evolution is the result of the action of natural 
selection in a non-nested hierarchical world. In that vein, hologenome evolution 
does not entail cospeciation, and thus it does not require tight transgenerational 
host-genotype-to-symbiont-genotype connection. By embracing a multilevel 
selection perspective, I argue that hologenome evolution results from the 
simultaneous action of natural selection on each of the lineages that compose 
the microbiome, and on the assemblage composed by the host genome plus 
the functional traits of its microbiome. Hologenome selection occurs when the 
evolution of the traits of the microbiome result from their effects on the fitness of 
the host, and it can take the form of multilevel selection 1, or multilevel selection 
2. In both cases, hologenome selection entails the evolution of microbiome 
traits, as well as evolution of the host genome, rather than cospeciation of 
lineages. 
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Introduction 
 
Introduction and motivation of the doctoral project 
 
The doctoral project that I develop here aims at shedding light on one of the 
most disputed topics in theoretical biology and philosophy of biology in the last 
few years, the so-called ‘hologenome concept of evolution’ (HCE). HCE is an 
hypothesis about the nature of biological individuality, and specifically about the 
role of symbiosis in defining the (blurry) boundaries of biological individuals. 
Concretely, HCE posits that the entity composed by a macrobial host (animal, 
plant) plus the microbial symbionts of its microbiome (bacteria, Archaea, fungi, 
viruses) is a biological individual, that they refer to as the ‘holobiont’, and also a 
level (or unit) of selection in evolution. The statement that the holobiont is a 
biological individual and a unit of selection constitutes, in my view, and as I will 
discuss throughout the doctoral project, the main innovative thesis that the 
formulation of HCE puts forward. HCE defenders support their thesis by 
departing from two key empirical observations: the pervasiveness of macrobe-
microbe symbiotic relationships, and the importance of symbionts for the life of 
the macrobes whose bodies they occupy. It is precisely the observation of these 
two empirical realities, plus a series of experimental results hard to explain with 
the traditional conception of ‘one organism = one genome’, that lead the authors 
to propose such a radical thesis about biological individuality. 
 
 HCE was originally proposed by biologists, but its postulates go far 
beyond pure biological theory. As it is a hypothesis about biological individuality, 
it has implications for metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, philosophy of 
science, and the relation between these categories. Foremost, and most 
intuitively, HCE raises a clear ontological question: if holobionts are biological 
individuals, how should we understand the ontology of individuals? In other 
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words, what makes biological individuals ‘individuals’, if symbionts are structural 
elements of biological individuals? And, if they are, should biological 
individuality be understood hierarchically, like a series of concatenated 
Matryoshka dolls? The ontological question immediately prompts an 
epistemological question: are there scientifically relevant criteria to determine 
the truth of HCE, or is it a hypothesis that cannot be empirically validated in any 
significant manner? Can we really determine whether holobionts are (or are not) 
biological individuals, or we can only assume that they are (or they are not)? 
What will be the impact for scientific research of assuming that holobionts are 
individuals? These questions are, at the same time, connected to many 
questions in philosophy of science: what is the evidence that should be 
demanded to accept (or reject) HCE? Is it worth pursuing a scientific avenue of 
research if the evidence that supports it is scarce? If HCE turns out to be based 
on false assumption, but it still leads to interesting pathways of research, is it 
possible to argue that a promising community-wide research project can be 
based on false assumptions?  
 
 As with most questions in philosophy, each of the questions I have just 
presented are not monolithic, and the answer to some subset of these 
questions will have immediate impact on the way of answering the others. What 
is more, many of these questions only arise after others have been asked, or 
only after others have been answered. I have come up with most of these 
questions during my doctoral project, precisely as a consequence of my doubts 
about the truth and scientific validity of HCE, which soon created an important 
contradictory attitude in my stance towards the hypothesis: on the one hand, I 
was convinced that there was a ‘core of truth’ in the theory, and I did so based, 
among other things, on how the assumption of the hypothesis had led, and was 
leading, many biologists toward really fascinating scientific discoveries that 
were hard to imagine had HCE not been proposed. On the other hand, I was 
constantly questioning the truth of the hypothesis, since mounting evidence 
seemed to suggest that the ‘core of truth’ that I believed to be contained in HCE 
vanished, and I was constantly tempted to believe that the hypothesis was 
simply false. Was there a way of putting order in the whole array of empirical 
and philosophical literature about holobionts and hologenomes, so that the 
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hypothesis could be consistently held, and made coherent with the accumulated 
empirical evidence? Especially, was it possible to elaborate a coherent 
conceptual explanation of the claim that holobionts are units of selection? And if 
so, what was the purpose of elaborating such a coherent ‘story’? Another 
important question that revolved in my mind was how far my ‘coherent story’ 
could (and should) be from our current empirical data about the role of 
holobionts as units of selection. Was it possible to argue that one of the reasons 
why HCE was dismissed was because the authors were supporting different 
definitions of the holobiont, or different views about what units of selection are? 
I worked under the impression that this might be the case, and that the reasons 
for the disagreement did not have to be looked for in the empirical evidence, or 
in the alternative interpretations of this evidence, but also in conceptual 
disagreements that were prior to the collection and interpretation of the 
evidence. So, I thought that the best way to understand the debates concerning 
HCE were to explore and rethink the conceptual foundations of the hypothesis, 
as well as the conceptual foundations of the units of selection. Samir Okasha 
had previously elegantly expressed this point about the resolution of scientific 
disputes, especially applied to the units of selection debate: 
 
‘Obviously, empirical data is crucial for resolving the levels-of-selection 
question, as for all scientific questions; but conceptual clarity is a 
prerequisite too. Unless we can agree on what it means for there to be 
selection at a given hierarchical level, on what the criteria for individuating 
“levels” are, on whether selection at one level can ever be “reduced” to 
selection at another, on how multi-level selection should be modelled, and 
on whether there is always “one true fact” about the level(s) at which 
selection is acting, then there is little prospect of empirical resolution, 
however much data we collect. Focusing on conceptual questions such as 
these is not meant to downplay the significance of empirical data, but 
rather to help provide the clarification needed for addressing the issues 
empirically.’ (2006: 2) 
 
Like Samir Okasha, I strongly agree that conceptual reflection is a 
prerequisite to resolving many biological questions, including of course the 
15 
 
question about the levels of selection and the question about the possible 
role of holobionts as biological individuals and as units of selection. The 
empirical evidence for or against HCE will always be based on one or other 
conception of the units of selection, on how to individuate biological entities, 
on how to conceive natural selection, etc. So, it is important to reflectively 
speculate on what are the metaphysical/ontological assumptions that ground 
the support for HCE: why are HCE defenders so confident that their 
hypothesis is true? How do they conceive units/level of selection? How do 
they understand ‘biological individuality’? Why are the critics so unimpressed 
and think, as I was once told, that HCE is merely ‘bad biological practice’? 
Only once the different conceptions are clarified, could the debate about HCE 
possibly be settled and the empirical evidence evaluated. The purpose of the 
doctoral project is precisely to do so in order to provide a general account of 
how to make sense of the claim that holobionts and their hologenomes are 
units of selection. 
 
Structure of the doctoral thesis 
 
The doctoral thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter I introduces HCE and 
traces its historical development since the hypothesis was originally formulated. 
Chapter II deals with the main criticisms that have been raised against HCE, 
and explains them extensively, without presupposing any background 
knowledge in the reader apart from the information about the hypothesis 
provided in the previous chapter. These two chapters play a double role in the 
doctoral project: on the one hand, they serve as introductory chapters, in the 
sense of making the reader familiar with the scientific hypothesis, as well as the 
difficulties it must address, that will be philosophically assessed; on the other 
hand, they play the role of being motivational chapters for the terms in which the 
HCE will be discussed from a philosophical point of view. Concretely, the two 
introductory chapters motivate the aspect of HCE that I will engage with in the 
rest of the doctoral project, which is basically the claim that holobionts and their 
hologenomes are biological individuals and units of selection in evolution. It is 
important to clarify this point because, as I said, HCE can be used 
instrumentally to assess many philosophical questions. However, in my doctoral 
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project, I will exclusively and extensively analyse one concrete philosophical 
and biological worry that HCE creates, namely, the question about the status of 
biological individuals. 
 
 Based on the principle just described, Chapter III examines the general 
debate about biological individuality, and how it has been addressed in 
philosophy, with a special application of some of the ideas to the notions of 
‘holobiont’ and ‘hologenome’ as defined in HCE. The reader might believe that 
this way of presenting the debate is confusing, and that it would have been 
more sensible to introduce first the debate about biological individuals, as this 
has been extensively discussed in the philosophical (and biological) literature, 
and later discuss HCE in the framework of biological individuality. I disagree. To 
start with, I think HCE can be used as evidence for many different purposes, 
including answering questions in epistemology, philosophy of science, ontology, 
etc. Thus, it is important to present, in the first place, the hypothesis and its 
historical development as concisely as possible, so that the reader, while 
motivationally guided towards the question I aim to answer in my doctoral 
project, can perceive all the philosophical problems that the careful study of a 
scientific hypothesis triggers. Second, because I suspect that starting the thesis 
with the discussion of biological individuality to later move to a discussion of 
HCE would be somehow putting the cart before the horse, and the reader would 
be losing the overall motivation of the doctoral project. Biological individuality is, 
in itself, a very interesting philosophical topic. But the reason why it is 
philosophically interesting needs to be argued for, i.e. it cannot be simply 
assumed. Starting with the presentation of HCE, and only then moving to the 
discussion of biological individuality fulfils, in my opinion, the motivational gap. 
 
 Chapter IV builds on the previous chapter to argue that most criticisms 
to HCE presuposse a nested-hierarchical view of the biological world, according 
to which a holobiont would qualify as a biological individual if and only if all the 
species that compose the holobiont (including the species that compose the 
microbiome) stand in mutual relations of dependency with each other with 
respect to the biological process of interest (e.g. physiological dependence, 
developmental dependence, evolutionary dependence, etc.). These assumes 
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that the hologenome equates the sum of genomes that interact. On these 
grounds, many philosophers and biologists have rejected the claim that 
holobionts are biological individuals in any significant sense, because the 
relations of dependency are usually non-reciprocal between the species that 
interact. While the host depends on its symbionts physiologically, 
developmentally and, defenders of HCE argue, evolutionarily, the opposite is 
not usually the case, or at least it is not the case for every single species 
member of the microbiome. Therefore, they conclude, holobionts are not 
biological individuals because they are ‘blurry entities’ (Chapter II). Against this 
approach, I argue that the requirement concerning the reciprocity of the 
relations of dependency between the host and the species that compose its 
microbiome is unjustified, as it is grounded on a questionable metaphysical 
assumption about the structure of the biological hierarchy. I argue that if the 
requirement for a nested-hierarchy is replaced by a requirement for a non-
nested-hierarchy, the hypothesis that the holobiont is a biological individuality 
becomes reasonable. Under the latter framework, the holobiont would not be 
the entity composed by the host plus the species that compose its microbiome, 
but rather by the host and the traits that compose its microbiome. For that 
reason, the traits that compose the microbiome would be coevolving both with 
the host genome, in virtue of the relations of dependency for certain biological 
processes (physiology, development, etc.), and with the species of microbes 
where the traits are realized, in virtue of being physically bounded to the 
genome of the bacterial species, which suggests the necessity of introducing a 
multilevel selection (MLS) analysis to study their evolution. 
 
 Finally, Chapter V introduces an original account of the main claim of 
HCE, namely, the notion that holobionts are units of selection. The chapter 
starts with an argument against the criticism, presented in Chapter II, that 
holobionts are not units of selection because they lack proper transgenerational 
transmission of the species that compose microbiome. I argue that the 
requirement that these authors rely on is not satisfied by canonical units of 
selection either, and thus, by analogy, it should not be considered a serious 
threat to HCE, for the condition that holobiont detractors assume is simply not 
necessary for an entity to be a unit of selection. Later, I present a multilevel 
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selection (MLS) analysis to support the thesis that holobionts are units of 
selection. MLS analysis conventionally includes two dimensions, multilevel 
selection 1 (MLS1), and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2). MLS1 occurs when the 
particles that compose a conglomerate engage in fitness-affecting relations, so 
that the final distribution of traits in the global population of particles is 
conditional on the relationships between the entities that form the conglomerate. 
MLS1 does not require that the conglomerate stands in parent-offspring 
relationship. MLS2, on the contrary, occurs when there is parent-offspring 
regression, i.e. when the conglomerate forms parent-offspring lineages. In my 
chapter, I first introduce a MLS1 analysis, and defend that what matters to 
argue that holobionts are units of selection from this perspective is to find 
transgenerational ‘stability of traits’, as opposed to transgenerational stability of 
species. I depart from the observation that the existence of collective parent-
offspring lineages is not strictly necessary from MLS1, and argue that the only 
criterion that is required is that the trait-distribution in the global population of 
particles is conditional on the fitness-affecting interactions between the host and 
its microbiome. I connect this observation to our current empirical evidence and 
show how it suggests that holobionts are units of selection from a MLS1 
perspective, at least in some cases. Secondly, I present a suggestion of how 
holobionts could be conceived as units of selection from a MLS2 perspective. 
MLS2, in contrast with MLS1, requires the existence of parent-offspring 
lineages of holobionts. I suggest that part of the current biological evidence 
could also be reinterpreted in MLS2 language, as a form of ‘extended 
inheritance’. As in the case of MLS1, I argue that the evidence that supports 
that holobionts are units of selection from a MLS2 perspective also depends on 
conceiving the holobiont as a biological object composed by the host plus its 
functional microbiome. My account constitutes a suggestion of how the MLS2 
model can be applied to holobionts, rather than an accumulation of empirical 
evidence that supports its existence. 
 
 As the reader will note, many sections in the project will be named ‘A 
brief reflection’, ‘Reflection on…’, ‘A discussion of…’, etc. These sections and/or 
subsections are aimed at guiding the reader towards the arguments and thesis 
that I will be defending further on. Especially, they will serve to orientate the 
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reader towards the thesis that I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of 
my doctoral project, although they will not present the complete argument: only 
the reasons why I find certain positions difficult to accept, or hard to argue for. 
Additionally, every chapter will contain a section entitled ‘Brief summary of 
chapter x’, where I will summarize the main points that have been discussed in 
the chapter. As some of the discussions, especially the most technical ones, will 
be hard, I think adding a summary at the end of each chapter will help to reader 
to keep afresh in his memory the main points that I have discussed. 
 
A note on the chapters 
 
Many of the chapters from this thesis are the result of the collaboration with 
different people, and some of them have been either drafted or already 
published as papers in specialized scientific journals. These include: 
 
• J. S. Díaz (2015): ‘El mecanismo evolutivo de Margulis y los niveles 
de selección’. Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía XX (1): 7-
24. 
• J. Suárez (2016) ‘Bacterial species pluralism in the light of medicine 
and endosymbiosis’. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, 
History, and Foundations of Science 31(1): 91-105. 
• J. Suárez (2018a): ‘The importance of symbiosis in philosophy of 
biology: An analysis of the current debate in biological individuality and 
its historical roots’. Symbiosis 76(2): 77-96. 
• J. Suárez, and V. Triviño (2019): ‘A metaphysical account of holobiont 
individuality. Holobionts as emergent individuals’. Quaderns de 
Filosofia VI(1): 59-76. 
• J. Suárez (under review): ‘Stability of traits as the kind of stability that 
matters. Holobionts as units of selection from a multilevel selection 
perspective’.  
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• J. Suárez (under review): ‘On the individuality of holobionts and other 
multispecies assemblages: A critical response to Bourrat and Griffiths’ 
• Á. Moreno, and J. Suárez (under review): ‘Plurality of explanatory 
strategies in biology: Mechanisms and networks’ 
• V. Triviño, and J. Suárez (under review): ‘The eco-immunity account of 
the holobiont. A review’ 
• J. Suárez, and A. Stencel (under review): ‘A part-dependent account 
of holobiont individuality’ 
 
Furthermore, the way of articulating these chapters is closely related to my way 
of thinking about two topics. On the one hand, my way of thinking of the 
onological structure of the biological world. This problem has sourrounded my 
mind since the very beginning of my Bachelor’s degree, and is probably the 
reason why I decided to study philosophy. On the other hand, my way of 
approaching the topic of scientific explanation, on which I have been working for 
the last few years with a close collaborator from Logos, University of Barcelona. 
In fact, I strongly suspect that my (probably) biased intuitions in favour of the 
hologenome concept of evolution are a consequence of my inclination to 
believe that defenders of this theory appeal to processes to explain something 
that cannot be explained with the same degree of precision by appealing to 
substances. My way of thinking about the ontological structure of the biological 
world is clearly a consequence of my deep interest in the work of John Dupré, 
whom I started reading when I was still a Bachelor student, and whose 
pluralism and processual ontology have clerly determined my way of 
approaching the problems in my dissertation. My way of thinking about scientific 
explanation, however, has been heavily shaped by the undeniable influence of 
José Díez, who has systematically insisted (in a very monistic manner) 
throughout his career that a good scientific explanation requires three 
ingredients: the existence of a regularity, the derivation of that regularity from a 
theoretical corpus, and the fact that the theoretical corpus from which the 
regularity derives is, so to speak, conceptually ‘richer’ than the phenomena that 
the existence of the regularity explains. Following José’s intuition, my colleague 
Roger Deulofeu and I have analysed three different case studies—derived from 
my research on symbiosis and the holobiont—that became specialized papers 
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and which together constituted the body of his dissertation, defended at 
University of Barcelona and supervised by José Díez. These papers are: 
 
• R. Deulofeu, and J. Suárez (2018): ‘When mechanisms are not 
enough. The origin of eukaryotes and scientific explanation’. In: A. 
Christian, D. Hommen, N. Retzlaff, and G. Schurz (eds) Philosophy of 
Science. Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the 
Humanities. European Studies in Philosophy of Science, vol 9. 
Springer, Cham. 
• R. Deulofeu, J. Suárez, and A. Pérez-Cervera (2019) ‘Explaining the 
behaviour of random ecological networks. The stability of the 
microbiome as a case of integrative pluralism’. Synthese. 
• J. Suárez, and R. Deulofeu (accepted) ‘Equilibrium explanation as 
structural non-mechanistic explanations. The case of long-term 
bacterial persistence in human hosts’. Teorema. 
 
The chapters presented here are, however, original, and everything has 
been rewritten to make the whole project consistent. Nonetheless, it is important 
to note that most of the final content that I present here has resulted from my 
symbiosis with other authors, and that some of the original theses that I will 
present as a result of my research are actually the result of two, three, or even 
more minds thinking together.  
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Chapter I 
 
 ‘A historical perspective on the hologenome 
concept of evolution’ 
 
The hologenome concept of evolution was first explicitly formulated in 
2008 by Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg and Eugene Rosenberg. In this chapter, I 
review the history of the idea, starting from the original paper and tracing 
its origin both backwards and forwards, to show: first, the historical origin 
of the concept, as well as its relation to Lynn Margulis’ ideas about the 
creative power of symbiosis and its influence on evolution; second, how 
the idea has been modified since it was first formulated in 2008.1 
 
1. The origins of the hologenome concept. A generalization from coral 
biology 
 
The hologenome concept of evolution (HCE, hereafter) is a biological 
hypothesis about the evolution of plants and animals. Briefly sketched in 
Rosenberg et al. (2007a), the hypothesis was firstly developed in Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg (2008) (section 3).2 HCE is an hypothesis about 
                                                          
1 This chapter and the next will be an extension of a work I presented in J. Suárez (2018a): ‘The 
importance of symbiosis in philosophy of biology: An analysis of the current debate in biological 
individuality and its historical roots’. Symbiosis 76(2): 77-96. The chapters, however, presents a 
more extended review of both the hologenome concept of evolution and its criticisms. I will 
specify in footnotes which sections of the chapter are more similar to the paper, specifying if 
necessary the pages where I took the reference from. The two chapters also build upon J. 
Jeffrey Morris (2018): ‘What is the hologenome concept of evolution’ F1000Research 7: 1664, 
doi: 10.12688/f1000research.14385.1. 
2 Whether to call it ‘hologenome theory of evolution’ or ‘hologenome concept of evolution’ is 
mostly an idiosyncratic decision, not necessarily connected to the scientific status of the 
hypothesis. In the first papers where the Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg presented the idea, 
they referred to it as ‘theory’, whereas in later works they usually refer to it as ‘concept’. 
Because of this, for the rest of my dissertation, I will refer to it as ‘hologenome concept of 
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biological individuality, according to which the multispecies assemblage that 
results from the symbiotic union between an animal and/or a plant plus its 
symbiotic microbiota constitutes a biological individual that the authors call 
‘holobiont’ (from the Greek, holos, all; biont, life).3 Concretely, HCE posits that 
the holobiont is a unit of selection in evolution, with its hologenome (sum of the 
genetic material from the animal/plant plus the genetic material of the members 
of the microbiome) hypothetically getting transmitted from one generation to 
another. 4  
 
 The hypothesis is a generalization of the observations previously made 
by the authors about corals. The proponents of HCE are well-known in the field 
for their work in coral biology, specifically in the Oculina patagonica/Vibrio shiloi 
model system, used to study the well-known phenomenon of coral 
decolouration (coral bleaching). In the late 90s, using the Koch postulates, V. 
shiloi had been deemed responsible for the disease affecting O. patagonica 
(Kushmaro et al. 1997). However, some analyses made a few years later 
showed that V. shiloi had mysteriously disappeared from most of the corals. 
This evidence suggested that corals had been able to somehow overcome the 
infection. Most researchers considered this fact to be puzzling for two reasons: 
first of all, corals do not have an adaptive immune system, which means that 
they cannot develop antibodies to overcome any infection, except in 
evolutionary timescales; second, most corals live for decades, which suggests 
that coral populations had not have enough time for selection to act on the coral 
population so that they could develop the genetic changes that would be 
                                                                                                                                                                          
evolution’, or shortly ‘the hypothesis’ or ‘HCE’. Nonetheless, the reader might find some specific 
quotes that refer to the hypothesis as ‘hologenome theory of evolution’, which should always be 
interpreted as HCE. 
3 Before proceeding, it is important to make a conceptual clarification about the meaning of the 
terms that I will be using. First of all, by ‘microbiota’ I will refer to the ‘assemblage of 
microorganisms present in a defined environment’. In the case of the holobiont, the environment 
will be provided by the animal or plant, which acts as the host in the symbiotic relationship. 
Secondly, ‘microbiome’ will be used to denote ‘the entire habitat, including the microorganisms 
(bacteria, Archaea, lower and higher eukaryotes, and viruses), their genomes (i.e.; genes), and 
the surrounding environmental conditions’ in a given environment (Marchesi & Ravel 2015: 1).  
4 It seems that Richard Jefferson had previously suggested the hypothesis in a public lecture 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgL3rmZL9P0), as recognized in Bordenstein and Theis 
(2015: 5, Box 2). Also, in Suárez (2018a: 87, ft. 20), I suggested that Jan Sapp’s concept of 
‘symbiome’ could be understood as an equivalent to the notion of hologenome (Sapp 2003, 
2004). Nonetheless, as all of this is still unclear, and more research is needed to prove the 
conceptual connections between the ideas, as well as the possible channels of influence, I will 
stick to the work that starts with Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg and Eugene Rosenberg.  
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required to overcome the infection. To explain the recovery from V. shiloi 
infection in corals, Reshef et al. (2006) formulated ‘The coral probiotic 
hypothesis’. The hypothesis departs from the observation that corals contain a 
very diverse bacterial population symbiotically interacting with it in its tissues 
and mucus layers, and from this it derives the possibility that rapid shifts in this 
bacterial population might give rise to the acquisition of pathogen resistance. In 
other words, the reason why corals could get rid of the infection is not explained 
by appeal to coral genetics, or to coral immune system. It is a consequence of 
the rapid changes that coral microbiota can experience (and thus the name 
‘probiotic hypothesis’), so that new species infect the corals and displace 
previous ones, thus generating a rapid, “Lamarckian” adaptation (Rosenberg et 
al. 2009).5 And from this observation, the authors conclude: ‘it is now clear that 
corals must be considered as symbiotic organisms consisting of the coral 
animal, the endosymbiotic zooxanthellae and a metabolically active, diverse 
pool of prokaryotes’ (Reshef et al. 2006: 2072).  
 
 The observations concering V. shiloi led the authors to reflect more 
carefully on the general role of the microbiota in coral’s ontogeny and evolution, 
that is, on the very nature of coral’s biological individuality (Rosenberg et al. 
2007a). If corals behave as the coral probiotic hypothesis suggests they do, 
how can we conceive their individuality? The authors noticed that the coral 
probiotic hypothesis was premised on a controversial assumption, namely: 
corals are holobionts, and their phenotypes result from the complex dynamic 
interactions between the coral host and its symbiotic microbiota. Because of 
this, changes in the coral phenotype, and thus, coral adaptations, can arise 
either from changes in the coral itself (its genomic content, the genes it 
expresses, etc.), or from changes in its microbiota. If this is correct, then the 
coral’s microbiota is partially responsible for coral’s evolutionary success and 
thus, the authors conclude, the environment does not select between competing 
corals, as it had been commonly assumed, but between competing coral-
holobionts. And hence the authors propose the first explicit formulation of HCE: 
                                                          
5 The use of ‘Lamarckian’ is here opportunistic, to keep the flow that will lead to the following 
paragraphs. It only aims to show that the change in the adaptive trait has been produced during 
the ontogeny of the organism, but see Osmanovic et al. 2018, especially ‘Referee report 3: 
Philippe Huneman’, and the authors response. 
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‘[T]he holobiont with its hologenome should be considered as the unit of 
natural selection in evolution, and microbial symbionts have an important 
role in adaptation and evolution of higher organisms. Therefore, 
microorganisms are essential not only in the health and disease of 
individual higher organisms, but they also are a significant factor in 
species survival and evolution.’ (Rosenberg et al. 2007a: 360, Box 2, 
emphasis added). 
 
This original formulation was explicitly addressed to coral biologists and was 
soon criticized for ‘disregarding the coral holobiont’. In William Leggat, Tracy 
Ainsworth, John Bythell, Sophie Dove, Ruth Gates, Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, 
Roberto Iglesias-Prieto, and David Yellowlees (2007): ‘The hologenome theory 
disregards the coral holobiont’, the authors make the following points: first, that 
the Rosenberg et al. have misidentified the real causative agent of coral 
bleaching, since coral bleaching is not caused by any pathogen (not even V. 
shiloi), but is the consequence of broad stress response in corals; second, that 
Rosenberg et al. have oversimplified the complex relationship that exists 
between the coral and its dinoflagellates endosymbionts, which according to 
Leggat et al. provide a substantial set of responses and adaptive mechanisms 
that should be taken into account before making any general claim about the 
holobiont being the unit of selection; finally, Leggat et al. argue that that 
Rosenberg et al.’s emphasis on the importance of the microorganisms for coral 
biology is importantly at odds with the ‘widely embraced coral holobiont model’ 
(2007, emphasis added). 
 
 The three points raised by Leggat et al. were immediately addressed in 
Rosenberg et al. (2007b), where the authors argued none of the points raised in 
Leggat et al.’s paper contradicted their hypothesis. Particularly, neither the first, 
nor the second point would raise any problem for HCE: even if V. shiloi were not 
the causative agent of coral bleaching, and the relationship between corals and 
their endosymbionts are more complex than what Rosenberg et al. assumed in 
their first paper, this would not rule out the observation that corals did not bear 
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the V. shiloi anymore, and how this happened requires an explanation. The third 
point is however more problematic, and it points to an important distinction that 
defenders of HCE have been accused of ignoring while formulating their 
controversial evolutionary claims (chapter II). By the ‘coral holobiont model’, 
Leggat et al. refer to the model for coral disease developed in Rohwer et al. 
(2002), and Knowlton and Rohwer (2003), where the authors introduce the term 
‘holobiont’ to refer to the ecological community composed by the coral, its 
endosymbiont Zooxanthella, and its microbiota, including not only bacteria but 
also fungi, algae, or whatever element that might be discovered (Figure 1). In 
sharp contrast with the hologenome model, the holobiont model assumes that 
the coral holobiont is an ecological community, whose components (host, 
Zooxanthella and species of the microbiota), even when they might contribute in 
different ways to coral fitness (e.g. helping with nitrogen fixation, as antibiotics 
against some pathogens, etc.), can easily move from one holobiont to another, 
and thus their evolutionary histories are not necessarily connected to the 
evolutionary history of the host, nor to the evolutionary history of the other 
components of the holobiont (Hester et al. 2015).  
 
 
Figure 1. Rohwer et al.’s schematic representation of the holobiont. In the picture, ‘ZOOX’ 
stands for the Zooxanthella, coral’s endosymbiont whose lost is assumed to cause coral 
bleaching. The question mark indicates that the exact relationship between the microbiota and 
the coral, as well as its function, are still unknown, although some possible roles are 
hypothesized. One of the points that Rohwer et al. emphasized clearly in their model is that the 
holobiont does not only include bacteria, but also fungi, algae or whatever unknown component 
that happens to reside in any of the tissues of mucus layers of corals. (From Rohwer et al. 2002: 
8, Fig. 5). 
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The distinction between the ‘holobiont model’ and the ‘hologenome model’ 
raised in the dispute between Rosenberg et al. and Leggat et al. connects 
directly with the distinction between holobionts and hologenomes, as well as 
with the historical origins of the concept of ‘holobiont’.6 In the next section, I will 
trace back the historical origins of the holobiont concept and explain where it 
might have come from when it was first used by Rosenberg and Zilber-
Rosenberg.7 
 
2. The holobiont in its historical context. The importance of Lynn 
Margulis8 
 
Lynn Margulis (born Alexander) was one of the most important researchers in 
the study of symbiosis, to which she dedicated about 50 years of her life. She is 
especially known for having reinvigorated the hypothesis of the symbiotic origin 
of eukaryotic cells, as well as for her enthusiasm about the importance of 
symbiosis for the maintenance of life on Earth and for its important evolutionary 
consequences (Margulis 1990, 1991, 1998, 2010; Sagan & Margulis 2002; Díaz 
2015; O’Malley 2017; Suárez 2018a). Margulis is acknowledged as the first 
person to have introduced the term ‘holobiont’, which originally appeared in her 
(1990). In this work, she compares cyclical hereditary symbiosis with meiotic 
sex (Figure 2). Margulis argues that in both cases there are two entities which 
                                                          
6 ‘Term’ and ‘concept’ need to be carefully distinguished at this point, since they are not 
coextensional. ‘Term’ refers to the word or expression that is used to designate one (or more) 
concept(s), whereas ‘concept’ is used to refer to a concrete idea (understood as its 
extension/denotation and intension/connotation) expressed by one (or more) term(s). One 
example can easily illustrate the distinction: the term ‘bank’ can be used to express the 
concepts of ‘financial institution’ or the ‘slope’ in a mountain. Here we have a case of one term 
used to refer to two concepts. On the other hand, the concept of a ‘large container of hot liquids 
with a handle’ can generally be designated by the terms ‘mug’ and/or ‘cup’. This would be a 
case of one concept that can be expressed by two terms (Valdés-Villanueva 2005; García-
Suárez 2011; Margolis and Laurence 2014). The distinction is important because, as I will show, 
the term ‘holobiont’ has been used differently by different authors, thus expressing different 
concepts. This has generated some confusion which I would like to avoid as much as possible 
here. 
7 From now onwards, Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg and Eugene Rosenberg will always be credited for 
the first original formulation and the development of HCE since, as the authors have explicitly 
recognized (Lamm 2018; Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg, personal communication), the 
hypothesis has been a product of their joint work. 
8 This section is entirely based on my paper J. Suárez (2018a): ‘The importance of symbiosis in 
philosophy of biology: An analysis of the current debate in biological individuality and its 
historical roots’. Symbiosis 76(2): Part II, sect. 2.1, pp. 86-87. 
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recognize each other to merge together and restart the cycle in every 
generation. Moreover, she hypothesizes the existence of mechanisms of mutual 
recognition and association which guarantee the integration of the two entities 
in both cases (cyclical symbiosis and meiotic sex) and, also, their subsequent 
dissociation, resulting in the formation of new individuals in every generation. If 
the entity is formed by the fusion of two haploid gametes, it will constitute a 
‘zygote’, whereas if the entity results from the merger of two symbionts it will be 
a ‘holobiont’. According to Margulis, both the zygote and the holobiont are new 
individuals and she speculates that, given the adequate recurring environmental 
pressures, both associations will be expected to be maintained by the selective 
pressure acting on the bionts/haploids (1990: 676, Fig. 3). Margulis does not, 
however, specify which ‘bionts’ should be regarded as part of the holobiont, nor 
does she explicitly define the term in the paper. Nonetheless, since her analogy 
is between cyclical symbiosis and meiotic sex, it has reasonably been assumed 
that she was thinking of cases of hereditary symbiosis (e.g. the eukaryotic cell) 
(O’Malley 2017). 
 
 
Figure 2. In this figure, Lynn Margulis compares the process of sexual reproduction with the 
case of cyclical symbiosis. She argues that, like during the process of karyogamy two haploid 
gametes fuse to form a diploid zygote, the process of symbiotic association can be conceived of 
as a process in which two previously independent bionts recognize each other and their bodies 
merge to establish and maintain a new individual. At a later point in time, she argues, the bionts 
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will dissociate in a structurally similar way than the way in which the process of meiosis gives 
rise to new gametes, so that the cycle can repeat itself in the next generation. (From Margulis 
1990: 676, Fig. 3) 
 
One year later, in her (1991), Margulis defines the holobiont as a ‘symbiont 
composed of recognizable bionts’, and she defines symbiosis as the physical 
contact between organisms of different species occurring ‘throughout a 
significant proportion of the life history’ (1991: 2, Table 1). Once more, Margulis 
does not explicitly spell out which bionts should be taken as constituents of the 
holobiont. However, she presents a definition of ‘life history’ as the set of 
‘events throughout the development of an individual organism correlating 
environment with changes in external morphology, formation of propagules, and 
other observable aspects’ (1991: 2, Table 1). If one follows this definition 
strictly, it might be argued that the holobiont would necessarily encompass all 
the bionts that share their lifetime together, irrespective of whether they are 
inherited or not. However, one important difficulty must be noted here: when the 
definition applies to a host such as the eukaryotic cell, and a symbiont such as 
the mitochondrion or the chloroplast, it might be reasonable to assume that both 
partners share their life histories, since they are expected to have similar 
lifespans. But the situation is completely different if the host is an animal and 
the symbiont is a bacterium (e.g. aphid-Buchnera aphidicola association), since 
their lifespans are completely discordant, at least at the ‘biont’ or individual 
level. This does not mean that different tokens of the same type of bacterial 
species cannot interact with a host throughout the host’s entire lifespan. But one 
must be cautious, since it seems that the entities that are being compared, if 
Margulis’ conception of the holobiont is expected to include animal-microbe 
associations, are not at the same temporal and, thus, biological (in the sense in 
which tempo might affect biological properties) scale (Cáceres-Vázquez and 
Saborido 2018; Osmanovic et al. 2018).9 
 
In any case, leaving the problem about discordant lifespans aside, and 
trying to be as charitable as possible with Margulis’ use of the term ‘holobiont’, it 
                                                          
9 I will come back to this problem in chapter IV, as I use precisely this asymmetry to criticize the 
hierarchical-nested view of the biological world. 
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seems that the conception of the holobiont that she is putting forward with her 
requirement of interaction during the whole life history of the bionts might be at 
least in part incoherent with the concept she had put forward in her previous 
(1990), where she seemed to be suggesting that the holobiont should 
exclusively include the cases of hereditary symbiosis. This is so because it 
might occur that symbionts that share their life history for one generation are not 
inherited in the next generation, if the symbionts have independent reproductive 
regimes. And, what is more important, even in case where the two bionts 
interact again one generation after another, it might happen that they do so 
because of a shared environment, instead of the existence of an inheritance 
mechanism, inheritance being understood here as ‘vertical transmission’ (e.g. 
squid-Vibrio fischerii symbiosis, where the bacteria are acquired from the 
environment every new generation).10 
 
Nonetheless, despite the difficulties of interpreting Margulis’ precise 
position about the definition of ‘holobiont’, it seems reasonable to consider that 
her initial aim was to conceive the holobiont as the entity composed by 
hereditary bionts. This conception becomes even clearer if one analyses the 
overall purpose of her ‘Symbiogenesis and symbioticism’, namely, to vindicate 
the notion of symbiogenesis as a way in which new species, kingdoms and taxa 
could evolve. For instance, she explicitly says that ‘the highest-level taxa (…) 
have evolved by acquisitions of symbionts that have become hereditary’ (1991: 
11, emphasis added). I will call this conception the ‘hereditary holobiont’. The 
‘hereditary holobiont’ is also coherent with some further claims she made in her 
later writings (Margulis and Fester 1991; Margulis 1998, 2010; Margulis & 
Sagan 2001, Margulis and Sagan 2002; and also see O’Malley 2017). For 
instance, in one of her latest papers, where she justifies the historical role of 
Kozo-Polyansky in introducing the idea of symbiogenesis to biology, she argues 
for the necessity of genetically distinct bionts reproducing together for 
                                                          
10 There is still another logical possibility, which seems to be however biologically impossible. It 
might well happen that hereditary symbionts do not share their life history with each other. For 
example, imagine a pair association in which one of the members—the host—is able to ‘kill’ its 
symbiont while retaining some signal that would permit its reconstitution in the precise moment 
of reproduction. If that case were biologically possible, it would then be a case of inherited 
symbionts without shared life histories. 
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symbiogenesis to occur. Analysing the association between eels and a specific 
species of shrimp (cleaning symbiosis), she argues:  
 
‘It is symbiosis, but not symbiogenesis. Both partners grow and reproduce 
separately. Both shrimp and eel can live separately. One sees no obvious 
novelty generated by this symbiosis; i.e., symbiotic physical association. 
The relationship between the shrimp and the eel is still a behavioral one’ 
(2010: 1528, emphasis added) 
 
In this vein, one might argue that, as the term ‘holobiont’ was introduced in 
comparison to meiotic reproduction, and Margulis discusses it while reflecting 
the importance of symbiogenesis as an evolutionary mechanism (and evolution 
requires inheritance to lead to adaptation), the holobiont is thus the biological 
individual that includes all those symbionts that are inherited together 
(organelles in eukaryotes, obligatory endosymbionts in insects, etc.), i.e. 
Margulis conceives the holobiont as the ‘hereditary holobiont’ (O’Malley 2017: 
36, for a defence of this interpretation). 
 
The interpretation of Margulis’ understanding of holobionts as ‘hereditary 
holobionts’ is not without contestation, though. In the same volume where 
Margulis published her paper, John Maynard Smith proposes ‘a Darwinian view 
of symbiosis’, which he considers opposed to Margulis’ conception (Maynard-
Smith 1991). In his paper, Maynard Smith relates the debate about symbiosis 
with the well-studied problem of the units of selection11, and embeds his 
discussion of symbiosis in the framework of the theory of evolutionary 
transitions in individuality, which he was starting to develop by that time. 
According to Maynard-Smith, symbiosis can be understood as an evolutionary 
                                                          
11 Maynard-Smith does not use ‘units of selection’, but ‘units of evolution’, where a unit of 
selection is whatever entity exhibits phenotypic variation that led to multiplication of the entity 
within the population (thus being selected for or against), and a unit of evolution is a unit of 
selection that, furthermore, exhibits heredity (Maynard-Smith 1987). In contrast with Maynard-
Smith, I will use ‘unit of selection’ as it is conventionally used, i.e. requiring heredity, variance 
and fitness/multiplication, and thus meaning what Maynard-Smith means by ‘unit of evolution’ 
(see Okahsa 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Lloyd 2017a, 2017c: 293–297; Gontier 2010, for an 
analysis of the concept of ‘unit of selection’). The idea of ‘unit of selection’ will be discussed in 
chapter III, in the context of the discussion of different ideas of biological individuality. 
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mechanism and interpreted in a Darwinian fashion—i.e. with the entities that 
interact symbiotically forming a higher-level unit of selection—only if the 
symbionts are transmitted directly during the reproduction of the host, and 
cannot be transmitted differently. In other words, the reproductive regimes of 
the symbionts must be mutually dependent (Hurst 2017, reviewed in chapter II, 
makes exactly the same point).  
 
Maynard Smith supports his position by adducing that ‘[w]ith direct 
transmission the genes of the symbionts will leave descendants only to the 
extent that the host survives and reproduces’ (1991: 35). The condition of 
‘common reproduction’ is taken for Maynard-Smith as a precondition for the two 
symbionts to have their fitness interests aligned, which, according to standard 
evolutionary theory, is the only way in which two entities could be considered to 
evolve as a single unit. Therefore, if the reproductive regimes of the symbionts 
are concordant, then it will be expected that they will tend to maintain a 
mutualistic relation that, eventually, might make it ‘reasonable to consider the 
association as a single unit’ (1991: 38). However, Maynard Smith’s argument 
follows, in cases of indirect transmission, this possibility is much less likely, and 
thus he suggests that the interacting entities should be considered as 
independent units (of selection). 
 
Maynard Smith’s paper is relevant in this context because he seems to 
be discussing Margulis’ liberal views about the strength of symbiosis at 
generating evolutionary novelty that could be ‘filtered’ by natural selection. For 
him, the cases where symbiosis can be considered to have a substantial 
evolutionary impact, in the sense of affecting the ‘input’ of natural selection—i.e. 
the unit of selection, or the entity on which natural selection directly acts upon—
are very limited, and probably precluded exclusively to very specific cases such 
as cellular organelles, as he suggests at the end of his paper. If Maynard 
Smith’s interpretation of Margulis’ views about the creative power of symbiosis 
were correct, then Margulis’ notion of the holobiont might be interpreted not as 
constrained exclusively to cases of hereditary symbiosis (i.e. the ‘hereditary 
holobiont’), such as the eukaryotic cell, but also as including symbiosis 
associations composed of many different bionts (which I will call the ‘ecological 
33 
 
holobiont’). In fact, this latest view is endorsed in Guerrero et al. (2013), 
published two years after Margulis’ death. In that paper, holobionts, considered 
as autopoietic (self-sustaining) units, are defined as ‘integrated biont organisms, 
i.e., animals or plants, with all of their associated microbiota’ (2013: 133, 
emphasis added). In that same paper, they also coined the term ‘holobiome’, 
referring to ‘the assembly of genetic information contributed by the animal or 
plant and its associated microbiota’ (2013: 134), and demanding a new look at 
evolution that would take into account the importance of the host genome plus 
the genome of its microbiota. They argued the holobiome to be a new biological 
entity, whose basic interacting elements would give rise to new species and, in 
general, new biological variety by means of the resources of both the animal or 
the plant, and its microbiota. At some point in the paper, the authors even 
endorse the theses that: (1) holobionts are subjected to natural selection; and 
(2) holobiomes are entities that have been selected due to their selective 
advantages. Even if the authors do not mention the concept ‘units of selection’, 
their paper might be interpreted as implicitly endorsing HCE, thus considering 
the holobiont, with its hologenome (which they refer to as ‘holobiome’), a 
possible unit of selection in evolution. 
 
Whether Margulis’ concept of the holobiont must be interpreted as 
hereditary, i.e. the ‘hereditary holobiont’, or ecologically, i.e. the ‘ecological 
holobiont’ is not exactly relevant for the ideas I aim to present in this chapter.12 
Also, whether she considered the holobiont as a unit of selection, or she did not, 
is not relevant either. What matters to my purposes here is to show that 
Margulis was the first to propose the concept of ‘holobiont’ to refer to a certain 
kind of symbiotic assemblages with some evolutionary importance, and how the 
meaning she wanted to assign to the concept is ambiguous (Margulis 1998; 
Margulis and Sagan 2002). Importantly, this ambiguity is still today at the core 
of the hologenome debate. 
 
                                                          
12 Opposing interpretations of Margulis’ use of the concept of ‘holobiont’ might be found in 
O’Malley (2017) and Suárez (2018a). 
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2.1. Margulis’ hereditary holobiont and Rohwer et al.’s holobiont model 
Margulis’ use of the the term holobiont might be interpreted as hereditary, at 
least in her first writings in the early 90s (the ‘hereditary holobiont’) or 
ecologically (the ‘ecological holobiont’), as in her latest work with Guerrero and 
Berlanga. Setting this aside, and assuming that Margulis was using the concept 
of ‘hereditary holobiont’, what is clear is its sharp contrast with the concept of 
holobiont that appears in Rohwer et al.’s coral’s holobiont model (Rohwer et al. 
2002; Knowlton and Rohwer 2003). As argued in section 1, Rohwer et al.’s 
holobiont is the ‘ecological holobiont’, insofar as it refers to the whole microbial 
community that a given coral interacts with during its lifespan, including its 
endosymbiont Zooxantella. This established, it becomes now important to ask 
the following two questions: Firstly, how does the ‘hereditary holobiont’ differ 
from the ‘ecological holobiont’? Secondly, why is this relevant for our purposes 
and, specifically, for the formulation and development of HCE? 
 
 The answer to the two questions just formulated will be given during the 
rest of the chapter. In the next section, I will start reviewing Zilber-Rosenberg 
and Rosenberg’s reinvigoration of the term ‘holobiont’ with their formulation of 
the HCE, and I will try to disentangle the precise nature of the holobiont concept 
that their hypothesis assumes. My main argument will be that, by linking the 
concept of the holobiont to the concept of the hologenome, Zilber-Rosenberg 
and Rosenberg will be mixing Margulis’ ‘hereditary holobiont’ with Rohwer et 
al.’s ‘ecological holobiont’.13 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 This footnote constitutes a call of caution for the reader. I have just advanced that, in my view, 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg are mixing two concepts of the holobiont that are not 
extensionally equivalent. This should not be taken as a criticism of HCE. In fact, my whole 
thesis project, as announced, is a project to defend the main claim made by HCE defenders, 
namely: that holobionts are units of selection. Presenting the hypothesis in the way I am 
presenting it constitutes, in my opinion, the best way of trying to conceptualize which are the 
elements of the theory that are valuable and which are the elements that should be redefined to 
be correctly articulated. 
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3. Formulating the hologenome concept of evolution 
 
3.1. The original formulation by Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 
As Rosenberg et al. (2007b) explicitly acknowledge, they believe that Rohwer et 
al.’s holobiont model ‘not only does not contradict the hologenome theory but 
provided some of the information on which the theory was developed.’ This 
quote is particularly illuminating here, since it clearly shows how HCE aims to 
connect two apparently incoherent ideas: the ‘hereditary holobiont’, that might 
be argued to be Margulis’ heritage, with the ‘ecological holobiont’ that is present 
in Rohwer et al.’s work. That connection between the two ideas is as well clear 
in the references that the authors mention in their very first explicit elaboration 
of the idea: 
 
‘In the hologenome theory of evolution, we suggest that the holobiont 
(Margulis, 1993; Rohwer et al., 2002) (the host and its symbiotic microbiota) 
with its hologenome, acting in consortium, should be considered a unit of 
selection in evolution, and that relatively rapid variation in the diverse 
microbial symbionts can have an important role in the adaptation and 
evolution of the holobiont.’ (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008) 
 
Notice that, as HCE is formulated in this paragraph, it postulates, as its main 
claim, that the holobiont, with its hologenome, is a unit of selection in evolution. 
One obvious is question concerns what is the evidence that would be required 
to justify that type of claim. What are the conditions that holobionts and 
hologenomes would be required to satisfy to be considered units of selection in 
evolution, as Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg claim? According to a very 
widely accepted conception of ‘unit of selection’, an entity in a population is a 
unit of selection if and only if it exhibits hereditary (or transmissible) phenotypic 
variation in fitness (Lewontin 1970; Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Lloyd 
2017c).14 Taking this as their departure point, Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 
                                                          
14 The debate about the units of selection is much more complex than what the assumption I will 
make here suggests, as I will show in chapter III. For the moment, it is enough to accept this 
vague definition as the driver of the discussions about HCE. The reader must take into account, 
though, that this vague assumption about the metaphysics of the units of selection will reappear 
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argue that their hypothesis is grounded on the following four observations15: 
first, all animals and plants interact symbiotically with a large number of 
microorganisms; second, the symbiotic microorganisms with which hosts 
interact can be intergenerationally transmitted with fidelity; third, that the 
interactions between the host and its microorganisms affect the fitness of the 
holobiont, given its environment; fourth, genetic variation in holobionts can be 
produced by incorporating new symbiotic microorganisms within their 
microbiota. Since microorganisms can respond more rapidly and using multiple 
mechanisms (including horizontal gene transfer) to changing environmental 
conditions, they offer an entire new set of possibilities for holobionts to adapt to 
dramatic environmental shifts, which are not limited exclusively to the genetic 
changes in the host’s genome. 
 
3.1.1. Evidence of microbiome transmission and microbiome-induced fitness 
effects 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg acknowledge that HCE requires not only the 
existence of interactions between the host and the symbionts (first piece of 
evidence in support of HCE), but that these interactions: (1) are reliably 
transmitted transgenerationally; (2) affect the fitness of the holobiont. If there 
are host-symbiont interactions but they do not have any (or they only have one) 
of the two shortlisted properties, then the holobiont cannot be considered a unit 
of selection, but a conglomerate of independent units of selection interacting 
ecologically with each other (and thus, HCE would be plainly false). In their 
original paper, Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg present evidence to support 
the claim that the symbionts that compose a holobiont are intergenerationally 
transmitted with sufficient fidelity to support the claim that holobionts are units of 
selection (Figure 3). It is important to note, although in passing, that Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg argue that what needs to be intergenerationally 
transmitted, if the holobiont can be considered a unit of selection, are the 
different genomes that constitute the holobiont. In their words: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in chapter II, section 3, when I analyse some of the criticisms that have been raised against 
the hypothesis.  
15 These observations, as well as the evidence that supports them, have slightly evolved with 
time, especially the third one, which has been reinterpreted differently. 
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‘The hologenome theory [concept] of evolution relies on ensuring the 
continuity of partnerships between holobiont generations. Accordingly, 
both host and symbiont genomes must be transmitted with accuracy from 
one generation to the next.’ (2008: 726, emphasis added) 
 
 
Figure 3. Table presenting the original evidence of (1) rate of transmission of a host’s 
microbiota and (2) phenotypic effects of the microbiota in the host’s phenotype, as introduced by 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg. (From Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008: 727, Table 2). 
 
This is important, since this is a very specific requirement about: first, the type 
of inheritance that is required for units of selection; second, the nature of the 
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holobiont, which is here conceived as a purely genomic conglomerate of 
interacting species.16  
 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg do not consider the transmission of the 
host genome problematic, since it relies on the well-studied rules of Mendelian 
inheritance. What is more problematic, though, is the transmission of the 
genomes of microbes that constitute the host’s microbiome. What are the 
mechanisms that ensure that the same microbes will reappear 
transgenerationally, to ensure the inheritance of the hologenome? Drawing 
upon previous work by McFall-Ngai (2002), Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 
distinguish direct from indirect modes of transmission of the microbes within the 
holobiont. The most direct case of transmission, they argue, can be found in the 
organelles (mitochondria, chloroplasts) of the eukaryotic cells, which are 
transgenerationally transmitted by cytoplasmic inheritance. A less direct, but not 
indirect mode of transmission occurs when the symbionts are transmitted with 
the reproductive cells of the host, as happens in the aphid-Buchnera symbiosis. 
Another still less direct mode of transmission occurs when the direct contact 
between the host and its offspring induces the passage of the microbes of the 
microbiota of the parents. This mode of transmission has been observed in 
humans, through the birth canal or through breast-feeding. The case of breast-
feeding is similar to the cases of parent-offspring coprophagy, like the one 
observed in termites, where adult workers feed juveniles with feces. This 
mechanism is thought to be used to guarantee the acquisition of the hindgut 
microbiota by juveniles. A less direct mode of transmission occurs when the 
microbiome needs to be acquired horizontally, from the environment. Some 
cases of horizontal transmission, despite being almost indirect, can be very 
precise after all. One example is the Vibrio fischeri that bobtail squids acquire 
every generation to develop their light organ. Even if the transmission is not 
vertical, meaning that the squids need to acquire their bacteria from the 
environment every generation, the acquisition is very precise, and it seems that 
bobtail squids have developed barriers to prevent colonization from V. fischeri 
that do not emit light, suggesting that horizontal transmission does not 
                                                          
16 It is important to point this here because the notion of the holobiont that I will present later will 
be different, and so will be the conception of the units of selection that I will develop, especially 
in chapter V, where I introduce my model of the units of selection. 
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necessarily prevent a faithful transmission of the microbiome that guarantees a 
faithful transgenerational reconstitution of the holobiont. 
 
After they review all the possible mechanisms of hologenome 
transmission, Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg end their section with the 
following highly illuminating quote:  
 
‘The large varieties in modes of transmission have an interesting 
implication: individuals can acquire and transfer symbionts throughout their 
lives, and not just during their reproductive phase. This means that the 
parents, grandparents, nannies, siblings, spouses or any organism that is 
in close contact with an offspring can transfer symbionts and thereby 
influence the holobiont of the next generation.’ (2008: 728, emphasis 
added) 
 
The highlighted part in their quote reflects an important assumption in Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg’s first definition of HCE. According to the authors, 
the transgenerational transmission of the holobiont is a consequence of the 
transgenerational transmission of the host and microbial genomes (genomic 
view), and this transmission does not necessarily occur during the host’s 
reproductive phase, but it can occur during its whole lifespan, and be a 
consequence of the interaction with any member of the population (nannies, 
spouses, etc.), not necessarily parents. This assumption will be crucial for some 
of the criticisms to HCE that I will review in chapter II. 
 
 Part of the information included in Figure 3 referred to the fitness 
influences of the symbionts in the holobiont. I will not extend this here, since I 
will talk more extensively about it again in section 4 (see McFall-Ngai et al. 
2013). For the moment, it is enough to say that the symbionts can have different 
phenotypic effects on the holobiont, including not only metabolic effects 
(respiration, digestion, etc.), but also behavioural effects (e.g. determining mate 
preference), immunological effects (e.g. protection against pathogens), 
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morphological effects (e.g. organ development), etc. Some of these phenotypic 
effects will influence the fitness of the holobiont, thus potentially generating fitter 
and less fit holobionts in competition with each other, as natural selection 
requires. Thus, according to Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, this evidence 
suggests that the fitness of the holobionts is comparable, which is a 
requirement for an entity to be a unit of selection. 
 
3.1.2. Modes of variation among holobionts  
According to Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, if evolution were exclusively 
based on the properties of the host’s genome, evolution among animals and 
plants would be very slow since (a) plants and animals have relatively long 
generation times (i.e. the time it goes since the animal is conceived until it 
reproduces), (b) the only changes that get transferred to the offspring are those 
that affect the germ line, and (c) the number of genes required to introduce a 
phenotypic change is usually relatively high. This would entail the process of 
animal and plant evolution to be very slow. By positing that the host with its 
microbiome evolves as a single unit, HCE recognizes new possibilities for 
holobiont variation which go beyond the genetic changes within a single host 
(mutation, recombination, chromosome rearrangement). First of all, it also 
recognizes the possibility that changes within the genomes of the microbial 
members of the microbiome (transduction, conjugation, horizontal gene 
transfer) could also influence holobiont evolution. In fact, since holobiont = host 
+ microbiome, holobiont variation might arise from genetic changes in any of 
them. Secondly, HCE also recognizes three modes of acquisition of variation 
that are exclusive to holobionts. These include: (a) microbial amplification and 
microbial reduction, i.e. changes in the relative numbers of a microbial species 
within the microbiota; (b) microbial acquisition, i.e. the possibility that the 
holobiont acquires new microbial species from its environment; (c) horizontal 
gene transfer between the microbes in the microbiota, or between the host and 
some of its microbes (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Modes of variation in the holobiont, and modes of transmission. The holobiont might 
vary as a consequence of changes in its germline cells, or as a consequence of changes in its 
microbiome. Variation in the microbiome includes the increase or decrease in the members of 
one species (microbial amplification), the arrival of new species or the loss of some species 
(microbial acquisition), and horizontal gene transfer among the species of the microbiome (not 
represented). (From Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Neo-
Lamarckian_inheritance_of_hologenome.svg#file)  
 
Microbial amplification refers to the possibility that the numbers of a given 
population of microorganisms within the microbiome increase (or decrease) as 
a response to environmental changes, such as the availability of nutrients, the 
temperatures (including the effects of climate change), the treatment with 
antibiotics, etc. Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg conceive the process of 
microbial amplification by analogy to the process of gene amplification.17 They 
believe that the process of microbial amplification is well-documented and offers 
a wide spectrum of evolutionary capabilities to the holobiont. Importantly, the 
authors recognize and accept that microbial amplification might occur as a rapid 
response to changing environmental conditions, and thus during the ontogeny 
of an organism. They believe this to be a consequence of the holobiont being a 
                                                          
17 ‘Gene amplification’ refers to a process by which the number of copies of a given gene within 
the genome get increased (amplified) without the same proportional effect occurring to other 
genes. For a definition check: https://www.nature.com/subjects/gene-amplification. 
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highly dynamic entity, whose components might shift their numbers, increasing, 
decreasing, or disappearing during the holobiont’s lifespan.  
 
 The second mechanism is microbial acquisition. As animals and plants 
interact during their lifespan with a wide number of microorganisms from their 
environment, it will be expected that, eventually, some of these microorganisms 
will ‘break the host’s barriers’ and, if they eventually happen to find it a suitable 
niche, they can incorporate to its microbiota. Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 
argue that the new symbiont might introduce a whole set of new genes into the 
holobiont which, if the environmental circumstances are appropriate, might 
affect the holobiont’s phenotype.18 
 
 Finally, horizontal gene transfer, also called lateral gene transfer, refers 
to the mechanism by which bacteria can exchange genetic material with each 
other through plasmids, transposons, bacteriophages, etc. They believe that the 
microbial density in a holobiont’s microbiome might accelerate the process of 
horizontal gene transfer, thus resulting in process of rapid evolution within the 
holobiont that would have not been expected ‘outside’ the holobiont. 
 
3.1.3. Holobionts as interactors, hologenomes as replicators 
According to Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg, at least in their seminal paper 
on HCE, their hypothesis can be interpreted under the interactor/replicator 
framework of the units of selection. Following the famous distinction by David 
Hull (1980), an interactor is an entity that cohesively interacts with its 
environment, so that reproduction is differential, and the replicator is the entity 
whose variations are transgenerationally transmitted in a cohesive way. 
Replicators, but not interactors, are characterized by their ‘longevity’ and 
‘copying fidelity’; whereas interactors, but not replicators, are characterized by 
their high degree of ‘cohesiveness’, however cohesiveness is interpreted. 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg interpret the interactor/replicator distinction as 
                                                          
18 Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg’s assumption here is that, as natural selection acts on 
variation on phenotypes, if the new symbiont acquired affects the phenotype of the holobiont, 
then natural selection can act on it, as a ‘unit’. This has to be taken into account at this point, 
since the mechanisms of microbial acquisition will be used as one of the main criticisms to HCE: 
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the phenotype/genotype distinction and argue that HCE entails that the 
holobiont is an interactor, and its hologenome is the replicator. In other words, 
the holobiont realizes a phenotype that can be selected for or against, and the 
hologenome gets faithfully replicated transgenerationally (when the holobiont is 
selected for), including its variants.19 
 
3.1.4. Mixing the ‘ecological holobiont’ and the ‘hereditary holobiont’ 
At this point, it should be clear how Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg have 
fused the concept of ‘hereditary holobiont’ with the concept of ‘ecological 
holobiont’ into a new concept, represented by the claim that holobionts are units 
of selection, i.e. HCE.20 On the one hand, Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 
argue that the hologenome is a replicator that can be faithfully transmitted 
intergenerationally, thus guaranteeing the sufficient degree of fidelity for natural 
selection to act on it as a single unit. On the other hand, they aim to include 
phenomena such as microbial amplification among the possible evolutionary 
mechanisms by which a holobiont can acquire phenotypic variation. However, 
the two phenomena are not on the same timescale. Ecological processes occur 
during the lifespan of the organism, whereas evolutionary processes extend 
much further, as they depend on the appearance of lineages, i.e. on the 
establishment of parent-offspring generations. This raises a series of biological 
and philosophical questions that will be raised (and partially answered) along 
this thesis. What are the conditions under which an ‘ecological holobiont’ can be 
considered an ‘hereditary holobiont’, and vice versa? Is it possible, under any 
possible formulation of natural selection, to consider the ‘ecological holobiont’ 
as a unit of selection? If so, what will be its properties? Do ‘ecological 
holobionts’ form parent-offspring lineages? How can the ‘ecological holobiont’ 
be individuated, and how might its individuation criteria differ from the 
individuation criteria of the ‘hereditary holobiont’? Are the ‘ecological holobiont’ 
                                                          
19 As I already said, many of these notions will change when HCE develops further and more 
evidence is gathered. For the moment, it is interesting to see what Zilber-Rosenberg and 
Rosenberg claimed in their seminal formulation of HCE to explore how the hypothesis has 
changed.  
20 Notice that the confusion is already acknowledged by Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg in 
their first quotes, since they always refer to Margulis (‘hereditary holobiont’) and Rohwer 
(‘ecological holobiont’) as the original proponents of the term, probably ignoring the fact that the 
term used by Margulis and by Rohwer is definitely not co-intensional and might well not even be 
co-extensional either. 
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and the ‘hereditary holobiont’ even co-extensional in certain circumstances? 
When would those circumstances obtain? 
 
 Once the main problem that HCE posed has been established (i.e. 
mixing the ‘ecological hoobiont’ with the ‘hereditary holobiont’) two points must 
be noticed: first, that most of the criticisms against HCE will be based on the 
mixture (or confusion) of the two concepts; second, that this thesis is an effort to 
reconcile the two concepts, by partially relaxing the concept of ‘inheritance’ 
(chapter V). 
 
3.2. The hologenome concept of evolution as a Lamarckian theory within a 
Darwinian framework 
In an effort to clarify the view of evolution that HCE entailed, one year after their 
proposal of the hypothesis, the authors published their paper: Eugene 
Rosenberg, Gil Sharon, and Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg (2009): ‘The hologenome 
theory of evolution contains Lamarckian aspects within a Darwinian framework’. 
This paper is very important to fully understand HCE, since it helps in clarifying 
how to conceptualize the different modes of transmission and variation that are 
brought about in Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg’s original HCE proposal. 
Particularly, it helps to understand which elements of their hypothesis should be 
characterized in a neo-Darwinian fashion and which elements should be 
characterized differently, as well as why they should be characterized 
differently. 
 
 The starting point of the paper puts the emphasis on two properties 
which, according to Rosenberg et al. (2009), are the core of ‘Lamarckism’: first, 
the principle of use and disuse; second, the principle of the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics. The first principle states that biological evolution will 
work in a way such that those organs, parts, etc. that are highly used by 
individuals will tend to be preserved, whereas those that are not used, or 
stopped being used, will be lost. The second principle states that those traits 
that an individual acquires during its lifetime may be inherited by their offspring. 
Both principles are nowadays rejected in biology, at least in the neo-Darwinian 
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conception of evolutionary biology, where both the principle of use and disuse 
and the inheritance of acquired characteristics are believed to be false for two 
reasons: first, because the observed variation in a population is always the 
result of random, i.e. non-directional, modifications in the DNA of an organism, 
and not a consequence of the use and disuse of one specific organ or part. For 
the Neo-Darwinist, evolutionary variation is ‘blind’. Second, because the only 
inheritance that is possible is the one that affects the genotype of the germ cells 
of an organism; phenotypic features that result from effects that are different 
from modifications of the DNA of the germ cells are not inherited, and thus 
‘acquired characteristics’ are never inherited according to Neo-Darwinism. 
 
 In which sense is HCE Lamarckian? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to take a look back to the mechanisms that might bring variation in a 
holobiont and that are additional to the conventional and stochastic 
mechanisms of sexual recombination, gene amplification, etc. that will affect 
both the host and its microbes (section 3.1.2). According to Zilber-Rosenberg 
and Rosenberg, these mechanisms include microbial amplification, microbial 
acquisition and horizontal gene transfer. In Rosenberg et al. (2009), the authors 
argue that microbial amplification and microbial acquisition could be interpreted 
as a Lamarckian aspect of the evolution of holobionts, concretely, as changes 
that are driven by ‘use and disuse’ (see also Osmanovic et al. 2018). In their 
view, the phenomenon of microbial amplification, as well as the phenomenon of 
microbial acquisition might be driven for the use that a given holobiont makes of 
its symbionts: if a particular species brings about a fitness-enhancing trait, then, 
as a consequence of the use of the trait, microbial acquisition (if the species 
was not previously included in the holobiont) and microbial amplification will 
follow; if, on the contrary, some microbes are not used, they will tend to be lost 
from the microbiome. The interesting aspect of this is the goal-directedness of 
holobiont variation, i.e. that variation among holobionts will depend on the use 
(or disuse) of the elements of the microbiome, which clearly fits the paradigm of 
the Lamarckian principle of use and disuse. 
 
 Secondly, in Rosenberg et al. the authors argue that, insofar as the 
microorganisms that are acquired and/or amplified during a holobiont 
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generation can be transgenerationally transmitted, the holobiont model also 
satisfies the principle of inheritance of acquired characteristics, since the 
changes that are brought about in one generation will tend to reappear in the 
next one, as a consequence of microbiome transmission (section 3.1.1; Figure 
3). All this material, though, will be later ‘filtered’ by natural selection, and thus 
HCE is a Lamarckian theory, meaning that the variations and the transmission 
among holobionts are/can be Lamarckian, within a Darwinian framework, 
meaning that all the changes that appear in holobionts will later be selected for 
or against, depending on their influence on fitness. 
 
3.2.1. A comment on the Lamarckian character of the hologenome concept of 
evolution 
Rosenberg et al.’s (2009) arguments about the Lamarckian aspects of HCE 
need a careful look, since it does not seem as clear as the authors assume that 
HCE can be properly defined as a Lamarckian theory. Firstly, one of the 
elements that, according to Rosenberg et al. (2009), defines Lamarckism is the 
idea that the variation that appears in the organism is not random, or stochastic, 
but is brought about as a consequence of the use and disuse of the parts. In the 
usual textbook example, giraffes have longer necks because they tend to 
stretch them further and further, and thus the phenotypic variation (longer 
necks) is brought about by the use of the organ (see also Veigl 2017, 2019). 
Does HCE entail necessarily the same about holobionts, when it comes to the 
processes of microbial acquisition and microbial amplification? The answer is 
negative, for in cases where the acquisition of a positive trait leads to the 
amplification of the microbe that bears it, the amplification is the result of the 
ecological conditions of the holobiont, rather than of a goal-directedness. In this 
vein, it is not that clear that HCE is a Lamarckian theory. 
 
 Secondly, HCE, as originally formulated in Zilber-Rosenberg and 
Rosenberg (2008) (section 3.1) is completely opposed to the Lamarckian 
notion of inheritance of acquired characteristics. According to the standard 
interpretation of Lamarckism, the inheritance of acquired characteristics refers 
to the inheritance of phenotypic traits that are the result of the process of use 
and disuse. Neo-Darwinism explains the inheritance of traits by appealing to the 
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mechanisms of Mendelian transmission. HCE is not far from Neo-Darwinism, 
since Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg argue that the genomes of the microbes 
that are acquired need to be transmitted. They offer a genetic interpretation of 
the holobiont which is closely related to the normal process of inheritance, more 
than it is to the notion of ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’, since the key 
point for the latter is that the genetic modifications (if any) that bring them about 
do not need to be inherited. 
 
3.3. First evidence of hologenome selection: the case of mating 
preferences in Drosophila melanogaster 
The first non-coral evidence that supported HCE appeared in Sharon et al. 
(2009).21 In their paper, they drew on a previous case of mating preference in 
Drosophila pseudoobscura reported in Dodd (1989). In his experiments, Dodd 
reared two groups of flies on a starch-based medium and on a maltose-based 
medium for more than 25 generations. Afterwards, he put the two groups 
together and observed that the flies reared on the starch-based media preferred 
to mate with these reared in the same media, whereas the opposite was the 
case for the flies reared in a maltose-medium. Surprisingly, despite the clear 
mating preference that had been developed among flies, Dodd could not find 
any evidence of selection for mating preference in any of the groups. He could 
only hypothesize that mating preference developed as correlated response to 
selection favouring an adaptation to a new diet.  
 
 Sharon et al. decided to replicate Dodd’s experiment and take it one step 
further, to test whether they could have any evidence of selection on 
hologenomes. To do so, they divided a population of D. melanogaster in two 
groups, rearing one of the groups on a molasses medium and the other on a 
starch medium. They later put the two groups together and observed that a 
mating preference has appeared: flies reared on starch preferred to mate with 
flies reared on starch, whereas flies reared on molasses preferred to mate with 
flies reared on molasses (Figure 5). They observed: (1) that the mating 
                                                          
21 Notice that the evidence found in corals was not about speciation, it was only about the 
acquisition of an adaptation, which could not be taken in any sense as an initiator of a 
speciation process. 
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preference appeared after only one generation of divergent diets; (2) that the 
preference was maintained for at least 37 generations. Until this point, nothing 
is too surprising, as Sharon et al.’s evidence is identical to Dodd’s evidence. A 
second important step was taken when the authors decided to investigate the 
cause of the divergent mating preferences. Their hypothesis was that 
microbiome differences were underlying the diverging mating preferences in the 
population, a hypothesis which derives entirely from HCE. To test their 
hypothesis, they performed two different types of tests: first, after rearing the 
bacteria on their respective media, they treated them with antibiotics, observing 
that the mating preference disappeared; second, they did four independent 
infection experiments, which suggested that the flies that had lost their bacteria 
and for which mating preference had disappeared recovered their tendency 
towards a divergent mating preference if re-infected with the bacteria they had 
lost because of antibiotic treatment.  
 
 
Figure 5. Description of the experimental set-up in Sharon et al.’s experiment. The population 
was divided in two groups and each was reared on a starch-based medium and on a molasses-
based medium (CMY) for several generations (left side). Later, members from both groups were 
transferred from one generation into a CMY-based medium. The mating preferences were 
tested afterwards on 24-well plastic plates which contained four flies: two, male and female, 
reared on the starch-based medium, and the other two, also male and female, reared on the 
CMY medium (right side). (From Sharon et al. 2009: 20052, Fig. 1). 
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They later performed a 16S rRNA array of the bacterial communities of the flies 
to determine which members of the microbiota might have been responsible of 
the appearance of the mating preference. They observed that the group of flies 
reared on a starch-based medium had a substantially higher proportion of 
Lactobacillus plantarum (26%) than the flies reared on the CMY-based medium 
(3%), which suggests L. plantarum as a plausible candidate for determining the 
divergent mating preferences. They tested their hypothesis and observed that 
what might happen is that the starch-based medium induces a microbial 
amplification increasing the relative numbers of L. plantarum in D. 
melanogaster. This microbial amplification is later responsible of the observed 
mating preference that caused flies reared on CMY to develop a preference for 
other flies raised in the same medium, whereas the opposite was the case for 
flies reared in a starch-based medium. Therefore, the authors conclude, 
changes in the microbiome are responsible of the mating preferences in D. 
melanogaster, thus suggesting that the holobiont is the unit of selection. 
 
3.3.1. Brief reflection on Sharon et al.’s results 
Sharon et al. argue that their experiments supported HCE but, how true is this? 
In other words, is there another way of interpreting their evidence so that it is 
not taken as a straightforward case in favour of HCE? I suspect that, even if the 
results obtained by Sharon et al. suppose a strong case in favour of HCE, one 
must be cautious about how to interpret them, since there are different 
alternatives that do not necessarily match with HCE. First of all, Sharon et al. 
have not proven that the microbiome has an influence on the mating 
preferences of D. melanogaster. At most, they have proven that L. plantarum 
has a transgenerational influence on the mating preferences of D. 
melanogaster, under very restricted environmental conditions. This, of course, 
suggests that it is important to study the influence of the microbial community 
on a host’s mating preferences, and it might also suggest that D. melanogaster 
and L. plantarum could evolve as a single unit under the influence of natural 
selection. But, unfortunately, this evidence is still far from proving that the 
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whole, i.e. the host plus its microbiota act as a unit of selection, which is the 
main claim made by HCE defenders.22  
 
 Secondly, there are further hypotheses which are totally consistent with 
the evidence found by Sharon et al. and that do not need to consider the 
holobiont as a unit of selection. For instance, one may argue that the CYM-
based medium and the starch-based medium were different environments in 
different territories—each group of flies in different media with no mixture—that 
had the power to induce these phenotypic changes, but natural selection is not 
playing any role here. The effect that Sharon et al. observed is simply the result 
of two populations of flies, rather than of the action of natural selection on the 
hologenome. Under this hypothesis, it is possible to justify that this isolation 
could trigger, in the long term, to a phenomenon of allopatric speciation, if the 
genotypes of the two populations of flies start diverging as a consequence of 
the environmental differences. Furthermore, it is perfectly consistent to argue 
that even if flies from the two groups were put together afterwards to test their 
mating preferences, the flies would be inhabiting different environments (an 
environment rich in L. plantarum versus an environment poor in L. plantarum), 
and thus there are two populations of flies that share the same territory.  Under 
this hypothesis, the mating preferences would be a consequence of the 
existence of two populations that inhabit the same territory, rather than of the 
action of natural selection on the flies hologenome (an effect that could trigger a 
sympatric speciation, if the flies genomes start diverging). However, natural 
seletion would not have had occurred until the genomes of the two groups of 
flies started diverging. Therefore, Sharon et al. would have at most proven that 
different environmental conditions, including changes in a host’s microbiota, 
might trigger some phenotypic differences. But this is a far cry from the 
hypothesis they aimed to prove, namely: that the host and its microbiota evolve 
as a single unit.23 
                                                          
22 I will provide a consistent way of explaining these results in chapter IV, section 4.2. 
23 Recently, Leftwich et al. (2017) revisited the experiments carried on by Sharon et al. (2009) 
and claimed to have found no evidence of microbiome-induced mating preferences. They also 
made an interesting point about the observations made by Sharon et al.: Leftwich et al. argued 
that, even if in some circumstances it could be possible to find cases of diet-induced mating 
preferences, these should be looked at carefully since, they speculated, in species with a highly 
flexible microbiome (like flies), diet-induced effect will always tend to be transient. Their point is 
relevant here since it is consistent with the ‘ecological holobiont’, despite being inconsistent, in 
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3.4. Further developments of the hologenome concept of evolution. The 
‘capacious’ hologenome of Brucker and Bordenstein 
Robert M. Brucker and Seth R. Bordenstein are two of the authors who have 
been most interested in HCE and have applied some of its postulates in their 
research, obtaining very interesting results and developing very useful notions 
to test the validity of HCE. Concretely, they have always been interested in the 
power of symbiosis to drive speciation processes, a feature of symbiosis that 
had been vigorously emphasized by Lynn Margulis (section 2), so most of their 
work has been oriented to test cases of speciation by symbiosis, which they 
analyse by taking the ‘whole’ (i.e. the holobiont) as the unit of 
evolution/selection. Their research is specifically oriented to prove the thesis 
that hologenomes are replicators (section 3.1.3). In this section, I will review 
their theoretical and empirical work. 
 
3.4.1. ‘Speciation by symbiosis’ and ‘The capacious hologenome’ 
Two of the most important theoretical works written by Brucker and Bordenstein 
include their relatively early Brucker and Bordenstein (2012a), and their 
(2013a). In (2012a), Brucker and Bordenstein argue that the models of 
speciation should include not only the study of the molecular genes or possible 
organelles that are responsible for speciation events, but also the 
microorganisms of the host’s microbiome, since the latter opens a new avenue 
of possible speciation mechanisms that would remain unexplored if speciation is 
exclusively restricted to phenomena that affect molecular genes and/or cellular 
organelles.24  
 
Their paper starts with the following reflection: first, it is clear that 
symbiosis is a very powerful mechanism for generating new traits (e.g. 
luminescence in the bobtail squid); second, it seems clear that symbiosis has 
played some role in accelerating evolution, i.e. in creating the conditions that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
principle, with the ‘hereditary holobiont’. For a response to Leftwich et al. (2017), see Rosenberg 
et al. (2018). 
24 The whole paper is concerned with the evolution of higher animals, so it is built on the 
assumptions of the biological species concept (i.e. the notion that species appear as a 
consequence of reproductive isolation, and thus reproductive isolation = speciation). 
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favour the appearance of genetically-based reproductive barriers. However, 
what would happen if the microbial species that compose the microbiome of a 
given host are taken as extensions of the host’s genome? In other words, would 
our view of speciation processes change if instead of focusing on the 
monogenomic organism (i.e. the nuclear genes of the genome of the organism) 
we focus on the whole array of genes of an organism’s hologenome? In the 
view of Brucker and Bordenstein, the obvious answer is ‘yes’, and not only that, 
but they believe that the consideration of the hologenome as the unit that 
‘speciates’ would open the avenue for new speciation processes and the 
appearance of reproductive barriers much earlier than they would appear if only 
the changes in host’s genome that led to reproductive incompatibilities are 
considered as potential cases of speciation. Therefore, it is the hologenome, not 
the host’s genome, the unit that, according to Brucker and Bordenstein, should 
be taking as ‘evolving’ and, thus, driving speciation processes. 
 
 However, it is necessary to support further the claim that the hologenome 
is the unit of evolution. How strong is Brucker and Bordenstein’s evidence to 
claim that the hologenome, and not the host’s genome, is the entity that 
speciates? In (2012a) the authors refer to three sources of evidence that 
support HCE: first, the observation, already anticipated in Zilber-Rosenberg and 
Rosenberg (2008), that all eukaryotes bear microbial symbionts, i.e. the 
universality of eukaryote-microbial symbiosis; second, the notion of host’s 
specificity, or the idea that the microbes that associate with an eukaryotic host 
are species-specific, i.e. the species of the microbiome recapitulate the 
phylogeny of their hosts;25 third, the observation that the immune genes of hosts 
are rapidly evolving in an arms race with the microorganisms that compose the 
host’s microbiome. If these three observations are true, then there is evidence 
to support the idea that the hologenome, and not the individual genome, is the 
entity that evolves, is naturally selected and is driven by speciation processes, 
as HCE postulates. 
 
                                                          
25 This second observation, which was later called ‘phylosymbiosis’, as well as its importance for 
justifying HCE, will be explored in more detail bellow. 
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 The question is now the following. Assuming that the three 
aforementioned observations are true, and thus hologenomes can be 
considered evolutionary units, what are the consequences for our 
understanding of speciation processes? Brucker and Bordenstein argue that 
symbiosis can drive reproductive isolation, and thus speciation, in two different 
ways: by generating pre-mating isolation conditions that reduce the gene flow 
between the members of a population, so that in the long-term they will become 
two independent populations and even two species, due to the lack of genetic 
exchange; by generating post-mating isolation conditions, or incompatibilities 
that arise after the offspring is produced, making it non-viable.  
 
Cases of pre-mating isolation include behavioural preferences, including 
mating preferences (section 3.3), and ecological isolation, including 
phenomena like the occupation of new niches, the utilization of new nutrients, 
etc. Brucker and Bordenstein believe that bacterial symbionts are responsible 
for many of the cases of ecological and behavioural isolation, thus suggesting 
that symbionts can play a fundamental role in creating the conditions that 
prevent gene flow and thus lead to speciation processes. Cases of post-mating 
isolation include all the phenomena that give rise to the appearance of hybrid 
incompatibility. Hybrid incompatibility refers to the impossibility of hybrids being 
born, developing normally (hybrid inviability), or reproducing (hybrid sterility). 
One hypothesis to explain hybrid incompatibility is the Bateson-Dobzhansky-
Muller model, according to which hybrids are sterile or, in some cases, inviable, 
because the epistatic interactions between their nuclear genes give rise to 
incompatibilities that disrupt development, or reproduction. According to Brucker 
and Bordenstein, considering the hologenome as a unit of selection widens the 
possible modes in which hybrid incompatibility can arise (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Schematic representation of the Bateson-Dobzhansky-Muller model of hybrid 
incompatibility. (a) depicts the most basic case, where the incompatibility occurs at two loci, 
such that alleles A and B are incompatible; (b) represents the possibility of having an 
incompatibility among three loci, such that A is incompatible with B and C, and B and C are 
incompatible with each other; finally, (c) represents a situations where the incompatibility can 
additionally occur between an allele and some component of the microbiome [(iii)], or 
exclusively between some components of the microbiome [(iv) and (v)]. (From Brucker and 
Bordenstein 2012a: 447, Box 2) 
 
The mechanisms that drive hybrid incompatibilities and are known to be (at 
least sometimes) a consequence of incompatibilities among symbionts include 
cytoplasmic incompatibility (Figure 7), hybrid susceptibility and hybrid 
autoimmunity. These cases, Brucker and Bordenstein argue, suggests that 
symbiosis is a driver of speciation, and thus provides some support for HCE. 
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Figure 7. Cytoplasmic incompatibility among invertebrates has been shown to be caused in 
many cases by Wolbachia pipientis. As the bacteria are transmitted vertically, coupled with 
female reproductive cells, they disrupt the mating between infected males and uninfected 
females, whereas infected females can mate both infected and uninfected males. Cytoplasmic 
incompatibility is a method of post-mating isolation that has been shown to drive reproductive 
isolation in some populations. (From Werren et al. 2008: 743, Fig. 2) 
 
Right after (2012a), Brucker and Bordenstein published (2013a), where they 
emphasized the importance of considering the hologenome, and not only the 
host’s genome, as the unit of evolution. (2013a) is important because it is 
partially clarificatory of the meaning of the concept of ‘hologenome’, which had 
been previously introduced by Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg to refer to the 
total among of genetic information in the holobiont (section 3.1.). There, 
Brucker and Bordenstein postulate that, among all the microbial components of 
a host’s microbiome, there is a whole family of species-specific microbes which 
are acquired under the control of the host. Based on a previous study that they 
had conducted in Nasonia wasps (Brucker and Bordenstein 2011), they 
hypothesized that the species that compose the gut microbiome have shared 
part of their evolutionary history with the host, and thus represent ‘an ancestral 
footprint of evolution’ (2013a: 260). Therefore, the hologenome is the entity 
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composed by the host’s genome, its endosymbionts (i.e. the mitochondrial 
genes) and the species-specific fraction of the microbiome (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. The hologenome according to Brucker and Bordenstein. The dark/black spots in the 
figure represent the total microbiome that a host interacts with. It is divided in two sets: the part 
of the microbiome that is considered to be a part of the environment, and the part that is 
considered to be part of the hologenome (to which they refer to as ‘beneficial microbiome’). The 
division between the two sets in the microbiome is made according to whether the microbes are 
acquired deterministically, i.e. dictated by the host’s genome, or they are the result of a pure 
environmental acquisition, i.e. diet, abiotic factors, etc (part of the microbiome represented in 
grey). (From Brucker and Bordenstein 2013: 261, Figure 1) 
 
At this point, two important points about the hologenome, and about HCE, need 
to be noticed. First, Brucker and Bordenstein’s definition of the hologenome is 
not co-extensional with Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg’s formulation. For the 
latter, the hologenome would encompass all the microbes of a host’s 
microbiome. Only if this is so, it is possible to consider the phenomenon of 
microbial acquisition as a case of variation among holobionts, as Zilber-
Rosenberg and Rosenberg aim to consider it. For the former, on the contrary, 
the hologenome includes exclusively the species-specific microbiome, and not 
the whole set of microbes of the microbiome. Again, these two concepts of the 
hologenome mirror the distinction introduced previously between the ‘ecological 
holobiont’ and the ‘hereditary holobiont’ (section 3.1.4), so I will refer to them 
as the ‘ecological hologenome’ and the ‘hereditary hologenome’. Second, but 
very important, is the fact that Brucker and Bordenstein recognize that part of 
the species-specific microbiome is (or can potentially be) environmentally 
acquired (by horizontal transmission), probably by some of the mechanisms that 
Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg had previously hypothesized. This, obviously, 
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creates a puzzle: it is clear, for example, that organelles, which are vertically 
transmitted from parent to offspring can be understood as an integrated unit 
together with the host’s genome. Now the question is ‘whether fractions of the 
environmentally acquired, but host associated, beneficial microbiome can be 
understood in a similar way’ (2013a: 261).26  
 
3.4.2. Introducing the concept of ‘phylosymbiosis’ 
A key element to the discussion of HCE that was introduced by Brucker and 
Bordenstein was the observation that the microbes that associate with a given 
host are species-specific and are acquired under host control. They refer to this 
phenomenon with the concept of ‘phylosymbiosis’ (Brucker and Bordenstein 
2012b). Phylosymbiosis is taken by the authors as a proxy for selection on 
hologenomes27 and refers to the ‘eco-evolutionary pattern in which evolutionary 
changes in the host associate with ecological changes in the microbiota.’ 
(Brooks et al. 2016: 3). In other words, a phylosymbiotic pattern between two 
(or more) species obtains when the evolutionary patterns of the species mirror 
each other, such that their changes are concordantly related in a relevant way. 
Importantly, as the authors have emphasized several times, the discovery of 
phylosymbiotic patterns does not imply the existence of coevolution, 
cospeciation or even cocladogenesis among the interacting species.28 This is 
because the concept ‘does not necessarily presume that the members of the 
microbial community are constant, stable, or vertically transmitted from 
generation to generation’ (Brooks et al. 2016: 3; see also Theis et al. 2016). 
This raises two important questions. First, if phylosymbiosis does not presume 
vertical transmission of the microbiome, what does it exactly refer to and how it 
can be experimentally identified? Or, in other words, what’s the relevant way in 
which the divergent evolutionary patters need to be related so that 
phylosymbiosis can be identified? Second, and more importantly for the 
conceptual purposes of my thesis: if phylosymbiosis does not entail 
                                                          
26 Brucker and Bordenstein specifically refer to the ‘beneficial’ microbiome in this paragraph. We 
will see how this definition changes in more recent conceptions of the hologenome and further 
developments of HCE. 
27 Notice that all this section is about selection on hologenomes, not about selection on 
holobionts. This distinction is crucial to understand the discussion and the type of arguments 
that Brucker and Bordenstein will introduce. 
28 Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg (2013) have however sometimes identified phylosymbiosis 
with the existence of cospeciation, but this is not what Brucker and Bordenstein meant when 
they originally introduced the concept (Theis et al. 2016). 
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cospeciation, how can it be taken as a proxy for hologenome selection (section 
3.4.3; chapter V, section 3.3)? 
 
A quick answer to the first question would be the following: The 
concordance that needs to be found to argue that there is a phylosymbiotic 
pattern among two or more species needs to be higher than the concordance 
that would be expected if the association between the host and its microbiota 
were due to a process of ecological filtering. Host’s microbiome composition is 
known to be affected by different environmental factors, including diet, close 
physical contact with other hosts (especially sex), age, etc. If the acquisition of 
the microbiome were stochastic every generation, then every environmental 
microbe would have the same chance to colonize every host in its surroundings, 
and thus microbiome composition would be similar among host’s colonizing the 
same niche, partially irrespectively of host’s species. However, if the assembly 
is not random, then the pattern of host-microbiome concordance will be higher 
among hosts of the same species than among hosts of different species (i.e. 
intraspecific, rather than interspecific). Or, in other words, the higher the genetic 
differences among hosts, the higher the differences in their microbiomes, 
suggesting that host-microbiome assemblages are not randomly formed 
(Figure 9).  
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Figure 9. Representation of two patterns of stochastic vs phylosymbiotic assembly by ordination 
analysis and topological congruence analysis. In the ordination analysis, the dashed lines 
represent host-specific clustering. The divergent nature of the stochastic assembly and the 
phylosymbiotic assembly can be shown by comparing (A) and (B). Figures (C) and (D) compare 
the dendograms of a stochastically assembled holobiont versus a phylosymbiotically assembled 
one. It can be show how the patterns of divergence are congruent if the relationship is 
phylosymbiotically (D). (From Brooks et al. 2016: 3, Fig. 1) 
 
The conceptual part of the first worry is thus solved, and the exact meaning of 
‘phylosymbiosis’ has been made clear. Now the question is how to solve the 
second part of the problem, namely, how to empirically test the existence of 
such phylosymbiotic pattern. Is it possible to isolate all the confounding 
variables that might affect microbiome composition, so that the existence of 
phylosymbiosis can be tested? A pioneering study, previous to the introduction 
of the concept of ‘phylosymbiosis’, was done by Sebastian Fraune and Thomas 
C. G. Bosch (2007): ‘Long-term maintenance of species-specific bacterial 
microbiota in the basal metazoan Hydra’. They analysed the microbiome 
community of two closely related species of Hydra: H. vulgaris and H. oligactis 
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and compared the microbiome composition (16S rRNA analysis)29 of free-living 
Hydra with the microbial composition of Hydra that had been cultured and 
reared under laboratory conditions for more than 30 years. Their results showed 
that the microbiota of the Hydra that had been reared under laboratory 
conditions had preserved their composition and were significantly similar to the 
microbiome composition of free-living Hydra, in both species. Their conclusion 
is, thus: 
 
‘Taken together, these data show that both Hydra species select particular 
bacterial guilds. H. oligactis and H. vulgaris maintain these species-specific 
bacterial communities even when cultured under constant conditions for 
>30 years. Alternatively, it seems possible that the bacteria are also actively 
involved in selecting the host.’ (Fraune and Bosch 2007: 13148) 
 
Brucker and Bordeinstein (2011) carried out a second experiment that proved 
the existence of a phylosymbiotic pattern. In their experiment, Brucker and 
Bordenstein reared individuals from three different Nasonia species: N. 
vitripennis, N. giraulti, and N. longicornis. N. vitripennis is known to have 
diversified 1MY ago from the ancestor of the other two species, whereas N. 
giraulti, and N. longicornis are believed to have diversified from each other 
about 400 thousand years ago (Raychoudhury et al. 2010). The purpose of 
Brucker and Bordenstein’s research was twofold: on the one hand, they wanted 
to test whether under the same rearing conditions, with controlled diets, sex, 
and ages, each Nasonia species would bear a species-specific microbiota (16S 
rRNA analysis), different from that of members of the other species; on the 
other hand, they wanted to test whether the different microbiomes recapitulated 
Nasonia phylogeny. Their results confirmed their initial hypothesis, thus 
suggesting that the microbiota can diversify in concordance with the 
diversification of the host species, i.e. in parallel to the host phylogenetic 
relationships and, thus, the species that compose a host’s microbiota are, at 
least in part, specific to the host species. 
                                                          
29 The fact that they analyse microbiome composition using the 16S rRNA analysis will become 
relevant later (chapter II). 
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 Many other experiments have further supported the existence of 
phylosymbiosis in different animal species, including bats (Phillips et al. 2012), 
corals (Pollock et al. 2018), hominids (Ochman et al. 2010), sponges (Souza et 
al. 2017), etc. The evidence is however controversial and admits different 
interpretations, since it is not always clear whether all the confounding variables 
have been correctly isolated, whether the evidence is fully conclusive, or even 
whether phylosysbiosis can be given an evolutionary interpretation (Mazel et al. 
2018). In any case, reviewing all the cases is outside the scope of my project. It 
will be important to bear in mind, though, that the concept of phylosymbiosis 
might have some significance for testing HCE. This leads us to the second 
question I had formulated above: how can phylosymbiosis be taken as a proxy 
of selection on hologenomes?  
 
3.4.3. Phylosymbiosis as a proxy for selection on hologenomes 
Notice that the concept of phylosymbiosis that has just been introduced and 
elucidated serves to demarcate which part of the microbiome can be said to 
integrate with the hologenome, versus which part of the microbiome must be 
considered a part of the environment. In other words, it introduces a criterion to 
make clear the boundaries that appear in Figure 8. This is a clear individuation 
criterion, which individuates the hologenome in relation to its participation in an 
eco-evolutionary process that generates a pattern of concordance. But, as I 
already explained, the observed pattern of concordance does not need to be 
the result of vertical transmission of the microbiome, nor necessarily indicative 
of a process of cospeciation, cocladogenesis, or coevolution (Brooks et al. 
2016, Theis et al. 2016).30 Then, what is exactly its evolutionary significance? 
Or, in other words, how can the existence of a phylosymbiotic pattern be 
evolutionarily interpreted?31 
 
                                                          
30 ‘Not necessarily indicative of a process of coevolution’ does not mean that it is not indicative 
of one. It might be indicative of a process of coevolution, in some cases. But the key point of 
Brucker and Bordenstein is that it does not need to be automatically interpreted as such. 
31 See chapter V, section 3.3 for a discussion of these points from the perspective of my own 
framework to study the role of holobionts as units of selection. 
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 The response to this question relies on the concept of ‘community 
heritability’ H2c, for whose existence phylosymbiosis is a proxy. In van 
Opstal and Bordenstein (2015), the authors suggest reconsidering the 
ways in which heritability measures of the microbiome had been 
previously carried out and concentrate instead on the notion of 
community heritability. Let me explain the significance of this point from 
the beginning. ‘Heritability’ is a concept from population genetics that 
measures the degree in which variations of a phenotypic trait can be 
attributed to the genetic differences among the members of the 
population (Visscher et al. 2008).32 Variation in a trait can be argued to 
be highly heritable if and only if an important proportion of the individuals 
of the population that bear the trait—if it is a qualitative trait—or a 
concrete value for the trait—in case it is a quantitative trait—have a 
specific variance in their genetic makeup that can be argued to be on the 
basis of the trait variance. That way of thinking (the ‘standard heritability’ 
approach h2) had been previously applied to the study of the microbiota 
species composition, where the microbiome was taken as a quantitative 
trait whose variation in species composition should be accounted for in 
terms of the genetic differences among the hosts. Thus, twin studies—
the conventional method of testing heritability—were conducted to 
determine the influence of the host’s genetic makeup and the influence of 
the environment in determining microbiome composition.  
 
However, as van Opstal and Bordenstein argue, the standard heritability 
approach is ‘unidirectional’, since it presupposes that the host is the only entity 
determining the composition of the microbiome, and thus the composition of the 
hologenome. But, if the whole point of HCE was to emphasize the ‘unitarian’ 
aspect of host-microbiome interactions, i.e. the claim that the hologenome is a 
‘unit’, in some sense of ‘unit’, then the standard heritability approach is 
misguided to understand the role of hologenomes as biological units. In their 
approach, a more comprehensive view is required, according to which the 
assembly of the host and its microbiome is driven by genotype-by-genotype 
interactions, i.e. by interspecies interactions. That is precisely the approach that 
                                                          
32 For the purposes of the discussion here, I will not distinguish between narrow-sense and 
broad-sense heritability. 
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the study of community heritability H2c offers, and that van Opstal and 
Bordenstein propose as an alternative to standard heritability measures (Figure 
10). Now, an obvious question arises: it is clear what standard heritability 
measures measure but, what does community heritability exactly measure? In 
the words of van Opstal and Bordenstein:  
 
‘H2c emphasizes that the host is part of an ecosystem and measures the 
extent to which variation in “whole-community” phenotype is due to genetic 
variation in the foundation (i.e., host) species of the community. It 
therefore specifies that host genetic variation will have predictable effects 
on microbial community assembly, in addition to having effects on specific 
members of the microbiome, as measured by h2.’ 
 
 
Figure 10. Comparison of the concepts of ‘heritability’ h2, as it is conventionally understood in 
population genetics, and community heritability H2c, as it should be understood for the 
hologenome. Standard heritability measures how hosts with different genetic backgrounds might 
bear different microbial species in their microbiome, to determine how much of the variation in 
microbiome species composition can be ascribed to variation in the genetic makeup of the host 
(studies are usually carried out comparing the microbiomes of monozygotic and dizygotic twins). 
Community heritability, in contrast, measures how the differences in the genetic makeup of 
individuals in the population might condition the structure of their microbiomes, or whole-
community phenotype. (From van Opstal and Bordenstein 2015: 1173) 
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Notice the important contrast that exists between H2c and h2. First, whereas the 
later only measures the degree of host control on microbiome composition, the 
former, insofar as it only measures the relation between the phenotype of the 
whole-community and the genetic variation of the host, can represent three 
possible states: host control of microbiome assembly; host susceptibility to 
microbiome ‘infection’; or a combination of host control and host susceptibility. 
Second, whereas h2 measurements implicitly assume that microbiome 
composition is merely an extension of the host’s phenotype, H2c measurements 
inherently incorporate the existence of non-random (i.e. not caused by a 
process of ecological filtering) interspecies interactions that give rise to the 
appearance of a whole-community phenotype. Third, whereas a high degree of 
h2 for a microbial species in the microbiome underscores the possibility that the 
host undergoes selection to secure the transgenerational presence of that 
species, a high degree of H2c suggests that natural selection can potentially 
select certain forms of community assembly over other, thus potentially acting 
on hologenomes.33  
 
 The question, however, is whether the existence of community heritability 
of the hologenome is likely, and what are the conditions that should be satisfied 
if it is going to happen. Or, in other words, can we make sure that community 
assembly is a result of genetic factors rather than environmental factors?  That 
question is really hard to parse, and many have suggested that the value of H2c 
is very low in most holobionts (Moran and Sloan 2015; Douglas and Werren 
2016; Skillings 2016). I will review their arguments in chapter II.  
 
3.4.4. How ‘capacious’ can the hologenome be? The case of Nasonia wasps 
Let us grant Brucker and Bordenstein the possibility that phylosymbiosis is a 
proxy for the existence of selection acting on hologenomes, as well as the 
discovery of a phylosymbiotic relationship in Nasonia wasps (Brucker and 
Bordenstein 2011; section 3.4.2). The next step in their research to prove that 
the hologenome is a unit of selection is to show a case of speciation where the 
                                                          
33 These three points about the distinction between H2c and h2 will remain crucial for the rest of 
the thesis. 
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hologenome is (or can at least be considered) a relevant unit. To do so, they 
study the phenomenon of hybrid lethality in Nasonia wasps (Brucker and 
Bordenstein 2013b). Hybrid lethality is a post-mating (post-zygotic) mechanism 
of reproductive isolation that occurs when the hybrids that result from the cross-
mating of two species do not properly develop, thus leading to their death 
before they are even born. Hybrid lethality has been traditionally assumed to be 
a consequence of the existence of negative genetic epistasis in hybrid genomes 
that do not let hybrids develop properly. However, as Brucker and Bordenstein 
explained (2013a) (section 3.4.1), there is no reason to assume that the same 
negative epistatic model cannot be applied to elements of the microbiome. In 
other words, it is possible that hybrid lethality is a consequence of the 
interactions between the host’s nuclear genes and some elements of the 
microbiome, or a consequence of the interactions between the elements of the 
microbiome themselves.  
 
To test this possibility in the case of Nasonia, Brucker and Bordenstein 
reared three species of Nasonia wasps (N. vitripennis, N. giraulti, and N. 
longicornis) under the strict same laboratory conditions to guarantee that each 
species mostly interacts with its phylosymbiotic community.34 They observed 
that reciprocal crossings between Nasonia species gave rise to fertile, and 
diploid hybrid females in the first generation F1. However, hybrid lethality—
manifested during the larval stage—is observed in the haploid male offspring of 
the second generation F2. The proportion of hybrid lethality was about 90% 
among N. vitripennis x N. giraulti, and N. vitripennis x N. longicornis, and about 
8% among N. giraulti x N. longicornis. Brucker and Bordenstein hypothesized 
that the lethality in hybrids was in part a result of the presence of altered gut 
microbiomes in F2 male hybrids.  
 
Their hypothesis was then tested in two steps. First, they studied the 
symbiotic communities of hybrid males and non-hybrid males in F2 and during 
                                                          
34 Nasonia are parasitoid wasps, so all of them were reared on the same fly host Sarcophaga 
bullata, guaranteeing that all of them have the same type of diet and avoiding Wolbachia 
infections to guarantee the possibility of reciprocal crossings between the species. Also, 
importantly, lethality is diagnosed by the observation of larval melanisation, so that the precise 
moment in which it happens can be detected.  
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larval development, right before hybrid lethality occurs. If the microbiome plays 
any role in the lethality of hybrids, then hybrids and non-hybrids might bear 
different microbiomes. They observed that F2 N. vitripennis x N. giraulti hybrids 
had a different microbiome than both of their parental species, differing both in 
species composition and species abundance. The major shift they observed 
was that the dominant bacterial operational taxonomic unit (OUT, hereafter) had 
changed from Providencia sp. IICDBZ10 (in F2 pure species) to Proteus 
mirabilis SMBS (in F2 N. vitripennis x N. giraulti hybrids). The shift was 
significantly substantial, so that some microbiome effects on lethality could be 
hypothesized. 
 
Second, they studied the possible effects of the microbiome on N. 
vitripennis x N. giraulti F2 hybrid lethality. To do so, they reared conventional, 
germ-free, and bacteria-inoculated hybrids and non-hybrids. The driving idea 
was the following: if hybrid lethality is a consequence of negative epistasis 
among the genes in the hybrid genome, then it will be expected that hybrid 
lethality will not be substantially different between conventionally and germ-free 
reared hybrids. However, if the microbiome has some influence on hybrid 
lethality, then it is possible that germ-free reared hybrids will recover from 
lethality. Indeed, their results convincingly showed a statistically significant 
recovery of the hybrids that had been reared in germ-free conditions, in relation 
to the degree of hybrid lethality among those that had been reared in the 
conventional environment. Secondly, their data also showed how the same 
levels of hybrid lethality were shown if germ-free F2 hybrids were inoculated with 
Proteus mirabilis SMBS and Providencia sp. IICDBZ10 from parental Nasonia 
during their larval stage, an effect that was not observed in non-hybrid wasps 
(Figure 11), thus strongly suggesting the influence of the microbiome as one of 
the causative agents of hybrid lethality. 
 
67 
 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of the survival rate among F2 male Nasonia hybrids versus F2 non-hybid 
males in three different rearing conditions. The data shows how the survival rate increases 
significantly among the hybrids (g/v; v/g; g: N. giraulti; v: N. vitripennis) when they are reared in 
a germ-free environment, whereas they increase again when they are inoculated with bacteria 
during their larval stage. (From Brucker and Bordenstein 2013b: 668, Fig. 1C) 
 
Brucker and Bordenstein’s results strongly support the hypothesis that host-
microbiome interactions can generate post-mating mechanisms that guarantee 
that the reproductive isolation between species is transgenerationally 
maintained. Furthermore, they also suggest the possible existence of an 
hologenomic basis underlying certain speciation events—provided that the in 
fact the epistatic interactions between the host genes and the microbiome were 
causing hybrid lethality—which supports the hypothesis that ‘the hologenome 
[acts] as a unit of evolution [HCE], blur[ring] the line between what biologists 
typically demarcate as the environment and the genotype of a species’ (Brucker 
and Bordenstein 2013b: 669). 
 
3.4.4.1. Not so capacious, after all. Chandler and Turelli’s response 
Brucker and Bordenstein’s experiment elicited an immediate response by 
James Angus Chandler and Michaelle Turelli (2014): ‘Comment on “The 
hologenomic basis of speciation: Gut bacteria cause hybrid lethality in the 
genus Nasonia”’. In their response, Chandler and Turelli made basically two 
points: First, that since Brucker and Bordenstein’s data did not include any 
evidence about specific incompatibilities between concrete bacterial lineages 
and the host’s genome, it was not conclusive to prove the existence of 
hologenomic speciation. Second, that the evidence that Brucker and 
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Bordenstein provided to support phylosymbiosis—taken by the authors as a 
proxy for hologenomic speciation—was weak and inconclusive. The second 
criticism is highly technical and concerns the type of methodologies that are 
required to test phylosymbiosis, so I will not review it here. I will only 
concentrate on the first criticism, as it is the criticism with a broader 
philosophical reading. 
 
 Chandler and Turelli believe that Brucker and Bordenstein’s experiment 
lacks the crucial test that would convincingly prove coadaptation, namely: a 
phylogenetically informed cross-inoculation experiment of gut microbes among 
the different Nasonia species. As their experimental set up was displaced, 
Brucker and Bordenstein proved, at most, that the gut microbiome influences 
hybrid lethality, but not that it is the causative agent of lethality. An alternative 
explanation of their results could be the following: the genome of hybrids is so 
dysfunctional due to their high degree of genetic incompatibility that any 
encounter with any free-living bacterial species (no matter its history of 
interaction with the host) will make it susceptible to lethality (‘intrinsic hybrid 
disfunction’). But, if this interpretation of Brucker and Bordenstein’s results is 
correct, what is the opportunity for hologenomic selection? As Chandler and 
Turelli put this criticism: 
 
‘Brucker and Bordenstein’s data demonstrate that bacteria can contribute to 
hybrid lethality, but not because of concordant phylogenetic divergence with 
their hosts. The data suggest that hybrids may be generally weakened and 
incapable of dealing with many free-living bacteria. There are many such 
examples in both animal and plants. Intrinsic hybrid dysfunction is fully 
consistent with the (…) [notion] that host divergence leads to defective 
hybrids, without invoking coadaptation between hosts and their microbiota 
as a driver of speciation. (…) [T]he hologenomic conjecture that 
incompatibilities between lineage-specific, free-living, horizontally 
transmitted microbes contribute to speciation remains testable speculation 
without experimental support’ (2014: 1011a) 
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This criticism is more important than it might seem, since it points to one of the 
most serious flaws of HCE: where to put the direction of the ‘causal arrow’.35 Let 
me explain this with a little bit more detail. Brucker and Bordenstein have shown 
that germ-free reared hybrid wasps do not suffer hybrid lethality, whereas 
conventionally reared and bacteria inoculated hybrids die. However, they have 
not isolated the agent that causally explains the origin of the lethality or, in other 
words, where the incompatibility that generates the lethality in the first place 
comes from. Is there any specific bacterial species, or bacterial gene, whose 
interactions with the host’s genome are incompatible, thus producing lethality? 
Only if this is plausibly shown, can it be argued that the lethality is a 
consequence of a host-microbe incompatibility. But the evidence that Brucker 
and Bordenstein present is highly unspecific and, thus, inconsequential, about 
the mechanistic causes that produce lethality. Insofar as their data only shows a 
large effect of the microbiome, the direction of the causal arrow can always be 
reverted: what if the observed effect (lethality in conventionally reared wasps, 
recovery in germ-free reared wasps) is caused by the existence of a higher 
degree of susceptibility in hybrid genomes when compared to non-hybrid 
genomes? It would be precisely the existence of the susceptibility what would 
explain both the observed high rate of lethality among conventionally reared 
wasps and the lower rate among germ-free reared wasps.  It turns out that for 
their hypothesis about Nasonia to be conclusive, Brucker and Bordenstein need 
to prove not only a large effect of the microbiome on lethality, but the specific 
causal role of an agent. 
 
  Brucker and Bordenstein published a response (2014) right after the 
paper by Chandler and Turelli was published, where they defended the 
interpretation of the data that they had presented in their original paper. 
Particularly, they disagree that their experiments are compatible with Chadler 
and Turelli’s ‘intrinsic hybrid dysfunction’, but do not prove host-microbiome 
coadaptation. In their view, this is an inaccurate interpretation of their data, 
since it presupposes—as Chandler and Turelli explicitly state—that the bacteria 
that were inoculated to F2 male hybrids in Nasonia were random species—i.e. 
not necessarily phylosymbiotic. However, this was not the case, since Brucker 
                                                          
35 For a very similar criticism to holobiont research and the attribution of causal powers to the 
microbiome, see Bourrat (2018), and Lunch et al. (forthcoming). 
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and Bordenstein explicitly selected bacterial species that had been isolated or 
taxonomically found in the wasps. Thus, Chandler and Turelli’s argument that 
‘any bacteria’ can cause hybrid lethality is unjustified and, more importantly, the 
observation of that result would be completely irrelevant to discard adaptation. 
Why do Brucker and Bordenstein believe the latter to be so? Because, in their 
opinion, that ‘holds the ambiguous equivalence that any foreign mitochondria 
from different animals can cause mortality’ (2014: 1011b). Let me expand on 
the latter point a bit. The idea to grasp here is the following: to test the 
possibility that mitochondria are coadapted to their hosts in a way that breaks 
down in hybrids it is not necessary to discard the possibility that a randomly 
inoculated mitochondrion from any other species would have a similar effect on 
hybrids than the effect of a mitochondrion from the original species. It is enough 
to show the effect of an inoculation with a mitochondrion from the original 
species. And the same applies to testing the effects that certain genes might 
have on hybrids. In other words, Chandler and Turelli are demanding more 
evidence to accept a case of hologenomic speciation than the evidence they 
would demand for other cases (influence of a gene, influence of mitochondrion), 
and this seems to be unjustified from the perspective of Brucker and 
Borenstein. As they claim, what they are proposing is changing the ‘framework 
for studying the basis of any reproductive isolation mechanism’ (2014: 1011b). 
And either the new framework is accepted, or the evidence that will be 
demanded to prove its validity will always be biased from the perspective of the 
previous framework.36  
 
3.4.5. Pre/post-mating isolation and the hologenome concept of evolution. A 
brief refection 
The experiments conducted by Brucker and Bordenstein, the theoretical 
apparatus they introduced and the new concepts they have used to explore the 
consequences of HCE are probably some of the most elegant and influential 
steps that have been taken to gather wide support for the heavily controversial 
                                                          
36 The same type of response is given to refute Chandler and Turelli’s suggestion about the 
cross-inoculation experiment: while Brucker and Bordenstein accept that this would be 
additional evidence to support the hologenomic basic of speciation in Nasonia, they think that 
demanding that kind of experiment is unreasonable, since the same experiment could be 
demanded for every speciation gene in animals, and that type of experiments is usually not 
carried out. 
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hypothesis that natural selection can act on the multispecies consortia that 
hologenomes represent. However, their interpretation of the experimental 
results that they obtained, as well as their application of the principles of HCE to 
speciation is not without contestation. Specifically, their general explanation of 
the microbial-assisted BDM model of reproductive isolation (Figure 6) allows a 
completely different reading, closely allied to Chandler and Turelli’s 
interpretation of their results about the hybrid lethality in Nasonia. The reading 
would be as follows: every bacterium that interacts with a host is part of its 
environment. As such, some interactions will be beneficial, increasing its fitness, 
whereas others will be detrimental, decreasing it, or even killing the host in the 
most extreme cases. When, then, is it legitimate to consider the holobiont as the 
unit that speciates/gets selected, and when it is not? Brucker and Bordenstein 
need to be very specific about their way of answering this question, since their 
hypothesis about the BDM model does not clearly screen-off environmental 
factors from intrinsic factors. And this distinction is essential if the dispute is 
about the unit of selection qua replicator, which is the role that hologenomes are 
assumed to play in the context of HCE.37 
 
 The existence of phylosymbiotic patterns in nature, though, could be 
argued to fill in this gap. The hologenome, thus, would be the ensemble of 
phylosymbiotic species. But notice that this could drastically reduce the 
‘dimension’ of the holobiont, since the phylosymbiotic species that interact with 
a host are just a subset (variable in size) of the species that interact with a host 
during its lifetime. And, more importantly, proving the existence of 
phylosymbiotic patterns might yet not be enough to prove that holobionts are 
replicators because some of the phylosymbiotic species might interact within 
the holobiont for environmental—i.e. not intrinsic—reasons. It seems thus 
necessary to distinguish which elements are environmental and which elements 
are intrinsic if the position that will be defended is that the hologenome is a unit 
of selection qua replicator (for a long discussion of these issues, see chapter 
II). 
 
                                                          
37 I will provide a consistent way of explaining these results in chapter IV, section 4.2. 
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4. ‘Getting the hologenome concept right’. Clarifying the eco-evolutionary 
principles of the hologenome concept of evolution 
 
The formulation of HCE soon gave rise to some serious theoretical criticisms, 
which I will review in chapter II.38 Those criticisms moved the authors working 
under the postulates of HCE to clarify the specific meaning of their hypothesis, 
which gave rise to two very important pieces in the literature about HCE: 
Bordenstein and Theis (2015), and Theis et al. (2016).  
 
 Bordenstein and Theis’s (2015) paper summarized ten principles about 
the holobiont and the hologenome with the purpose of making HCE clear for 
future research, including possible ways of evaluating the empirical validity of 
the hypothesis. I think what makes their contribution more valuable is that they 
make clear how not to conceive holobionts, more than they directly clarify how 
positively to conceive them. This is reasonable because, as the authors have 
expressed: ‘Holobionts and their hologenomes are less entities that elucidate 
something per se than they are entities that need elucidation’ (Theis et al. 2016: 
2). Let me briefly summarize what I take to be the key elements that 
Bordenstein and Theis elucidate in their paper. First of all, the authors make 
clear that the holobiont must be considered as a unit of biological 
organization,39 meaning basically that host-microbiome associations 
(hologenome) should not be considered as genotype-by-environment (G x E) 
interactions in any of its possible interpretations (i.e. the microbiome being an 
environment for the host, or the host being an environment for the microbiome), 
nor as a phenotype encoded by the host. In their view, host-microbiome 
associations must be conceived as genotype-by-genotype-by-environment (G x 
G x E) interactions. This last point should be interpreted as stating that the 
holobiont acts as a single unit with its environment so that certain G x G 
interactions can be selected for. But, what would be the conditions that G x G 
                                                          
38 The reason for presenting the clarificatory papers first, and the criticisms later, is that none of 
the clarificatory papers directly tackled any of the criticism ‘in a philosophical way’, so to speak. 
Rather, they just stated HCE in more specific and operationalizable terms, which help to 
perceive the historical development of the hypothesis. 
39 Bordenstein and Theis never explicate what they mean by ‘unit of organization’, but from how 
they continue the section it might well be assumed that their definition has nothing to do with the 
meaning given by defenders of the organizational account of individuality (Moreno and Mossio 
2015). 
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should satisfy so that evolution can operate on them? Basically, that their 
degree of temporal persistence is enough so that evolution can operate on 
them, and this would happen only if there is a sufficient degree of co-
inheritance. Bordenstein and Theis argue this to be so based on the evidence 
about horizontal transmission of the microbiome reviewed in Bright and 
Bulgheresi (2010), Funkhouser and Bordenstein (2013), and Rosenberg and 
Zilber-Rosenberg (2013) (Bordenstein and Theis: Principles I and IV). 
 
 Second, following a previous statement by Rosenberg and Zilber-
Rosenberg (2013), Bordenstein and Theis clarify that the holobiont is neither an 
organ system, nor a superorganism, nor a metagenome. These clarifications 
are far from trivial: Firstly, organs are conventionally individuated because they 
perform one function in a system; by saying that the holobiont is not an organ 
system, they are neglecting the possibility of considering the microbiome as an 
organ, thus clarifying that it can play more than one function. And, because of 
this, they are simultaneously indirectly clarifying that transgenerational changes 
in the composition of the microbiome are not commensurable with 
transgenerational changes in a quantitative trait. Therefore, they cannot be 
studied under the framework of ‘standard heritability’ h2; a different way of 
measuring it is required. Secondly, by clarifying that the holobiont is not a 
superorganism, the authors are clarifying that it is a polygenomic entity, i.e. an 
entity necessarily composed by organisms of different species. Thirdly, by 
clarifying that the holobiont is not a metagenome, they are clarifying that it is not 
constituted by a host plus all its ‘environmental microbes’, but only by a subset 
of those. Unfortunately, they fail to define precisely which is this subset of the 
totality of microbes that interact with a host that should be included in the 
holobiont (Bordenstein and Theis: Principle II). 
 
 A clarification of this last problem is however provided in Theis et al. 
(2016). According to them, the holobiont is composed of the individual host and 
its microbial community, and the members of this microbial community ‘can be 
constant or inconstant, can be vertically or horizontally transmitted, and can act 
in a context-dependent manner as harmful, harmless, or helpful’ (2016: 1). 
Based on this definition, they define the hologenome as ‘the genomes of the 
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holobiont at a given point of time’ (2016: 1) (Figure 12).40 Notice that the 
definition encompasses three elements. First, a temporal timescale: the 
holobiont includes every symbiont that interacts with a host, no matter how long 
their interaction lasts (‘constant or inconstant’). Second, information about the 
modes of transmission/acquisition of the entities that compose it. Third, 
information about the possible effects of the microbes of the microbiome on the 
holobiont. Furthermore, the definition puts the emphasis on the fact that the 
hologenome is a spatio-temporally located entity which experiences/goes 
through (and results from) a series of eco-evolutionary processes, including 
selection, genetic drift, genetic conflict, epistasis, etc. As such, selection on the 
hologenome can lead to different evolutionary outcomes, including, but not 
restricted to, coevolution (see also Bordenstein and Theis (2015): Principles VII 
and VIII).  
 
 
Figure 12. Schematic representation of the hologenome. The hologenome includes the total 
sum of genes of the members of holobiont, including the genome of the host and part of the 
genetic material that is contained in the microbiome (the other part would constitute an 
environmental metagenome). The complete genetic material of the microbiome includes a) host 
and symbiont genes that affect the phenotype of the holobiont but have not coevolved; b) host 
and symbiont genes that affect the phenotype of the holobiont and have coevolved; c) host and 
symbiont genes that do not affect the phenotype of the holobiont. (From Theis et al. 2016: 2, 
Fig. 1) 
 
                                                          
40 This definition is different to the definition presented in Roughgarden et al. (2017), where the 
holobiont is defined as a host plus its symbionts, i.e. including long-term pathogens, but 
excluding pathogens ‘which kill their host or depart in a few days’.  
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From the definition of the holobiont presented above follows another 
consequence, which is the pluralistic view of the holobiont that HCE defenders 
embrace. In some of the original formulations of Brucker and Bordenstein, the 
authors put the emphasis on the cooperative (beneficial) microbiome as the 
entity that, together with the host, constituted the hologenome. However, in the 
definition presented in Theis et al. (2016), the authors put the emphasis both on 
cooperation and on conflict, without restriction. In fact, that is not surprising, 
since defenders of the hologenome concept have always emphasized their 
embracing of multilevel selection theory (MLS, hereafter), the notion that natural 
selection targets different levels of the biological hierarchy simultaneously. As 
such, it is expected to result in contradictory effects on each level of the 
biological hierarchy, promoting cooperation (low conflict) in some levels, and 
competition in others. In principle, selection at the level of the hologenome will 
tend to reduce the level of conflict among the host and its microbiome, but this 
is not necessary to argue that the hologenome is a unit of selection, as Theis et 
al. emphasize, since HCE presupposes MLS. Thus, they conclude: 
‘Hologenomes then exist as hierarchically nested, although not necessarily 
integrated, levels of genomes in which all levels of selection are in play’ (Theis 
et al. 2016: 4). This statement, as well as the rest of the clarifications about the 
multilevel nature of the holobiont, will be reviewed more carefully in chapter V. 
 
5. The hologenome concept of evolution is a story about songs, not about 
their singers. A functional, but still genetic, interpretation of HCE 
 
One of the main problems that HCE has to face is the apparent lack of 
transgenerational inheritance of the microbial species that compose the host’s 
microbiome (section 3.4.2, section 3.4.3). This problem raises a question 
about the stability of the hologenome: does the hologenome have the sufficient 
degree of temporal stability so that natural selection can act significantly on it? 
Some empirical studies suggested this not to be the case, showing a high 
degree of transgenerational species variability (Hester et al. 2015; Taxis et al. 
2015). The existence of this transgenerational variability has been interpreted 
by many as questioning the opportunity for significant selection on 
hologenomes, as I will review in detail in chapter II, section 3. However, this 
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has also produced an interesting conceptual shift, moving some authors to 
interpret hologenomes functionally (i.e. in terms of the genes that interact), 
instead of taxonomically (i.e. in terms of the species that make them up). This 
idea was first proposed in Taxis et al. (2015), and further developed by 
Lemanceau et al. (2017), Doolittle and Booth (2017), Doolittle (2017), and 
Doolittle and Inkpen (2018). 
 
 The notion of a functional understanding of the holobiont can be 
expressed as follows: the holobiont is the biological entity that performs a set of 
biological processes, including metabolic, immunological, or developmental 
processes, among others, in virtue of the existence of networks of functional 
genes whose interactions cause these processes. These processes have a high 
degree of transgenerational stability and can result from the interaction of 
different lineages (or taxa) of bacterial species, provided that the lineages that 
interact transgenerationally can carry out the same biological function as their 
predecessors—or, in other words, provided that the interacting taxa bring the 
same functional genes, thus giving rise to the creation of the same networks. 
Therefore, holobionts are units of selection qua interactors that lead to the 
transgenerational replication of different functional processes, in virtue of the 
replication of the functional gene-networks that have the capacity to carry out 
these processes.  
 
 The idea is hard to grasp, but can be elegantly captured with the 
following metaphor: Let’s consider the biological processes that are grounded 
on the genetic networks as ‘songs’ (or as games), and let’s consider the species 
that bear the genetic networks and interact to produce the biological processes 
as the ‘singers’ (or the players) of these songs (games). And now, let’s study 
the evolution of songs and the evolution of their singers. For example, assume 
that the song is the worldwide famous ‘Comme d’habitude’, first sang by Claude 
François. The song admits different versions, some of them slower, with a 
different orchestral sound, it can be sung in different languages (‘My way’, in 
English, ‘A mi manera’, in Spanish, ‘Precis som vanligt’, in Swedish, etc.), etc. 
Also, the song can be sung by different singers: Elvis Presley, Frank Sinatra, 
Gipsy Kings, Peter Jöback, etc. It is thus possible to talk about the evolution of 
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the song which, even if grounded on the singers that sing it, is somehow 
independent from them: the song can be sung many years after the death of 
some of its singers. The singers are only the interactors that guarantee the 
transgenerational success of the song, and of its different versions. The songs 
are the replicators, the entities that form the transgenerational continuous entity 
that evolves using its singers opportunistically. This is basically the idea of the 
song/singer model of Doolittle (Figure 13), which is clearly inspired by the 
game/players model of Taxis et al. (2015), and which the authors have summed 
up as follows: 
 
‘[P]athways or more generally interaction patterns in holobionts are 
themselves constructed niches, created by the earliest performers of their 
individual steps but then setting up conditions in which very many 
additional taxa capable of performing the same steps (or improved 
versions thereof) are continually selected for (…). Because there’s a song 
there are singers: because there are singers, there’s a song. […] [And], 
[r]ather than seeing shared metabolisms as the products of some sort of 
group selection operating on individual lineages—or, in any rare 
mitochondria-like cases, on some hologenome—to create multilineage 
interactions, we imagine that such interactions already exist. Lineages 
evolve to carry out their steps because in each case it is selectively 
advantageous to individuals (or their genes) within those lineages to do so. 
There is no need to envision the independent evolution, by some onerous 
collective mechanism, of similar patterns in thousands of individual 
holobiont species.’ (Doolittle and Booth 2017: 21-22, emphasis added) 
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Figure 13. Doolittle and Booth’s song/singer model. A-D represent the ‘songs’, which are the 
parts of a metabolic cycle, the stages in the developmental process of a host, components of a 
macromolecular assembly, etc. that give rise to a collective product, or song (A, B, C, D). W-Y 
are the ‘singers’, that is, the microbial components that are capable of producing the collective 
product. The singers are not required to belong to the same phylogenetic group, and are 
frequently interchangeable by other ‘singers’ (represented by X*, X**, X***), provided that those 
are able to make the same contribution to the collective activity. Their capability of contributing 
to the same cycle usually reflects the existence of lateral gene transfer between those 
components. Finally, Z represents the possibility that there are cyclical interactions (From 
Doolittle and Booth 2013: 13, Fig. 1) 
 
The song/singers model has a clear advantage over the taxonomical conception 
of the holobiont, namely, that it accommodates the contradictory empirical 
evidence about transgenerational symbiont transmission, while keeping the one 
of the horns of HCE, namely that holobionts are units of selection qua 
interactors. However, by doing so, the song/singers model also gets rid of one 
of, probably, the most ‘revolutionary’ notion of HCE, namely: the role of 
hologenomes as units of selection qua replicators. In other words, it gets rid of 
the idea that natural selection operates on collections of genomes, while 
keeping the idea that natural selection operates somehow on holobionts, which 
would be the instruments that are used by different gene-networks to persist. 
 
5.1. A brief reflection on the song/singer model of holobiont evolution 
The song/singer model is perhaps the most elaborated and empirically 
adequate version of the claim that holobionts are units of selection qua 
interactors. However, it also suffers from some imprecisions: first, it is not clear 
how to discriminate the metabolic pathways, developmental processes, 
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geochemical cycles, etc. that they argue holobionts transgenerationally 
recreate. Is it a question of having a vague impression of which are those cycles 
or processes? Or is there any way of actually recognizing (or discovering) them 
and ‘pointing them out’, so to speak? Second, it is not exactly clear why or in 
what sense their theory is biologically relevant. HCE was introduced to explain 
the existence of some traits whose existence was hard (or even impossible) to 
explain if the individual genome was taken as the unit of selection. The 
song/singer model completely moves away from this explanatory context, with 
the sole intention of keeping the claim that holobionts are units of selection. It 
seems to me that, in doing so, and contrary to what they claim to be doing, they 
are indeed ‘throwing the baby with the bathwater’. Third, the model seems to 
confuse cause and effect: the lineages of organisms that interact 
transgenerationally to form a holobiont are the effect of the existence of the 
metabolic pathways, geochemical cycles, etc. which use the organisms 
opportunistically for their maintenance. However, the explanation seems to work 
inversely, since it is hard to conceive the existence of these metabolic pathways 
in the first place without the lineages that interact to generate them. And, if 
these pathways, which are grounded on the genetic networks that instantiate 
them, are the replicators, then they must have been selected for as replicators 
precisely because the entities that instantiated them were selected for in the 
first place. So, what is being selected for is not the metabolic pathway itself, but 
the entities that interact so that those pathways obtain. And these entities are 
selected in virtue of these fact that these pathways confer them fitness 
advantages. But it is not the pathway that is selected (how can a pathway be 
selected?), but the set of entities that produce the pathway. Forth, and following 
the previous comment, the model is totally grounded in the action of single 
genes, which are the real focus of attention of the model, and not holobionts. 
The singer/song model does not really cast the holobiont as the unit of 
selection, but the genes that form the networks that give rise to the appearance 
of the metabolic pathways. In this sense, it seems to me that the model is not 
but another version of Dawkins’ selfish gene (1976/2006, 1982a) that, as I will 
argue later (chapter V, section 5) is an obvious consequence of assuming the 
interactor/replicator framework for conceiving the units of selection. Fifth, but 
not less important, it loses track of the analogy between the genome and the 
hologenome, because it basically disregards any mention of the hologenome. 
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Proponents of the song/singer model insist that it is not useful to think of the 
hologenome as a coevolved entity, because in most cases it is not, but they 
forget the key point that defenders of HCE made: that the hologenome does not 
presuppose the coevolution of the species of the hologenome, only that those 
species will manifest a higher tendency to associate than others (H2c).  
 
 Despite these criticisms, here only sketched, the song/singer model is a 
very ingenious way of understanding the claim that holobionts are units of 
selection, as well as a suggestive way of making the claim coherent with our 
current empirical evidence. It is now time to open the discussion about the 
claims of HCE to other, non-evolutionary, ideas. 
 
6. The hologenome concept as a general theory of biological individuality 
 
The previous discussion (section 3 to section 5) constituted a general review 
of the evolutionary claims made by the defenders of HCE, as well as their 
development since the hypothesis was first proposed by Zilber-Rosenberg and 
Rosenberg as a generalization of their observations in coral biology. This 
section presents a full new reading of the holobiont hypothesis, which is now 
conceived not as a specific theory about which units can be conceived as 
evolutionary individuals, but as a general theory about biological individuality. 
The reader might wonder in which sense it is legitimate to consider HCE as a 
general hypothesis about biological individuality, when the hypothesis is 
explicitly addressed to the role of holobionts and hologenomes as units of 
selection. To clarify this point, let me start by considering the following passage, 
taken from the introduction of Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg (2013): 
 
‘[The] holobiont (host + microbiota), with its hologenome (host genes + 
microbiome), is a unique biological entity, with the sum of the dynamic 
interactions within the holobiont giving rise to the genotype and phenotype 
of the organism, as we know it. The hologenome concept posits that the 
holobiont (host + all associated microorganisms, including viruses), being 
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a unique biological entity, acts also as a level of selection41 in evolution’ 
(2013: viii; emphasis added) 
 
The passage contains two different types of claim: First, that there are certain 
‘high-level entities’ that we should call holobionts, and which act as ‘a unique 
biological entity’ (the type of biological entity not being specified); second, that 
these entities are therefore a unit of selection in evolution.42 These claims, 
despite being presented as if the later were a sort of logical consequence of the 
former, are deeply problematic and not as easily intertwined as they assume. 
What is this ‘unique biological entity’ that Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg refer 
to, if it is somehow different from a unit of selection in evolution?  HCE will now 
be interpreted as a general theory about how to conceive the phenomenon of 
biological individuality, a thesis that I will call the ‘generalized individuality 
thesis’, in contrast to the ‘particular individuality thesis’ that holobionts and their 
hologenomes are units of selection. To that aim, I will review Dupré and 
O’Malley (2009), Gilbert et al. (2012), and Roughgarden et al. (2017).  
 
 Dupré and O’Malley, with their ‘collaborative’ view of life, were the first 
authors to point out, to a philosophical audience,43 the importance of symbiosis 
to define one of the key aspects of multicellular forms of life, namely: their 
functionality as a single whole (see also O’Malley and Dupré 2007; O’Malley 
2014). They introduce their point with the following reflection: 
 
‘Some biologists and philosophers may prefer to define multicellularity in 
ways derived from reflection on animals and plants, and thereby exclude 
these microbial communities from that category. But certainly any general 
                                                          
41 Notice that ‘unit of selection’ and ‘level of selection’ are frequently used interchangeably, and 
so do Rosenberg and Zilber-Rsoenberg (2013). 
42 I think this is the most convincing way of interpreting the use of the paraphrase in the second 
sentence of the passage, as stating a sort of causal claim that connects the role of holobionts 
as ‘unique biological entities’ with their role as units of selection. 
43 Dupré and O’Malley were of course not the first to point out the importance of symbiosis and 
its relation to biological individuality (concretely, how fuzzy symbiosis makes some of these 
boundaries). These reflections started at least with Anton de Bary and have continued since. I 
review some of these original debates in Suárez (2018a): Part I. In this section I start with the 
work of Dupré and O’Malley because they are the first to point out the importance of symbiosis 
—and also microbes—to philosophers. 
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account of the varieties of biological organization will need to take account 
of them and explain how they conform to concepts such [as] 
“multicellularity”, “invididuality” and “autonomy”. Do humans, for example, 
stop at their skin and have to be conceived of as tubular rather than solid 
in order to avoid incorporating large internal populations of gut microbes? 
Lederberg, with his concept of ‘symbiome’, raises the question of whether 
organisms are necessarily monogenomic or whether a multi- or 
metagenomic state is the usual state of organismal organization 
(Lederberg, in Hooper and Gordon 2001; Dupré and O’Malley 2007). 
Discussions of life and its organization have to take into account the fact 
that symbiotic relationships are ubiquitous and all organisms, when 
conceived as the functional wholes that interact with their surroundings, 
are multi-lineal and multigenomic.’ (2009: 11-12) 
 
From this observation, Dupré and O’Malley derive the following conclusion: the 
biological world is necessarily composed of two different and non co-
extensional types of entities: on the one hand, metabolic-forming entities; on the 
other, lineage-forming entities. They think that metabolic-wholes are multi-
lineages composites, that result from the interaction of collaborative (i.e. 
including both competitive and cooperative) lineage-forming entities whose 
interactions give rise to the emergence of the functional whole that we call 
‘biological individual’. And these metabolic-wholes are, for Dupré and O’Malley, 
the most fundamental unit of selection, something they express in the following 
manner: 
 
‘[F]unctional entities are, rather, associations of a variety of such lineage-
forming entities. A typical large eukaryote, for instance, is constituted by 
entities of all the kinds we have distinguished above [spatially bounded 
entities, evolvable entities, reproductive entities, etc.]. We might invoke 
here David Hull’s (1980) well-known distinction between replicators and 
interactors, but in a very different way from that originally supposed by 
Hull. Interactors, in our view, are complex systems involving the 
collaboration of many highly diverse lineage-forming entities. This sort of 
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interactor, we also suggest, is the most fundamental unit of selection. This 
perspective has radical implications for the way we think about evolution.’ 
(2009: 13; emphasis added) 
 
Notice that Dupré and O’Malley specify here the meaning of one of the claims 
made by Zilber-Rosneberg and Rosenberg in their first formulation of HCE. 
Remember that, for the authors, holobionts are interactors (section 3.1.3). But, 
what are interactors? Dupré and O’Malley give a clear response to this 
question: interactors are the collaborative multi-lineage entities that associate to 
form a functional entity (and the ‘unique biological entity’ of Rosenberg and 
Zilber-Rosenberg). Nonetheless, two important points should also be 
emphasized: First, Dupré and O’Malley’s paper does not contain any specific 
mention of the holobiont, nor of HCE. The most similar claim that can be found 
is their mention of the ‘symbiome’, and their reflections about the gut microbiota. 
So, even if their paper could have many implications for HCE, and has been 
used as evidence in support of the claim that holobionts are units of selection, 
some caution is required—especially since Maureen O’Malley has recently 
expressed serious doubts about the possibility that holobionts are units of 
selection (2016; personal communication). Second, the authors make a clear 
distinction between metabolic-forming wholes (interactors), and lineage-forming 
wholes. This is important because it can be read as a claim against the role that 
these ‘collaborative multi-lineage wholes’ are units of selection, if forming a 
lineage is a condition for units of selection, as in Lewontin’s formulation. And, 
furthermore, it can be read as a claim against the definition of the hologenome 
as a replicator. Recall that the role of the hologenome as a replicator is a key 
assumption of HCE. As Dupré and O’Malley’s paper is written, it is unclear how 
to understand that passage in terms of replicators/interactors, as well as in 
terms of HCE. Nevertheless, their paper makes an essential contribution by 
distinguishing between the notions of metabolic-forming wholes and lineage-
forming wholes, which points to the non-overlapping nature of different 
conceptions of biological individuality. 
 
 A second key development to disentangle the meaning of the rather 
obscure phrase that qualifies holobionts as ‘unique biological entities’ came 
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from the work of Gilbert et al. (2012) and Roughgarden et al. (2017).44 In their 
view, none of the standard criteria for individuality make sense except in the 
light of symbiosis: since macrobes interact during their lifespan with a wide 
range of microbial symbionts, it is not possible to make any definition of 
biological individual that excludes them as structural parts of the macrobe. 
Therefore, macrobes have never been independent individuals, but integrated 
host-microbiome ensembles (see also Dupré 2012). Let us start to show why 
this is so from the beginning. 
 
Anatomical individuality 
If we define biological individuality anatomically, i.e. as a structured whole 
where different parts work together to maintain its anatomical structure, it soon 
becomes clear that, for macrobes, the individual is constituted not only by the 
cells of the macrobe, but by the cells of the macrobe plus all the interacting 
symbionts. First, all macrobes interact with a wide number of microbes during 
their lifetime. Second, microbes occupy different compartments of the 
macrobe’s anatomy, in many cases occupying different body parts depending 
on their properties. In many animals, for example, the guts are mainly 
composed of microbial elements, with different microbes presents in different 
niches, which help them in their hosts in their (usually highly inefficient) 
processes of digestion. In humans, the microbiome has been estimated to 
contain approximately the same number of cells as the body cells, with an 
average weight of about 0.2 kilograms (Sender et al. 2016). This led 
Roughgarden et al. to conclude that from an anatomical perspective, animals 
are holobionts, anatomically composed of host cells and bacterial cells. I will 
refer to this entity as the ‘anatomical holobiont’.  
 
 
 
                                                          
44 I directly combine the claims made in the paper of Gilbert et al. (2012) with the claims made in 
Roughgarden et al. (2017), since both papers are complementary: the first, providing the 
‘negative’ argument that none of the dimensions of biological individuality would make sense 
without symbionts; the second, making the point of why host-symbiont ensembles should be 
considered biological individuals. 
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Physiological individuality 
‘Physiology’ refers to the study of how organisms realize their normal activities 
and functioning, including metabolism, nutrition, and all the biochemical 
pathways that lead to them. The opposite of a physiological state is a 
pathological state. Biological entities can be individuated by attending to their 
physiological properties (i.e. to how they fuction normally), thus leading to the 
‘physiological individual’, a very similar concept to Dupré and O’Malley’s 
‘metabolic-forming’ wholes, reviewed above. Gilbert et al. (2012) and 
Rouhgarden et al. (2018) argue that macrobes cannot be considered 
physiological individuals in themselves simply because their normal (i.e. non-
pathological) functioning is the result of their interaction with the microbial 
symbionts of their microbiome. Indeed, scientific investigation has extensively 
proven the essential role of the microbiome for processes such as nitrogen 
fixation, cellulose degradation, photosynthesis, oxidation of inorganic 
compounds, synthesis of essential aminoacids, detoxification of poisonous 
chemicals, synthesis of metabolites, and so on and so forth. The authors 
believe that this evidence strongly supports the considerations of the microbial 
symbionts as essential components of the physiology of macrobes and, 
therefore, as a unified physiological entity, which could be called the 
‘physiological holobiont’. Importantly, sceptics of HCE such as Godfrey-Smith 
(2009, 2013, 2015) have argued that holobionts are merely physiological 
individuals, with no evolutionary significance. 
 
Developmental individuality 
A developmental individual is what proceeds ‘from ovum to ovum’, i.e. from a 
zygote to the fully ‘fleshed’ biological entity which has the capacity of producing 
new zygotes and that we refer to as ‘individual’ or ‘organism’. In other words, a 
developmental individual is the entity that unfolds during a life cycle.45 Holobiont 
defenders argue that no macrobe can be considered an autonomous 
developmental individual, since microbes are key elements in macrobe 
development (Gilbert and Epel 2015; Gilbert and Chiu 2015; Gilbert 2018). For 
                                                          
45 In many cases, determining when the life cycle ends, and a new life cycle starts can be 
complex, especially in organisms with haplodiploid life cycles (see O’Malley 2016). I will put 
these problems aside in this discussion, though. 
86 
 
instance, the microbiota activates the genes that lead to the maturation of the 
gut and immune system in mice and zebrafish, and the same effect has been 
observed in the case of brain maturation in mice. The observation of these and 
other cases has lead Scott F. Gilbert (2018) to argue that every process of 
animal development is indeed a process of co-development between the 
macrobe and its microbiome (Figure 14). Therefore, by developmental criteria, 
macrobes cannot be considered individuals, but holobionts. I will call this notion 
the ‘developmental holobiont’. 
 
 
Figure 14. Gilbert’s developmental holobiont. The figure shows how the traditional 
developmental stages of the ‘host’, including fertilization, embryogenesis, morphogenesis and 
sexual maturation include their interaction with symbionts, through different chemical signals. 
Most symbiont cycles are indeed shorter than the ‘host’ lifecycle, and, for Gilbert, symbionts can 
be maternally acquired or environmentally acquired. They will be considered part of the 
‘developmental holobiont’, provided they interact with the holobiont during any of its 
developmental stages (From Gilbert 2018: 299, Fig. 12.1) 
 
Immunological individuality 
A classical manner of defining biological individuality is by immunological 
criteria, the reason why some have referred to immunology as ‘the science of 
the self/nonself discrimination’ (Klein 1982). The immunological system has 
traditionally been understood as a defensive system, a type of army, that 
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prevents the action of pathogens or any other sources that might cause damage 
to the ‘self’. However, more recent views on immunology have seen the 
immunological system as the key element in defining the constitution of 
biological entities, i.e. as the system that defines the boundaries of the 
biological individual (Pradeu 2012, 2019; Pradeu and Vivier 2016). Defenders of 
the holobiont argue that, on the one hand, the immunological system of 
macrobes is created due to the active participation of their microbiome whereas, 
on the other, the immune system actively recruits and tolerates its symbionts, 
sometimes even compartmentalizing them in special structures of their bodies, 
such as bacteriocytes in insects. Therefore, from an immunological perspective, 
the holobiont is a biological individual, the ‘immunological holobiont’. 
 
6.1. A brief reflection on the ‘generalized individuality thesis’ 
The ‘generalized individuality thesis’ is much more specific and, thus, more 
useful, than the rather unclear statement that holobionts are ‘unified biological 
entities’. However, one might still argue that the generalized individuality thesis 
is orthogonal to issues of individuality, for, at most, it says that the entities that 
participate in physiological processes, developmental processes, immunological 
processes, etc. are more complex than what we think of as biological individuals 
(i.e. the macrobe). A version of this criticism will in fact be examined in detail in 
chapter II. For the moment, it is enough that the reader realizes of this difficulty 
and, especially, that she realizes that the speech about immunology, 
development, physiology, etc. is talk about individual biological processes, but it 
is not necessarily—at least according to some authors—talk about individual 
biological substances (Dupré 2012; Bapteste and Dupré 2013; Bouchard 2018).  
 
 Second, it is important to notice that the ‘generalized individuality thesis’ 
has been presented in relation to the individuality of macrobes (particularly, 
animals, although the argument can be extended to plants). In other words, the 
argument is basically that standard individuation criteria—i.e. the appeal to the 
biological processes of physiology, development, immunology—capture entities 
that are way more inclusive than the monogenomic entity that ‘unfolds’ from an 
original zygote. Nothing is argued about the individuality of the microbes that 
interact symbiotically with the host, an individuality that HCE neither questions, 
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nor it is required to question. HCE, conceived as a ‘generalized individuality 
thesis’, is a thesis about the individuality of the macrobe, not about the 
individuality of the microbes. This point is crucial for the argument I will develop 
in chapter IV. 
 
7. Brief summary of chapter I: The hologenome concept of evolution as a 
set of distinguishable hypotheses 
 
This chapter dealt with the historical development of the HCE, since the 
hypothesis was originally formulated by Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg and Eugene 
Roseberg as a generalization from their research on corals. The chapter has 
shown how the concepts used have been made more precise, how different 
ways of testing the hypothesis have developed and it has explained how some 
experiments have been carried out to test the validity of some of the claims 
made by the defenders of HCE. The content of the chapter can be summarized 
in the following key points: 
 
1. HCE constitutes a new framework to study host-microbiome 
interactions, as well as a new way of conceiving these interactions. 
2. The holobiont is a biological individual and a unit of selection qua 
interactor. 
3. The holobiont can be conceived as a biological individual in several 
dimensions, including metabolically, immunologically, anatomically, 
and developmentally. 
4. According to the standard HCE model, the hologenome is a unit of 
selection qua replicator, and it has to be modelled as a set of G x G x 
E interactions. 
5. According to the song/singer model, hologenomes are not units of 
selection qua replicators, but holobionts are units of selection qua 
interactors. 
6. Phylosymbiosis refers to the eco-evolutionary pattern by which the 
evolutionary changes in the host’s phylogeny associate with parallel 
changes in the microbiome that associates with the host. 
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7. Phylosymbiosis can be used as a proxy for selection on hologenomes 
by means of the notion of community heritability H2c. 
8. The discovery of phylosymbiotic patterns is indicative of the action of 
natural selection on holobionts. 
9. Changes in the hologenome can be ascribed causal responsibility in 
speciation events under the BDM model. 
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Chapter II 
 
‘Problems with hologenomes. Three types of 
criticism to the individuality thesis’ 
 
The previous chapter explored the historical development of the 
hologenome concept of evolution—including a historical hypothesis about 
where some of its eco-evolutionary ideas might have come from—and 
sketched some of the early criticisms that had been made to its specific 
application to corals and Nasonia wasps. This chapter deals with the most 
important conceptual criticisms that have been raised against the 
hypothesis, understood now as a general thesis about the evolution of 
animals and plants. The chapter first discusses the problem of definition of 
the holobiont during the host’s lifetime (how to define holobionts as 
individuals ontogenetically), then connects this discussion with the 
evolutionary dimension of the holobiont (how to define holobionts 
evolutionarily), and finally discusses the problems of considering 
holobionts as units of selection (how can holobionts actually get selected). 
 
1. Introduction 
Since its original formulation, HCE has been subjected to several criticisms. The 
main criticisms it has received can be basically classified in two groups: first, 
criticisms concerning the logical/conceptual foundations of the hypothesis; 
second, criticisms about the empirical possibility of having real cases of 
selection on hologenomes, including criticisms about the scarce evidence 
supporting HCE, and the low likelihood that real events of hologenome 
evolution could actually happen, given our current empirical knowledge. In the 
literature, these different types of criticisms are not usually distinguished and 
are taken to lie on a continuum of problems that defenders of HCE must face for 
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their hypothesis to be sound. For the purposes of my doctoral project it is 
however crucial to distinguish the two kinds of problems, because, as already 
indicated, my project mostly cares about the conceptual foundations of HCE, 
i.e. about what might be the conception of biological individuality that might 
justify—if possible—such an enterprise. This does not mean, though, that the 
empirical problems that the application of the HCE to empirical biology presents 
should not have any impact on my analysis: in the end, empirical and 
conceptual problem do lie in a continuum. Nonetheless, in this chapter, I will 
exclusively analyse the conceptual arguments that have been made against 
HCE (Introduction). 
 
In this chapter, I will first introduce a general problem about the definition 
of the holobiont, namely, the ‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont. Secondly, I will 
connect this criticism to the problem of defining holobionts as evolutionary 
entities. Finally, I will connect this criticism to the general problems that have 
been raised against the consideration of holobionts as units of selection. 
 
2. A problem of definition. Holobionts as ‘blurry’ entities 
 
A serious criticism to HCE concerns the ‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont. By the 
problem of the ‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont I refer to the following: Defenders 
of HCE typically claim that the holobiont encompasses an animal or a plant—
that plays the role of the host—plus its symbiotic microbiota (chapter I, section 
4). However, the symbiotic microbiota of hosts is known to be very transient, 
contingent, and highly dependent on environmental factors such as host’s diet 
(Hester et al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016; Hallen-Adams and Suhr 2017; Adair and 
Douglas 2017). If this is so, then any hypothesis about the individuality of the 
holobiont will necessarily ‘suffer from imprecision’ (Booth 2014: 670), or so the 
argument usually goes, since the holobiont will not keep its identity over time 
(or, at least, its identity will not be the same as the identity of the host, at least 
not during a host’s lifetime, nor is it clear how to mark different moments/stages 
during a holobiont’s lifetime). These types of claims are present in different 
ways in Booth (2014), Chiu and Eberl (2016), Queller and Strassmann (2016), 
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and, to a lesser extent, in Bourrat and Griffiths (2018). Since all the criticisms 
have a very similar structure, I will concentrate here on the criticisms made in 
Chiu and Eberl (2016).46 
 
2.1. The question of proper parts: Microorganisms are not proper parts of 
the host 
Holobionts are composite objects, i.e. they are entities composed of different 
and independent parts (host, endosymbionts, microbiota) that arguably 
integrate with each other to form a higher-level object. As said in chapter I, 
defenders of HCE argue that holobionts are biological individuals, which creates 
the problem of explaining how the parts of the holobiont integrate with each 
other so that they can be considered proper parts. Chiu and Eberl reformulate 
this problem as a question of ‘glue’: what is the ‘special glue’ among the parts of 
the holobiont (i.e. microbiota and macroorganism) that allows us to consider the 
holobiont as a composite individual?47 
 
                                                          
46 The choice of this paper as representative of claims about the ‘blurry’ nature of holobionts is 
based on three reasons. First, I consider it to be the most clearly elaborated version of the 
argument. Second, because the claims made in Chiu and Eberl’s work seem partially different 
to the claims made in the other papers, which will be partially addressed in section 3 and 
section 4 of this chapter—concretely, Queller and Strassmann made their criticism in the 
context of the cooperation/conflict definition of organismality, which is the conception that I 
argue grounds the criticisms of the role of holobionts as units of selection (section 4); Booth’s 
discussion is more general, and it is connected to at least two different conceptions of the role of 
holobionts as units of selection, which will also be discussed later; finally, I will use section 3 to 
discuss Bourrat and Griffith’s ideas. Third, because I have drafted a critical response to Chiu 
and Eberl’s specific account of the holobiont, together with Vanessa Triviño (University Rey 
Juan Carlos de Madrid), submitted to SHPS: Part C, which makes me much more familiar with 
their way of criticisms than with the criticisms made by the others. This section is importantly 
grounded on that draft. 
47 In this section, I have decided to introduce the problem as Chiu and Eberl do it, as the 
problem of the ‘glue’ that ties together all the members of the holobiont, since I think it is the 
best way of guiding the discussion. The reader will notice that there is still another logically 
possible way of introducing the problem, which I have decided not to consider here for 
argumentative purposes: the problem introduced as the question of ‘glue’ presupposes that 
there must be a biologically non-trivial manner of arguing that the elements of the holobiont form 
a relatively cohesive conglomerate, or that a biologically non-trivial criterion needs to be 
introduced for at least some of the members of the host’s microbiota. However, there is the 
possibility of directly denying that there is any biologically non-trivial manner of doing so. This 
position is partially maintained by Queller and Strassmann (2016), who accuse holobiont 
defenders of basing their hypothesis solely on anatomical criteria, which are not necessarily 
biologically relevant. In their words ‘The holobiont is defined by spatial criteria. There is no 
reason to believe that spatial proximity necessarily leads to functional integration’ (2016: 869). 
‘Functional integration’ should be understood here as a general reference to any relevant 
biological property. 
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 To answer this question, Chiu and Eberl propose what might be called an 
‘immunological criterion of parthood’ (ICP, henceforth), which states that ‘what 
makes a microorganism part of an organism is not its taxonomic or functional 
properties, but whether it is interconnected with host components through the 
biochemical interactions of the immune system’ (Chiu and Eber 2016: 822, 
emphasis added). ICP is grounded on two recent theories about immunity: (a) 
the discontinuity theory of immunity (DT, hereafter) (Pradeu and Vivier 2016) 
and (b) the equilibrium model of immunity (EM, hereafter) (Eberl 2016). 
According to DT, the immune system of an organism determines both its 
constituent parts (criterion of inclusion) and the conditions in which the 
organism is actively maintained in the face of constant external perturbations 
(criterion of persistence). Regarding EM, immunity should be conceived in 
terms of the types of reactions (signals) that are triggered as a response to the 
different targets that the immune system faces: intracellular signals, small 
extracellular signals, large extracellular signals.  
 
Following the criteria of persistence and inclusion provided by DT, Chiu 
and Eberl argue that the microbiota, together with the immune system of the 
host, allows the persistence and individuality of the host itself (Chiu & Eberl 
2016: 820): First, the immunity system of the host allows for the host 
individuality insofar as it determines its constituents. Second, throughout the 
immune interactions of the microbiota with the host, the individuality and 
persistence of the latter is guaranteed.  
 
However, despite claiming that immunity allows to establish the 
individuality of the host by determining its constituents, and although the host 
immunity is partially activated by microorganisms, the authors do not consider 
microorganisms as constituents (proper parts) of the host, or as integrated with 
it to form a higher-level entity—i.e. a holobiont. That is where ICP enters in their 
picture of individuality: According to Chiu and Eberl, the microorganisms that 
integrate the microbiota of a host can be proper parts of the macroorganism 
host only in virtue of the continuity of host-microorganisms immune interactions. 
However, so their argument goes, our best current scientific evidence suggests 
that the interactions between the microbiota and the host are not continuous: 
94 
 
Insofar as most microorganisms are changeable, transient and sometimes, 
shared by other systems and processes, they are not continuously interacting 
with the immune system of the host, and therefore, they are not integrated into 
a single functioning and reproducing whole, even when they might occasionally 
have some necessary effects for the host’s survival, or even when 
microorganisms can substitute an entire organ of a host. In their own words: 
 
‘[T]hese fascinating cases [influence of the microbiome on the survival of 
the host] at most dispel the notion that macroorganisms are self-sufficient 
without microorganisms. They fall short from showing that holobionts are 
causally integrated metabolic or reproductive wholes [because] (…) [n]ot 
only do holobionts contain microorganisms that have negative or no 
effects on host phenotypes and reproduction, the selective cases of 
reciprocally beneficial relations are not necessarily mutualistic or 
cooperative’ (Chiu & Eberl 2016: 821) 
 
This last claim entails that microorganisms cannot be considered proper parts of 
the host. The holobiont is, thus, a ‘blurry’ entity, which lacks clear boundaries 
and clear criteria of membership/parthood and, therefore, it is not a biological 
individual. The host is the genuine biological individual, with its microorganisms 
playing the role of external resources that the host uses opportunistically to stay 
alive. 
 
The argument presented by Chiu and Eberl shows an important flaw in 
HCE thinking: most HCE defenders would argue that the host plus its 
microbiota constitute an individual, but they fail to notice the transient nature of 
many of the members that compose the microbiota of a host, and how sensitive 
these are to variable environmental conditions. This seems to make them more 
similar to external resources or background conditions than to internal 
components of a higher-level composite object. This criticism had been 
advanced by Leggat et al. (2007) (chapter I), when they opposed the holobiont 
model to the hologenome model. Notice that, in both cases, the problem that 
the authors highlight only affects the claims made by defenders of HCE, i.e. 
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defenders of the hologenome model. Defenders of the holobiont model would 
acknowledge the transient nature of microorganisms and would in fact claim 
that this supports their views, insofar as they are not committed to asserting that 
holobionts are individuals: they only claim that they are ecological communities. 
In any case, the argument presented by Chiu and Eberl suggests that there are 
some difficulties in considering holobionts as individuals, and does so from an 
immunological perspective, i.e. without having to link the general idea of 
biological individuality with the specific concept of evolutionary individuality, 
whose assertion for holobionts constitutes the main claim of HCE. Now, the 
important question to ask is this: is Chiu and Eberl’s argument a knock-down 
argument? Or, in other words, does the ‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont 
completely undermine the consideration of holobionts as biological individuals?  
 
2.2. A reflection about Chiu and Eberl’s criticism of the individuality of 
holobionts 
Chiu and Eberl’s problem is not about the empirical data that suggest that 
microbes perform really important functions for their microbes. Their concern is 
about the interpretation of those results as evidence for the claim that 
microorganisms are proper parts of the host and thus the holobiont is a 
biological individual. However, their interpretation of the evidence does not 
seem to be entirely conclusive, presenting some serious flaws that I will only 
summarize here. Firstly, take the case where microorganisms replace 
completely an organ of the host. According to Chiu and Eberl, this case should 
be interpreted ‘at most’ as dispelling the notion that macrobes are self-sufficient 
by themselves. But notice that the same reasoning can be applied to every 
single organ of a macrobe, no matter whether it is entirely composed by 
microorganisms or entirely composed by host cells. In this vein, it can be 
argued that the heart of a macrobe is not a proper part of the macrobe, but a 
structure that dispels the notion that the macrobe is independent without a 
heart. And the same reasoning can be applied to the lungs, to the pancreas, to 
the liver, and so on and so forth. Chiu and Eberl’s argument to discard the 
possibility that microbes are proper parts of the host while accepting the 
empirical evidence that shows their importance seems either inconclusive or 
very counterintuitive. 
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 Second, the argument based on the discontinuity of the interactions 
seems partially inconclusive as well since, again, the same logic can be applied 
to the host-derived structures, giving raise to very counterintuitive results. The 
thesis of discontinuity can be interpreted in at least two different ways: first, 
talking about tokens, i.e. individual microbes or cells; second, talking about 
types, that is, about the interacting species or genomes. If the discontinuity 
thesis is interpreted as a thesis about tokens, then its results are 
counterintuitive: Every macrobe, to be maintained alive, requires that its cells 
are constantly renewed in a process known as ‘cell turnover’. The existence of 
cell turnover entails that the interactions between the immune system and the 
organs of the host are, strictly speaking, discontinuous, and thus they do not 
constitute proper parts of the host according to ICP. On the other hand, if it is a 
thesis about types, then the thesis is inconclusive. Why should the change in 
types, understood as changes in the interacting genotypes, be considered so 
relevant for decisions about ‘proper parts’? If a cell in a macrobe mutates and it 
spreads and starts dominating in a tissue, it would still count as a proper part of 
the host. And so do organs that have been transplanted from another person. 
Arguing that cell types can change during the lifetime of a macrobe is, thus, 
inconclusive to prove that they should not be taken as a proper part. 
 
Of course, what I have just presented is a sketch of the 
counterarguments that can be raised against the thesis that because holobionts 
are ‘blurry’ entities, they cannot be considered biological individuals, and they 
would need more elaboration to be seriously considered.48 But at least it proves 
that both defending and discarding any claim about their status as biological 
individuals presents serious problems, and neither of the hypotheses can be 
discarded trivially. The next section will show how the arguments about the 
‘blurry’ nature of holobionts can be related to the arguments against the thesis 
that holobionts are evolutionary individuals.  
 
                                                          
48 For an elaboration of these ideas, see my draft with Vanessa Triviño, and for a full new 
account that explains away Chiu and Eberl’s problem, see my draft with Adrian Stencel, as well 
as chapter IV of this dissertation. 
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3. From the problem of the ‘blurry entities’ to the problem of holobionts 
and their hologenomes as evolutionary individuals 
 
Bourrat and Griffiths (2018) have recently wisely connected the problem of the 
‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont with the problem of conceiving holobionts as 
evolutionary individuals. According to Bourrat and Griffiths, the arguments 
presented by HCE defenders: (I) fail to correctly discriminate between 
holobionts and other random multispecies assemblages that are not holobionts 
and, consequently, (II) fail to support the thesis that holobionts are biological 
individuals, if biological individuality is understood evolutionarily.49 
 
3.1. HCE arguments as ‘part of the system’ arguments 
According to Bourrat and Griffiths, the arguments presented by HCE defenders 
constitute cases of what they call ‘part of the system’ arguments. ‘Part of the 
system’ arguments must be understood here in connection to Chiu and Eberl’s 
concept of ‘proper parts’. Bourrat and Griffiths’ idea is that, no matter if the 
arguments about the symbionts being ‘proper parts’ of the holobiont are 
successful, they will still fail to prove that holobionts are evolutionary individuals.  
 
‘Part of the system’ arguments would have the following logical structure: 
‘such-and-such components are essential to the functioning of some larger 
system, therefore those components are part of that system’. This line of 
reasoning, applied to holobionts (system) and their symbionts (components) 
might be explicated as follows: 
 
(i) Symbionts x, y, z are essential for the functioning of the holobiont H 
(ii) Therefore, x, y, z are parts of H. 
 
                                                          
49 This section bears on my draft ‘On the individuality of holobionts and other multispecies 
assemblages: A critical response to Bourrat and Griffiths’, submitted as a response to Bourrat 
and Griffiths in HPLS. See also chapter IV for a response to their criticisms. 
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Notice that the argument contains an additional elliptical premise that is 
required to be valid, namely: 
 
(iii) If a symbiont X is essential for the functioning of a holobiont H, then 
X is part of H. 
 
Furthermore, Bourrat and Griffiths assume that when defenders of HCE defend 
(ii), what they are indeed claiming is that: 
 
(iv) Therefore, H is a biological individual. 
 
And, importantly, for Bourrat and Griffiths: (a) an entity is a biological individual 
if and only if it is a unit of selection (‘biological individual = unit of selection’); (b) 
an entity is a unit of selection if and only if all the ‘parts’ of the unit have their 
fitness interests aligned (‘unit of selection = fitness alignment’). To quote: ‘the 
fundamental issue in identifying new levels of biological individuality should be 
whether some entity can function as a unit of evolution, which will depend on 
the fitness alignment between the partners over evolutionary timescales’ 
(Bourrat and Griffiths 2018: 2).  
 
 Once the debate has been framed, Bourrat and Griffiths dedicate the rest 
of the paper to argue that (iv) does not follow from (i) and (iii), at least if (i) and 
(iii) are supported by the kind of evidence that defenders of HCE have used to 
justify them, simply because (iii) would be false. This is because the arguments 
use by HCE defenders are not directed to the right kind of properties that would 
justify considering that a system is a biological individual, but rather to other 
types of properties which are common to many types of relationships between 
organisms of different species, and even to relationships between an organism 
and its abiotic environment (e.g. the gravitational field; Bourrat and Griffiths 
2018: 5). As they stand, the authors argue, those properties are not genuine 
markers of biological individuality. This leads to the second major criticism of 
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Bourrat and Griffiths to HCE defenders: holobiont advocates fail to provide a 
satisfactory theoretical criterion that allows them to distinguish between 
holobionts qua biological individuals and other multispecies assemblages qua 
consortia of interdependent biological individuals. In their view, the real criterion 
for determining whether a biological consortium is a biological individual is the 
fitness alignment among the parts that constitute it, an argument that defenders 
of HCE have not made. Therefore, defenders of HCE have failed in their 
defence of the notion that holobionts are units of selection, and a new criterion 
based on the concept of fitness alignment must be made explicit that satisfies 
two roles: (I) it allows divorcing holobionts from other multispecies 
assemblages, and (II) it allows supporting the thesis that (some) holobionts are 
biological individuals. 
 
3.2. Bourrat and Griffiths’ criticism to the ‘part of the system’ arguments 
Bourrat and Griffiths believe that the arguments presented by defenders of HCE 
to support (i) are based on (false) premises, which implies that the deduction of 
(iv) does not work. In their view, defenders of HCE have used three sources of 
support for (i): metabolic (physiological) arguments, developmental arguments, 
and immunological arguments. The metabolic argument, especially emphasized 
by Dupré and O’Malley (2009), although also present in other formulations of 
HCE (Gilbert et al. 2012, 2017; Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg 2013, 2016; 
Roughgarden et at. 2017; chapter I) basically states that insofar as macrobes 
engage in numerous interactions with their symbionts to achieve the basic goal 
of processing the external resources of their environment to keep the system 
(host + microbes) alive, the whole system should be considered a biological 
individual. Furthermore, in the case of Dupré and O’Malley the argument is 
complemented with the idea that those systems should be considered ‘the most 
fundamental unit of selection’ (2009: 13). To reach their conclusion, Dupré and 
O’Malley rely on the distinction between interactors and replicators (Hull 1980; 
Lloyd 2017a), adducing only that holobionts are interactors, and making clear 
that holobionts are systems composed of independent ‘lineage-forming entities’ 
(sic). 
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 Bourrat and Griffiths do not have any concern with Dupré and O’Malley’s 
defence of the claim that holobionts are interactors (cf. Booth 2014; Skillings 
2016; Queller and Strassmann 2016). Their only concerns are: Firstly, that so 
stated the definition would also be applicable to other multispecies 
assemblages that are not holobionts; secondly, that ‘although the notion of an 
interactor is useful in certain contexts within evolutionary theory (…), it is often 
of very limited value in deciding whether a multispecies entity is an individual in 
its own right’ (2018: 11). Their first observation is supported by comparing the 
metabolic system of the worm Olavius algarvensis and its microbial symbionts, 
with the system formed by the seagrass meadow, bivalves of the Lucinidae 
family and their endosymbiotic sulphide-oxidizing bacteria, and the sulphate-
reducing bacteria that reside next to the roots of the seagrass. Bourrat and 
Griffiths’ point is that although the metabolic processes—including some 
extremely complex biochemical exchanges—that occur within the O. 
algarvensis and those that occur among the members of the seagrass meadow 
multispecies assemblage are basically the same, only the former but not the 
latter would be considered a holobiont by HCE defenders. Then, there would be 
no theoretical ground to distinguish between holobionts and other multispecies 
systems, apart from a basic intuition of what seems to be more an individual 
from our perspective.50 And now, and always according to Bourrat and Griffiths, 
even assuming that holobiont advocates had a convincing argument to show 
why one system is a holobiont whereas the other is not, they would have only 
proven that holobionts are interactors. But because the notion of interactor is 
irrelevant for deciding whether a system is a biological individual,51 holobiont 
advocates have totally missed their target, and their evidence is simply not to 
the point. Therefore, no matter what, HCE advocates fail to provide a 
satisfactory criterion to support why the metabolic argument leads to the 
conclusion that holobionts are biological individuals. 
 
                                                          
50 Similar claims can be found in late 19th and early 20th century history of biology, always 
directed against those biologists that emphasized the integrative nature of symbiosis. Maybe the 
most interesting case is Pound (1893), reviewed in Suárez (2018a: 80-82).  
51 Their observation about the irrelevance of interactors for discussions about biological 
individuality, which I consider necessary for drawing their intended conclusion, is left unargued 
in their paper (for good arguments to that end see Okasha 2006; Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
Nonetheless, the reader should not assume that I also share their very same opinion about the 
usefulness of interactors for evolutionary biology. 
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 The other two arguments that Bourrat and Griffiths discuss 
(developmental, immunological) have the same conceptual structure, so to keep 
my thesis as parsimonious as possible, I will not consider them here. Bourrat 
and Griffith’s message is nonetheless clear: even if (some) holobionts could be 
proven not to be the ‘blurry’ entities that Chiu and Eberl, among others, have 
claimed them to be, proving that holobionts are interactors would not settle the 
question about their role as evolutionary individuals yet. What matters for an 
entity to be considered an evolutionary individual is that all the parts that 
integrate the entity have their fitness interests aligned. Insofar as this is far from 
being the case in holobionts, Bourrat and Griffiths argue, holobionts are not 
evolutionary individuals. Now that the problem of the ‘blurry’ nature of the 
holobiont has been related to the problem of evolutionary individuality 
(conceived as the consideration of the hologenome as a replicator), the next 
section will examine a bit deeper how the claims about ‘fitness alignment’ 
connect with the main claim of HCE, namely: that holobionts and their 
hologenomes are units of selection. 
 
4. Some major problems with the role of hologenomes as units of 
selection: the problem of (the lack of) partner fidelity 
 
The main argument against the role of hologenomes as units of selection qua 
replicators is based on the lack of proper transgenerational transmission of the 
entities that compose the holobiont. This thesis had been anticipated in the 
work of John Maynard Smith (1991): ‘A Darwinian view of symbiosis’ (reviewed 
in chapter I, section 2), and since the proposal of HCE, different versions of 
the thesis have been defended by Moran and Sloan (2015), Douglas and 
Werren (2016), Skillings (2016), Hurst (2017), and Bourrat and Griffiths 
(2018).52 The main criticism that these authors have raised can be summarized 
as follows: HCE assumes that the hologenome is a unit of selection. As 
hologenomes are composed by a host’s genome plus its microbiome, HCE 
entails the coevolution of the complete set of genomes. This possibility would 
                                                          
52 Peter Godfrey-Smith (2013, 2015) has also made a consistent and well-argued criticism of the 
application of ‘units of selection thesis’ to holobionts. However, his arguments are based on his 
rather idiosyncratic definition of ‘units of selection’, based on his concept of Darwinian 
populations, so I will not consider them in this chapter, but in chapter III and chapter V. 
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be feasible if and only if the genomes that constitute the hologenome are 
inherited, i.e. their association is transgenerationally maintained (partner 
fidelity). Expressed in the words of Douglas and Werren:  
  
‘Partner fidelity is a prerequisite for the hologenome [concept], because 
the host and its microbial partner(s) can only evolve as a unit if they co-
occur across multiple host generations, with tight host genotype-to-
microbe genotype matching.’ (Douglas and Werren 2016: 2)  
  
By ‘partner fidelity’, Douglas and Werren mean that the genotypes that interact 
within a holobiont in one generation (i.e. those of the host and of its microbiota) 
need to be stably preserved across different generations of the host, or 
otherwise the hologenome cannot be considered a unit of selection.  In other 
words, if there is a holobiont composed of a host H plus the symbiotic species 
S1, S2, S3, the hologenome can be considered a unit of selection qua replicator 
only if the same symbiotic species S1, S2, S3, re-occur across different 
generations of H. Otherwise, if there is no effective co-transmission of the 
microbiome and the host genome, selection at the level of the hologenome will 
be eroded, as the condition of inheritance is not satisfied.  Notice, that the 
criticism raised by Douglas and Werren concerns the claim that the hologenome 
is a unit of selection qua replicator, so their arguments should be read that way. 
  
Douglas and Werren’s claim follows this line of reasoning: 
 
1. Definition: Holobionts are entities composed by a host plus its 
symbiotic microbiome.   
2. Lewontin conditions for natural selection: For natural selection to act 
on a given entity in a population it is necessary that the entity (a) 
exhibits phenotypic variation that (b) affects its fitness and that (c) the 
phenotypic variation is inherited with sufficient fidelity.   
3. Partner fidelity: The only way of guaranteeing the satisfaction of (c) 
among holobionts would be that both the host and the symbiotic 
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microbiota co-occur transgenerationally, i.e. that the host genome and 
the genome of the microbiome are transgenerationally co-transmitted.   
4. Therefore, the existence partner fidelity is a necessary condition to 
claim that holobionts are units of selection, i.e. to demonstrate the 
existence of partner fidelity is necessary to defend HCE.  
  
Douglas and Werren argue that partner fidelity is usually satisfied in those 
cases when heredity of the symbionts is direct, as it happens in cases of vertical 
transmission (Maynard-Smith 1991; Hurst 2017). Vertical transmission occurs 
when the symbionts are transmitted from parent to offspring (transovarially, 
through feeding, etc.) in the moment of conception, or during early 
development. Vertical transmission is very common in insects, which usually 
carry heritable bacteria, but it is normally restricted to one or two symbiont 
species, instead of to the entire microbiome (Werren et al. 2008; Duron et al. 
2008; Osborne et al. 2009). Partner fidelity, however, is not necessarily 
restricted to cases of vertical transmission, as Douglas and Werren 
acknowledge, and it can also occur in very specific cases of horizontal 
transmission (Bright & Bulgheresi 2010; Shapira 2016). Horizontal transmission 
occurs when the symbionts need to be acquired again, from the environment, in 
every host generation. A well-known example and very well documented 
example is the case of Vibrio fischeri in bobtail squid, which needs to be 
acquired during development (Nyholm and McFallNgai 2004); this is also the 
case in legumes and their intracellular rhizobia, sited in their root nodules (Gage 
2004). In contrast with the cases of vertical transmission, where the 
transmission is direct and does not require such a strong mediation, ‘all 
horizontally transmitted symbioses require sophisticated molecular machineries 
to select specific symbionts from the environment’ (Bright and Bulgheresi 2010: 
221-222). In any case, it is important to note that in some circumstances 
horizontal transmission might also lead to situations of transgenerational partner 
fidelity.  
  
However, Douglas & Werren (2016: 2-3, emphasis added) insist that 
‘even when coinheritance occurs for a subset of the microbial associates, it is 
unlikely to be so for all members of the community, and so it seems difficult to 
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imagine that the entire microbiome should be considered part of a 
“hologenome” with its host if only a subset of microbes meet the requisite 
conditions.’  In other words, if HCE only makes sense if the totality of symbionts 
S1, S2, …, Sn that constitute the microbiome of the holobiont co-ocur across 
different host generations. But this case is either never fulfilled or, when it is 
fulfilled, it is only fulfilled for a very concrete subset of the symbionts that 
compose the microbiome. If this is so, then holobionts cannot be units of 
selection and HCE is neither a useful, nor an empirically justified framework for 
understanding the evolutionary dynamics host-microbiome associations.  
  
Douglas and Werren’s insistence on the necessity of transgenerational 
genotype-by-genotype (G x G) matching relies as much on their conception of 
the units of selection, as it does on their specific interpretation of the application 
of Lewontin’s conditions to holobionts. In their view, a consortium of lower-level 
entities constitutes a unit of selection only if the fitness interests of every lower-
level entity are aligned with each other. As holobionts are multispecies 
assemblages, by definition (Premise 1), the only mechanism that can guarantee 
that this happens is partner fidelity. This conviction leads them to express the 
following thought: ‘For a host-microbiome association to be the unit of selection, 
the hologenome concept requires (near-)perfect concordance of selective 
interests both among the microbial partners and between the microbiota and the 
host. As conflicts of interest among partners increase (e.g., due to weak partner 
fidelity), then the host-microbiome is undermined as a single unit of selection’ 
(Douglas & Werren 2016: 3).   
  
As I said before, Douglas and Werren’s position is not the only position in 
the biological (and philosophical) literature that is critical of the notion that 
holobionts are units of selection. A very similar position, argued on very similar 
grounds, is found in Moran and Sloan (2015: 6-7), who write: 
 
‘Heritable obligate symbioses such as those of mitochondria and 
eukaryotes, or of insects and obligate bacterial symbionts that provision 
nutrients, provide clear cases in which fitness of each party is directly 
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dependent on fitness of the other. Furthermore, this codependence is 
maintained, in some cases, for many millions of generations through the 
co-transmission of genomes of both parties. […] But the majority of 
microbial associations of multicellular animals and plants are non-
heritable. […] Across this spectrum, how can we determine if and when 
selection at the hologenome level has an important evolutionary impact?’ 
 
Moran and Sloan acknowledge that there are some special cases of host-
symbiont associations in which partner fidelity is not intergenerationally 
disrupted (e.g. eukaryotic cell, obligate symbionts in insects, etc), However, 
their quote also reflects a clear scepticism about the opportunity of selection at 
the level of the hologenome. Moran and Sloan argue that many of the microbial 
associations that constitute the microbiome of animals and plants are non-
heritable, and thus it is hard to determine the importance of selection on the 
holobiont. In other words, if most members of the microbiome are not inherited, 
is it possible to determine whether their adaptations are a by-product of 
selection on the holobiont, rather than a product of selection acting solely on the 
bacterial species? For instance, take those cases in which symbionts are 
horizontally transmitted. Is it possible to test whether their fitness is causally 
correlated with the fitness of their hosts? Even if horizontal transmission does 
not automatically rule out the possibility that the fitness interests of the host and 
the fitness interests of the microbiota are aligned, its existence creates two 
important problems for HCE: first, that it can result from independent selective 
regimes, and not from selection on the hologenome, as HCE presumes (Figure 
15); second, that it does not seem easy to assume that the whole bacterial 
community of an environmentally acquired microbiota will necessarily have all 
its fitness interests aligned. They thus conclude that ‘opportunity for selection at 
the hologenome level exists, but it may be small or insignificant relative to 
selection on individual interacting genomes.’ (Moran & Sloan 2015: 7).   
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Figure 15. Two alternative explanations of the existence of phylosymbiotic patterns. The figure 
on the left represents the possibility that the pattern is a result of a process of host-microbe 
coevolution (i.e. hologenome selection). The figure on the left suggests that the process can 
result from a process of ecological filtering, and thus independent selective regimes affecting 
the hosts and its microbes. (From Moran and Sloan 2015: 4, Fig. 1) 
  
The argument presented by Moran and Sloan adds additional support to the 
argument presented by Douglas and Werren. Concretely, Moran and Sloan 
support premise 3—the necessity of partner fidelity for selection on holobionts—
with a concrete conception of biological individuality. According to this 
conception, a group of entities can only be considered a biological individual 
qua unit of selection if the fitness interests of all the entities are aligned, so that 
the interests of the entities at the lower-level does not erode (disrupt) the 
aggregative effects of the fitness of the entity at the higher level. In other words, 
a group of entities can only be considered a unit of selection if a policing 
mechanism that ensures that the group acts as a real whole is present.53 This 
view about biological individuality is not original. Similar positions have been 
                                                          
53 There is another way to conceive the appeal that the alienation of fitness interests has in the 
discourse about units of selection, and therefore in Moran and Sloan’s discussion of the role of 
the holobiont as a unit of selection. It might be argued that, since natural selection leads to 
optimal evolutionary states, it is expected to cause the appearance of stable wholes. A whole 
will be stable if and only if there is no internal conflict that can disrupt its existence. If there are 
‘populations of wholes’, natural selection will be expected to select for the fittest, i.e. for those 
with lower internal conflicts. Thus, a test to discover whether natural selection has occurred in 
the holobiont is to analyse the alienation of fitness interests among the members of the whole. 
But notice that this is an argument to test how strong natural selection is on a whole, not to test 
whether the whole is a unit of selection. I will make this point stronger in chapter V. 
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defended by Michod and Roze (2001), Queller and Strassmann (2009, 2016), 
Folse and Roughgarden (2010), Clarke (2013, 2016). The originality of the 
claim found in Douglas and Werren (2016) and Moran and Sloan (2015) is that 
they make the existence of an efficient policing mechanism in holobionts 
dependent on the detection of partner fidelity, because this is the way to 
guarantee that the fitness interests of the interacting species are aligned and, 
therefore, selection can occur at the level of the multispecies individual.  
 
For partner fidelity to obtain, as I have argued, the species that compose 
the microbiota of the holobiont must be preserved across host generations. For 
the rest of the thesis, I will call this assumption stability of species (SoS, 
hereafter), and a specific argument against the necessity of SoS for evolution 
by natural selection will be presented later on (chapter V). For the moment, let 
me introduce a semi-formal definition of SoS. 
  
Stability of species (SoS): A holobiont in generation n+1 will be a unit of 
selection only if the symbionts S1, S2, ..., Sn, that occur within the host Hn+1 
belong to the same species as the symbionts S1, S2, ..., Sn, that co-
occur(ed) with the host Hn.54  
  
As SoS is stated here (i.e. in the works of Douglas and Werren, Moran and 
Sloan), it is clear that holobionts do not fulfil the strict conditions that it requires. 
First, empirical data about transgenerational transmission of the microbiome 
across different generations of a host species is scarce, limited to a very few 
cases, and also systematically limited to a subset of the species of the 
microbiome (e.g. Browne et al. 2017; Goodrich et al. 2017). Second, diet is one 
of the main drivers of microbial colonization and there is some evidence 
                                                          
54 As John Dupré and others have noticed, the real requirement is even stronger. It is not that 
the species need to re-occur together, but that the lineages need to re-occur 
transgenerationally. Indeed, in my original formulation of their view, I elaborated their position as 
a question of ‘stability of lineages’. However, I do not do this here because my claim is not that 
the stability of the lineages is not necessary to consider the holobiont as a unit of selection, but 
that not even the weaker requirement about the stability of the species is necessary, because 
holobiont evolution is not about the common evolution of microorganisms and the hosts that 
bear them, but about the evolution of hosts and the traits that their microorganisms bear. See 
chapter V for the detals. 
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suggesting that it partially determines the composition of the microbiota, with 
important shifts in species composition taking place quite rapidly related to 
changes in host’s habits (Lang et al. 2014; Gómez et al. 2016). Therefore, if one 
assumes that SoS is a necessary condition to have proper inheritance—as 
‘inheritance’ is defined in Lewontin’s conditions for natural selection—and the 
existence of proper inheritance is required for holobionts to constitute units of 
selection, then holobionts are not units of selection and the hologenome 
concept is hollow, as Moran and Sloan have put it. 
 
4.1. Does ‘stability of species’ constitute a knock-down argument against 
the hologenome concept of evolution? A brief reflection 
The criticism just presented is perhaps the most serious of the challenges that 
HCE defenders must face for their hypothesis to be true. If SoS is a necessary 
condition for an entity to be a unit of selection, and holobionts empirically lack 
reliable transgenerational SoS, then HCE is patently false. But take into account 
that the argument depends on the acceptance of a necessary condition (SoS is 
necessary for units of selection), and the acceptance of a definition (holobionts 
= coevolved multispecies consortia). If the definition of holobiont that the critics 
assume is rejected, then the argument is non sequitur, whereas if the SoS is 
proven unnecessary, then the conclusion can be considered unargued. Here, I 
will only advance the reasons why I think the arguments just reviewed do not 
constitute a knockdown argument against the claim that holobionts are units of 
selection. A longer discussion will be presented in chapter V, section 2. 
 
 To start with, defenders of HCE have claimed several times that they do 
not assume that the holobiont is a ‘coevolved’ consortium. They argue that 
some members of the holobiont might constitute a coevolved unit, but they do 
not think coevolution is necessary for natural selection. Coevolution, if anything, 
would be a consequence of selection acting on the unit, but that is not even 
necessary. As Brucker and Bordenstein (2014) argued in their reply to Chandler 
and Turelli (2014), coevolution is usually not proven for the genes that interact 
within a genome, and still the ‘monogenomic’ organism is assumed to be the 
unit of selection. Thus, there seems to be no reason to believe that coevolution 
needs to be proven to consistently claim that holobionts are units of selection. 
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Critics of the holobiont would be putting the cart before the horse. They would 
only accept that the holobiont is a unit of selection if defenders of HCE can 
prove that the action of selection has led to the specific result of coevolution. 
But, species coevolution (or, rather, cospeciation) is a by-product of the action 
of natural selection on a consortium, so assuming it as prior to the existence of 
a unit of selection simply misses the point and leaves unexplained an important 
outcome of natural selection. 
 
 Second, related to my first worry, it seems that these authors are 
conflating the notions of ‘response to selection’ and ‘selection’ itself, a 
distinction that should be carefully made to gain a clear understanding about 
what units of selection are. This distinction follows from the breeder’s equation, 
according to which R = h2*S, where R is response to selection; h2 is additive 
genetic heritability; S is selection coefficient. A unit of selection is the entity on 
which selection S can act, i.e. whose survival and reproduction are determined 
by the action of selective forces. How the entity is individuated is irrelevant for 
selection to act on it. Heritability is required to have a response to selection, and 
it is plausible to argue that, for holobionts, heritability will only be proven if there 
is a vertical transmission of the microbiome, i.e. SoS. But notice that heritability 
is completely irrelevant to address the question whether holobionts are units of 
selection. It is relevant to decide whether there will be a response to selection 
R, as well as the magnitude of this response h2*S, but not to decide if the entity 
is (or is not) a unit of selection. By demanding SoS, critics of the holobiont seem 
to be confusing the notion of response to selection with the notion of unit of 
selection. 
 
 Finally, following the previous criticism, let us assume that critics of the 
holobiont take SoS as a necessary condition for natural selection to act on the 
holobiont because it is the only way of having transgenerational heredity (not 
heritability). Based on this interpretation, their argument is that that SoS can 
only (or mostly) be obtained by vertical transmission of the microbiome. 
Horizontal transmission, they argue, would rapidly erode selection at the level of 
the holobiont. But their argument is not exactly correct, as Benjamin M. 
Fitzpatrick (2014) has proven. Horizontal transmission, combined with a strong 
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action of non-additive selection55 between the host and the symbionts 
(interspecific epistasis leading to linkage disequilibrium) and an appropriate 
population structure, can basically generate the same covariance dynamics 
between the host and the symbionts than the ones that are observed between 
the genes within a genome. Therefore, assuming that horizontal transmission 
will erode selection for the holobiont is equivalent to assuming that genetic 
recombination within one single genome will erode the action of natural 
selection at the level of the organism. Furthermore, as, due to the existence of 
abundant lateral gene transfer in the microbiome, the genetic components that 
guarantee the appearance of the epistatic effects that led to the linkage 
disequilibrium are not necessarily bound to the genetic markers used to 
recognise the bacerial taxa that compose the host microbiome, there can be 
multispecies units of selection without SoS, thus strongly contradicting the 
conclusions of holobiont critics (see chapter IV for an elaborated version of this 
argument).  
 
5. Confusing sorting with selection: sorting and selection must not be 
equated 
 
In the previous section, I presented the main criticisms that have been raised 
against HCE, conceived as a thesis about the role of the holobiont as a unit of 
selection. Concretely, the criticisms were raised against the thesis that the 
hologenome is a replicator which, as I explained in chapter I, is just one of the 
many theses about biological individuality that HCE entails. In this section, I will 
present a criticism that, although suggested in different ways in the critical 
literature about HCE, has never been explicitly presented in the way in which I 
will present it here. I will argue that one possible interpretation of the 
widespread disagreement about the role of holobionts as units of selection 
consists in the fact that defenders of HCE, by confusing the concepts of the 
‘ecological holobiont’ and the ‘hereditary holobiont’ (chapter I, section 3.1.4), 
are confusing the notions of sorting and selection, two notions that should be 
                                                          
55 In population genetics, additive genetic effects occur when the interactions between the 
genes are ‘linear’, meaning that all genes make the same contribution to the final outcome. Non-
additive effects include dominance (when the action of an allele at one single locus can silence 
another allele in the same locus) and epistasis (when the expression of one gene at one locus 
depends on its genetic background, i.e. on the action of genes at different loci). 
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carefully distinguished in debates about the units of selection (Sober and 
Lewontin 1982; Sober 1984; Vrba and Gould 1986; Lloyd 1988; Okasha 2006). 
 
 Let me start by defining the two notions. In biology, and specifically, in 
the way in which the Modern Synthesis recasts Darwinism, evolutionary change 
in conceived at the level of the population. Populations are collections of 
causally connected individuals from the same species, amongst which there is 
variation. Different individuals in the population have different rates of death and 
birth, and as a consequence the composition of the population changes with 
time. This process of differential death and birth of the individuals in a 
population that ultimately leads to the changes in their representation of in the 
population that is considered to be evolutionary change is simply a process of 
‘sorting’. In itself, sorting is simply the process of change in biological 
populations, but the concept does not specify any of the causes of why this 
process happens: sorting is simply what results from differential death and birth.  
 
Given this definition of sorting, an important question for biologists is thus 
the following: what causes the process of sorting? Or, in other words, taking 
sorting for granted, what causes that the population will shift in one direction 
(i.e. towards a specific set of changes) rather than another? Here is where 
natural selection enters the picture: selection one of the causes of the process 
of sorting. Concretely, it is the non-random cause of differential birth and death 
of the individuals in a population. Other causes, normally qualified as ‘random’, 
include the different phenomena of drift, including genetic drift. Now, an obvious 
question arises at this point, and it is important to tell selection and sorting 
apart, namely: in what sense is natural selection a non-random cause of 
sorting? Here, a quote from Elisabeth S. Vrba and Stephen J. Gould is 
particularly illuminating:  
 
‘Selection encompasses those interactions between heritable, emergent 
character variation and the environment that cause differences in rates of 
birth or death among varying individuals’ (Vrba and Gould 1986: 219) 
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Notice that the definition includes three elements: first, the localization of a focal 
level which is distinct from the environment; second, the localization of variation 
in character (phenotypic variation) at that level; third, the heritability56 of that 
variation in character. If these three properties are localized, then selection can 
arguably be understood as a cause of sorting, i.e. as a plausible cause for the 
differential rates of birth and death of the individuals in a population. However, 
and importantly, the biological world is usually considered to be hierarchically 
organized. That is to say, it is possible to find different focal levels where one 
can observe individuals that satisfy the three properties included in Vrba and 
Gould definition. Thus, the observation of sorting in one level of the biological 
hierarchy can always be the result of a process of selection acting on the 
upward or on the downward level, which generates a random (i.e. not due to 
selection) distortion in the level under study (Sober and Lewontin 1982; Vrba 
and Gould 1986; Lloyd 1988; Figure 16). Therefore, sorting and selection 
should not be conflated. 
 
 
Figure 16. Table suggesting the relationship between selection at a focal level with its upward 
and downward effects on the sorting of the entities at the upper and lower-levels. The table 
shows how what might look as selection at one level (e.g. effects of sorting on the organismal 
phenotypes) is just a result of the selection at a lower level (e.g. selection of ‘selfish DNA’). 
(From Vrba and Gould 1986: 220, Table 1) 
 
                                                          
56 Heritability should not be understood in its technical meaning in population genetics, but 
rather as a way of expressing the possibility of being inherited. 
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Take the following, and conventional example of selection: the case of 
selection for darker phenotypes—industrial melanism—in Biston betularia 
moths due to industrial pollution (Kettlewell 1958). In this case, the population is 
formed by two phenotypes: darker and brighter moths. In a non-polluted 
environment, darker months are less successful, because their pigmentation 
makes easier to identify by predators, and thus more susceptible to be eaten 
due to their phenotypic characteristics. However, in a polluted environment, the 
opposite is the case, and thus the trait distribution in the population shifts due to 
the higher susceptibility of brighter moths to be eaten. Selection is acting on a 
very specific trait (pigmentation), and thus might generate a distortion in the 
genetic makeup of the population (downward level) or on the macroevolutionary 
pattern of moths (upward level). However, the upward and downward level 
effects are mere sorting, which is due to the effect of selection on the focal level 
of moths. The changes in the genetic distribution, as well as the changes in the 
macroevolutionary patterns of moths (if any) are the distortions that result from 
the causal effect of natural selection on a different level of the biological 
hierarchy. Therefore, to prove selection at one level it is indispensable to prove 
that the change in the phenotypic character occurs at that level, that it can be 
inherited, and that it causally leads to the differential death and birth of the 
individuals at that level. 
 
How to apply the distinction between sorting and selection to the case of 
HCE? I think it is possible to argue that defenders of HCE are confusing the two 
notions and are therefore taking cases of mere sorting as cases of selection or, 
in other words, confusing an upward effect with a real cause acting at a lower-
level in the biological hierarchy. First, it seems unquestionable that holobionts, 
defined as a host plus its microbiome, have differential rates of birth and death. 
For instance, if holobionts are the metabolic-wholes of Dupré and O’Malley 
(2009; chapter I, section 6), it seems easy to argue that some holobionts live 
longer than others, and some holobionts produce more offspring (i.e. more 
metabolic-wholes) than others. Second, it seems at least plausible to think that 
holobionts have different phenotypic characteristics, and their different rate of 
birth and death can arguably be attributed to these differential phenotypic 
characteristics. But now the crucial question to decide whether selection can 
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possibly act at the level of the holobiont is whether inheritance can be detected, 
so that phenotypic features have a way of getting fixed, if they are 
advantageous. Hologenome defenders argue that this is possible, on the basis 
that the hologenome is the replicator. Hologenome detractors, on the other 
hand, argue that it is not possible to tell apart selection from sorting in the case 
of holobionts: how to distinguish cases of genuine host-microbiome coevolution 
and cases of ecological filtering? Assuming that the holobiont can be singled 
out as a genuine focal level that can be distinguished from the environment 
(which is something that some detractors of the holobiont would neglect, 
section 2), what are the criteria to tell apart cases of sorting from cases of 
genuine selection, i.e. differential rates of death and birth due to heritable 
phenotypic characteristics? The argument here would be that, since this is not 
empirically possible, then the holobiont cannot be singled out as a unit of 
selection, and thus HCE is empirically false. Defenders of HCE are thus 
conflating the indirect effects of selection on the differential rates of birth and 
death of the holobiont with the direct effects of selection on the individual 
species that interact in the holobiont and that produce sorting of holobionts as a 
byproduct. 
 
5.1. But should sorting and selection really be distinguished? A brief 
reflection 
The argument presented above seems a knock-down argument against HCE 
and seems even more strict that the argument based of SoS that I presented in 
section 3. The case I have made here is not that SoS is not detected among 
holobionts. It is that even if it were, the authors cannot really tell apart which are 
the cases of genuine selection where the holobiont is the focal level, versus 
cases of sorting, where the species that compose the microbiome are the focal 
level. It is just another (more elaborated) way of expressing Moran and Sloan’s 
worry that you can never tell apart cases of convergent host-microbiota 
phylogeny and cases of mere ecological filtering. I think reflecting their worry in 
terms of the distinction between sorting and selection is important, because it 
reflects one of the most genuine empirical worries to consider when selection 
for holobionts is being studied. 
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 However, is this worry legitimate? From a conceptual point of view, it 
seems important to consider that not all causes of differential births and deaths 
of the individuals in a population are due to selection for their characteristics. 
Also, it is empirically important to single out the mechanisms, or causal agents, 
that are producing the selection, in case its effects are detected. But it is not so 
clear that the possibility of the effects of selection at the lower-level should be 
taken simpliciter as a knock-down argument against selection at the upward 
level, because doing so might bear the risk of a regression ad infinitum. In a 
hierarchical-nested view of the world, it is true that holobionts are made of 
different species, but so is it true that genomes are made of different genes, 
genes are made of different molecules, molecules are made of different atoms, 
and so on and so forth. If the possibility of distortion is taken ‘too seriously’, one 
might end up with no level where the effects of selection can be studied. There 
must be one level where one can stop, and the reason for stopping at that level 
must be somehow independent from the possibility of distorting effects from the 
lower level, or no empirical research could be pursued. Godfrey-Smith suggests 
the idea that we must start ‘afresh’ at each level where we aim to study 
individuality and the levels of selection, and Okasha suggests that we must 
break up with the necessity of a nested hierarchy in biology. I will pursue these 
two thoughts for holobionts in chapter IV and chapter V. For the moment, it is 
enough to say that the argument based on the distinction between sorting and 
selection must not be taken as an argument that rules out the possibility that 
holobionts are units of selection, and thus the possibility that some formulation 
of HCE is true. The purpose of the project is precisely to figure out which 
formulation of HCE is true, and in virtue of what it can be considered true. 
 
6. Brief summary of chapter II: Three levels of criticism to holobionts and 
the hologenome concept 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced the main criticisms that have been raised 
against HCE, including one last criticism (the confusion of the ideas of sorting 
and selection) that I came up with. The main ideas that have been presented in 
the chapter can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Holobionts are ‘blurry’ entities. Because of the transient nature of many 
microorganisms during the life of the holobiont, holobionts lack a 
sufficient degree of ontogenetical temporal stability to be studied as 
biological individuals in any relevant sense. 
2. None of the arguments given by HCE defenders to support the thesis 
that holobionts are units of selection is to the point, since they fail to 
capture the essence of units of selection. 
3. Holobionts lack transgenerational stability of the species that compose 
their microbiota, insofar as they lack partner fidelity, so hologenomes 
cannot be units of selection qua replicators. 
4. Defenders of HCE are confuting the notions of sorting and selection. 
Some of their arguments prove that holobionts are units of sorting, while 
failing to prove that selection is the cause of this differential sorting. 
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Chapter III 
 
‘The concept of biological individuality: A review 
with an application to the discussion about the role 
of holobionts as biological individuals’ 
 
The previous chapters introduced the hologenome concept of evolution, 
and its problems, as a debate about the nature of biological individuality. 
The guiding question was whether holobionts could be considered 
biological individuals in any significant sense, particularly emphasizing 
their role as units of selection. But, of course, deciding whether holobionts 
are or are not biological individuals depends on what one means by 
‘biological individual’. This chapter reviews recent debates on the (many) 
meaning(s) of biological individuality, as well as the relationships between 
different characterizations of the concept. I will put special emphasis on 
the discussion about the conditions that a biological individual has to 
satisfy to be considered a unit of selection, as I take this to be the main 
claim of the hologenome concept of evolution. 
 
1. The never-ending problem of biological individuality 
 
My discussion in the previous chapters made clear that the main problem for 
HCE defenders is to offer a coherent account of biological individuality57 that 
                                                          
57 The concepts of “biological individuality” and “organism” are sometimes used interchangeably 
(e.g. Clarke 2013: 413, ft. 1), sometimes the later is taken as a subset of the former (e.g. 
Lidgard and Nyhart 2017b: 18), sometimes are taken to be non-synonymous, although 
sometimes generating partial overlaps (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2013; cf. Pradeu 2016a, 2016b), etc. 
To avoid confusion, I will use the concepts of “biological individual” and “organism” 
interchangeably, and I will always specify the nature of the biological individual I will be talking, 
e.g. metabolic individual, anatomical individual, developmental individuals, organisational 
individual, evolutionary individual, etc. 
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accounts for the individuality of the holobiont, including its role as a unit of 
selection. The problem that this creates to HCE defenders, however, is not 
exclusively reduced to them. It connects with a classical and well-known debate 
that has caught the attention of biologists, historians and, of course, 
philosophers, for many centuries (see Lidgard and Nyhart 2017a, for the first 
effort to offer an integrative approach; reviewed in Suárez 2018b): What is a 
biological individual? How can biological individuals be demarcated and 
distinguished from the environment that surrounds them? How can the parts of 
an individual be discriminated from the background conditions that sustain its 
existence, without being part of it? One of the reasons why this debate has 
caught (and still catches) the attention of so many researchers is that, while the 
concept of individuality is crucial in biology (biology deals with individuals), 
biologists cannot agree on its most fundamental meaning, and this generates 
confusion and conflict. Following Ellen Clarke (2010, 2013), I will refer to this 
lack of general agreement as the problem of biological individuality (PBI, 
hereafter). PBI arises from the combination of the following observations: (1) 
biological research needs a concept of biological individuality, i.e. a way of 
discriminating biological individuals, since biological individuals are the entities 
that biology studies (Ruiz-Mirazo et al. 2000; Pepper and Herron 2008; Moreno 
and Mossio 2015); (2) there are different criteria to define biological 
individuality; (3) these criteria generate non-overlapping classifications of 
biological individuals (Wilson and Barker 2013; Lidgard and Nyhart 2017b); (4) 
these non-overlapping classifications generate epistemological problems about 
how to study the entities that biological research is interested in studying; (5) 
therefore, there is a PBI which generates the following question: how can one 
arbitrate over the different definitions that are to a certain extent accepted in the 
current literature?58 
  
 In this chapter, I will examine the PBI with a particular emphasis on its 
relation to the problems of individuation that arise for HCE. I will start reviewing 
                                                          
58 There is always the possibility, embraced by some authors (e.g. Wilson 2000), to deny that 
the PBI needs to be arbitrated, arguing that biology can do very well without a clear concept of 
individuality. I think this is a legitimate option, but adopting it would still require explaining the 
PBI—even if it is to explain it away. As the purpose of this chapter is only to illustrate that there 
is a problem, no matter whether it has or not (serious) epistemological consequences, I will 
ignore these positions.  
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different criteria that have been used to define biological individuality, to show 
that they generate a non-overlapping classification of biological individuals. 
Second, I will present in depth the problem of the units of selection. Following 
Samir Okasha, I will distinguish between synchronic and diachronic approaches 
to the units of selection question, and I will analyse both approaches in detail. In 
the case of the synchronic approach, I will put the emphasis on the 
interactor/replicator framework and its application to the case of holobionts. I will 
put forward one hypothesis about the nature of the interactor category, which is 
inspired by Kevin de Queiroz’s ‘resolution’ of the species problem (de Queiroz 
2005a, 2005b, 2007): all the criteria of biological individuality that have been 
offered accord with different biological processes in which biological individuals 
can participate and that, taken together (i.e. if an individual satisfies all of them), 
characterize the interactor. In this sense, interactors are highly evolved entities 
that appear because of their simultaneous participation in different biological 
processes.59 In the case of the diachronic approach, I will put the emphasis on 
the MLS theory, distinguishing between multilevel selection 1 (MLS1, hereafter) 
and multilevel selection 2 (MLS2, hereafter). I will argue that the MLS approach 
is applicable to a level of biological individuality provided that the entities 
individuated at that level satisfy, at least, one of the criteria of biological 
individuality aforementioned—i.e. provided that they participate at least in one 
biological process. This said, I will defend (here and in chapter V) that the MLS 
approach is more appropriate than the interactor/replicator framework to study 
whether holobionts are units of selection. 
 
2. Different criteria for defining biological individuality and their non-
overlapping nature 
 
The PBI has lots in common with the problem of species in biology and 
philosophy of biology.60 As it occurs for the category of species, for which 
biologists and philosophers agree that there are different definitions that 
                                                          
59 The ideas about the interactor that I present in this section have come to my mind thanks to 
the thoughtful discussions I have had with Álvaro Moreno, as well as other members of the IAS 
Research Group, University of the Basque Country (Spain), especially Mark Canciani. No less 
important in the development of these ideas has been the role of Çaglar Karaca. 
60 I have analysed the problem of species, applied to the case of bacterial species, in my paper 
J. Suárez (2016): ‘Bacterial species pluralism in the light of medicine and endosymbiosis’. 
Theoria 31(1): 91-105. 
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generate non-overlapping classifications of the biological world (cf. Ruse 1987: 
238, for a notable exception), so it occurs for the case of biological individuals. 
There are nowadays dozens of different criteria to determine whether a 
biological ensemble is a biological individual—instead of a ‘random’ aggregation 
of biological stuff—and these different criteria generate non-overlapping 
classifications of the world. Or, in other (metaphysically more neutral) words, 
each of these different criteria entail the existence of distinct ways of ‘lumping’ 
matter together (each criterion corresponding to one legitimate way of lumping, 
and each lump corresponding to one biological individual), so that: (1) some 
lumps cut across each other, and (2) some ways of lumping matter will dictate 
that there are two (or more) individuals, on occasions where others will dictate 
that there is only one, and vice versa. Interestingly, and that is the reason why 
the PBI is indeed a problem, as Clarke (2010: 313-315; 2013: 413-418) has 
convincingly argued, the existence of different criteria generate methodological 
disputes, and discarding some definitions as inadequate can sometimes 
overlook some important biological phenomena.61 To illustrate the non-
overlapping nature of the definitions, and the problems that this generates for 
biological practise, let me first offer some candidate criteria for deciding how to 
delimit the boundaries of biological individuals (adapted from Clarke 2010; 
Wilson and Barker 2013; Lidgard and Nyhart 2017b: 19-21, Table 1.1.)62 63: 
 
- Physical boundedness: a biological individual is a physically bounded, 
spatially discrete unit. This criterion is similar, although not equivalent, 
to the notion of ‘Anatomical individuality’ which I first introduced in 
chapter I (Gould and Lloyd 1999; de Sousa 2005). 
                                                          
61 Notice that ‘criteria’ and ‘definition’ are not synonymous, although the use here might 
mistakenly suggest so. To be clear, I use ‘definition’ to refer to the criterion (if one) or set of 
criteria that are used to characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions that the entities of 
an ensemble must fulfil to be ‘lumped’ together as a biological individual, and criterion to refer to 
any of the biological mechanisms that could be included in the definition. 
62 The problem I will consider here is not how to reidentify one and the same organism/individual 
over time, but how to determine whether we should count one or two individuals. Notice that 
these two questions, although related, are not metaphysically equivalent (Pradeu 2010; Wolfe 
2010). 
63 The list is not, does not aim to be, exhaustive. I will only suggest some criteria that have been 
offered in the literature to illustrate the points that will connect the discussion in this section with 
the rest of sections in this chapter.  
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- Genetic homogeneity: a biological individual is the ensemble composed 
by the set of genetically homogenous cells (Dawkins 1982a; Santelices 
1999). 
- Development from a fertilized zygote: sexually (diploid) distinguishable 
sex cycle, excluding other means of propagation (Janzen 1977; de 
Sousa 2005). 
- Realization of a life cycle: having a demarcated life cycle, irrespective of 
the means of propagation/generation of the entity that realizes the life 
cycle (Rainey and Kerr 2011; Wilson and Barker 2013) 
- Immunological integration: existence of an immunological system that 
delimitates the boundaries of the system, protecting it from external 
attacks and recognising the entities that are ‘parts’ of it and maintain its 
functionality through time. This criterion is similar to the notion of 
‘Immunological individuality’ which I introduced in chapter I (Pradeu 
2010, 2012; Tauber 2016; Gilbert and Tauber 2016). 
- Germ/soma specialization: existence of a division of labour that clearly 
demarcates reproductive cells (i.e. cells that will contribute to the 
formation of the zygote in the future) and somatic cells (i.e. cells that 
compose the body of the individual) (de Sousa 2005; Godfrey-Smith 
2009, 2013; Folse and Roughgarden 2010). 
- Bottleneck: originated from a narrowing (usually in the form of a 
unicellular stage) of the material constituents that follows some form of 
propagation (Godfrey-Smith 2009, 2013, 2015). 
- Reproduction: originated from a distinguishable form of reproduction, 
normally following certain parameters that define the correct way of 
reproducing and tell reproduction apart from growth (Godfrey-Smith 
2009). 
- Functional integration: existence of cohesion among the parts, usually 
defined in terms of shared metabolism (Sober and Wilson 1989, 1994, 
1998; Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Folse and Roughgarden 2010; Moreno 
and Mossio 2015). 
- Organisational closure/ Autonomy: ensembles whose components 
together realise a regime of ‘regulated closed agential emergent 
organisation’ (Moreno and Mossio 2015). 
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- Reduced conflict/ High cooperation among the parts: ensembles whose 
parts interact in a harmonic manner (Queller and Strassmann 2009, 
2016; Folse and Roughgarden 2010). 
 
The criteria just offered are not exhaustive, and some of them might even be 
argued to be specifications of others (e.g. the autonomy approach is a way of 
making ‘functional integration’ precise). However, they will serve to illustrate the 
points I want to make for the purposes of this chapter. First of all, on a general 
ontological level, it is clear from the list above that some definitions are 
exclusively given on the basis of the satisfaction of one criterion (‘A biological 
individual is an entity that is X’, where X is a criterion), whereas others include 
several criteria that might be satisfied either conjunctively (‘A biological 
individual is an entity that is X, and Y’, where X and Y are criteria), or 
disjunctively (‘A biological individual is an entity that is X, or Y’, where X and Y 
are criteria), or both (‘A biological individual is an entity that is X, or Y, or (Z, and 
Z’, and Z’’)’, where X, Y, Z, Z’, Z’’ are criteria). For instance, Godfrey-Smith 
appears three times, Moreno and Mossio appear twice, and Pradeu and 
Santelices appear only once. This is because for some authors, an entity is a 
biological individual if and only if it has certain properties or participates in 
certain biological processes (e.g. it reproduces in the appropriate way, which 
means it forms bottlenecks, or has a clear germ/soma specialization). For 
others, on the other hand, the requirements are different and thus their 
definitions include only the satisfaction of one property or the participation in a 
specific type of biological process. In this sense, some definitions are ‘harder to 
satisfy’ than others, i.e. they are more demanding. I will come back to this point 
at the end of this chapter. 
 
Second, and partially a corollary of the first point, notice that some 
definitions are ‘absolute’, whereas others might accept the existence of degrees 
of biological individuality. According to the former, there is no possibility of 
vagueness: either an ensemble is a biological individual, or it is not. According 
to the latter, some ensembles will be biological individuals absolutely, while 
others will be individuals only to a very low degree. A canonical defender of the 
first position is Janzen. For him, a biological individual is the entity that derives 
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from a sexually formed zygote, and only that. Either an ensemble satisfied that, 
and thus it is a biological individual, or it does not, and thus it is a clone, or a 
part, of another biological individual. On the other hand, Queller and 
Strassmann defended the view that some ensembles are more ‘organismal’ 
than others, depending on the degree in which the parts cooperate (or compete) 
with each other (Figure 17).  
 
 
Figure 17. The higher the level of between-part cooperation and the lower the level of between-
part conflict, the higher the score in ‘organismality’. The figure presents a classification of some 
‘lumps’ of matter and their degree of ‘organismality’ according to these criteria (From Queller 
and Strassmann 2009: 3145, Fig. 2) 
 
The same is true of Godfrey-Smith, who has a rather idiosyncratic view of the 
problem. On the one hand, Godfrey-Smith believes that there are different ways 
of significantly individuating biological ‘lumps’ of matter, and thus distinguishes 
organisms (functionally integrated wholes) from Darwinian individuals (units of 
selection). On the other, he accepts that Darwinian individuals, which are things 
that reproduce correctly—i.e. according to any of the modalities of reproduction 
that Godfrey-Smith considers as ‘correct’—come by degrees, depending on 
how many mechanisms they possess that guarantee that their reproductive 
regime is clearly demarcated/ distinguishable (Figure 18). This classification 
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allows him to distinguish between paradigmatic Darwinian individuals and 
aggregates that approximate—more or less—to the paradigm.64  
 
 
Figure 18. Three mechanisms to determine whether a collective reproducer is a paradigmatic 
Darwinian individual or not. Depending how many of the mechanisms a collective possesses, it 
will score higher in Darwinian individuality, with the higher score constituting the case of 
‘paradigmatic Darwinian individuals’. Notice that, according to this criterium, individuals come by 
degrees, with paradigmatic individuals like us, and paradigmatic non-individuals, like buffalo 
herd. In between, cases like the slime mold, an aspen ramet or a sponge. (From Godfrey-Smith 
2009: 95, Fig. 5.1) 
 
Third, as in the case of species, the different definitions do not classify 
biological ‘lumps’ in the same manner. Take, for example, the case of 
individuals*65 with a haplodiplontic biological cycle (for an analysis of this type of 
reproduction, see O’Malley 2016; Figure 19).66 According to sexual definitions 
                                                          
64 Surprisingly, one of the criteria that he considers is ‘overall integration’, which is the criterion 
he uses to characterize what he calls ‘organisms’. For a sustained criticism to his model see 
Sterner (2015) and Stencel (2016). 
65 I will use ‘individual*’ to avoid pre-judging their status as biological individuals, since the point 
of the section is to show how different definitions offer different verdicts.  
66 Notice that I say ‘haplodiplontic’ biological cycle, not ‘haplodiploidy’, which refers to the 
mechanism of sex determination in some insects. While the former means that one organism 
goes through a haploid stage during its life cycle, the later refers to the species where members 
of one sex (females) are diploid individuals, whereas members of the other (males) are haploid 
individuals. Of course, these criteria of individuality according to which the haploid life stage is 
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of biological individuality, the gametophyte, no matter how well developed it 
might be, is just one of the stages of development, i.e. one temporal stage of 
the life cycle of the biological individual. But there is only one individual, in 
different stages if its life cycle. On the other hand, for those that consider that 
the biological individual is the entity that realizes a life cycle, both the 
gametophyte and the sporophyte are biological individuals, thus there are two 
biological individuals, and not only one, as the defender of the sexual criterion 
of individuality assumes. And the same would be true for the defender of the 
bottleneck view, since haplodiplontic individuals* experience two bottlenecks 
during their life time, one for each part of the cycle (for an excellent exposition 
of the type of disagreements, see Clarke 2010, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 19. Haplodiplontic life cycle. The individual* that develops during the gametophyte phase 
is haploid (n), whereas the one that develops during the sporophyte phase is diploid (2n). Notice 
that both cycles require respective bottlenecks, and that during both lifecycles a complete and 
fully formed individual* appears. (From Wikimedia Commons:  
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ commons/f/f7/Diplohaplontic_English.svg).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
just a stage of one individual make it hard to conceive haploid individuals qua individuals in 
haplodiploid species. However, I will not consider these cases here.  
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Fourth, and no less important, these disagreements have sometimes important 
practical consequences, that should not be left unnoticed. To explain this, take 
the case of aphids, and the verdicts about how to count new aphids that the 
sexual criterion and the bottleneck view render. As it is known, aphids can 
develop and grow to reach an adult stage both from fertilized and from 
unfertilized eggs. Defenders of the sexual view consider that only those aphids 
that appear from a sexual fusion of gametes must be counted as new 
individuals—the others would be ‘clones’, according to e.g. Jenzen (1977)— 
whereas defenders of the bottleneck view would count both aphids that develop 
from fertilized and unfertilized eggs. Why is this problematic? As Ellen Clarke 
(2013: 416-418) has convincingly argued, counting individuals one way or the 
other might overlook cases of selection. For instance, imagine a case in which 
one of the clones (i.e. the aphid resultant from an unfertilized egg) acquires a 
mutation and thus triggers a process of within-clone selection. In this scenario, 
the mutant can cause a process of informational decay (e.g. if the mutant 
expands it mutation to the 80% of the clone population), a process that cannot 
possibly be appreciated by the scientist who, as Jenzen, is exclusively 
concerned with the counting of the sexually produced aphids. Therefore, as 
Clarke summarizes: 
 
‘[D]ifferent counts of the number of individuals in existence can lead to 
different measures of the fitness of their traits, and thereby lead the 
scientist to generate a different figure for total evolutionary change than 
she would have done if she had counted aphid insects, instead of aphid 
clones. This undermines our ability to understand how natural selection 
acts on wild populations, as well as our efforts to conserve and manage 
our natural environment. This is the sense in which the biological counting 
problem is real. There is a genuine multiplicity of concepts of the organism 
and this multiplicity is potentially damaging to the discussion and 
application of evolutionary theory.’ (Clarke 2013: 417) 
 
Finally, different ways of defining—and counting—biological individuals are 
sometimes guided by the type of problems that the scientists are investigating. 
It is not the same to be concerned about how the immunity system reacts to an 
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external ‘invader’, or how it can overcome an internal dysfunction (e.g. a 
tumour), than to be concerned with how an organism develops into adulthood, 
or how an organism reproduces. The three are significantly important biological 
processes that require adequate tools to be studied and handled carefully. 
However, these different processes can lead to different ways of ‘lumping’ the 
biological matter, and thus to different responses about how biological 
individuals must be counted (Pradeu 2016a, 2016b; DiFrisco 2017). This 
observation needs to be taken into account, as it is, in my view, part of the 
essence of the importance of the PBI. 
 
In conclusion, the point I wanted to make in this section was simply that 
there is an intrinsic connection between our way of defining biological 
individuals, the problems we aim to study, and the set of criteria we use to study 
them. But this analysis leaves open an important question: how is the PBI 
related to the debate about holobionts and the nature of HCE? 
 
2.1. Brief reflection on the problem of biological individuality and its 
importance for the hologenome concept of evolution 
The PBI is fundamental to understand some of the issues raised by HCE, as 
some people have already emphasized (Gilbert et al. 2017; Stencel and Wloch-
Salamon 2017; Suárez 2018a), simply because the debate about holobionts 
puts tension on some conceptions of biological individuality. If defenders of 
HCE are right, there is a genuine set of biological processes where the entity to 
be individualized is the multispecies community. Which this set of biological 
processes might be, it is a difficult question to address here, and I suspect it is 
highly relative to the individual that is being studied (see chapter IV). In any 
case, it is important to notice three points, that result from my analysis in the 
previous section: first, that the choice of one or other criterion of biological 
individuality depends on the problem that the scientists want to address; 
second, that different criteria respond to different, but relevant, biological 
processes, and thus different criteria capture some dimensions of the biological 
individual; thirds, that the use of different criteria is legitimate, if they are 
connected to the appropriate type of questions—i.e. if they serve to give 
responses to a biologically relevant question. These three points are, and will 
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be, fundamental for my position about HCE, and about the role of holobionts as 
units of selection. Thus, the lesson to derive from this discussion is that the 
choice of a criterion of biological individuality is (and must be) connected to the 
kind of problem that one is addressing.67  
 
3. Biological individuals as units of selection 
 
The reader might have noticed, at this point, that the list I have just presented in 
section 2 lacks a fundamental criterion, one that many take as the criterion, to 
faithfully demarcate biological individuals. I am referring to the notion of units of 
selection, and specifically to the idea that biological individuals are units of 
selection and only units of selection, i.e. entities or ensembles that participate in 
the selection process (Clarke 2013). There are two reasons for introducing the 
PBI first, in a rather general way, not specifically addressing the issue of the 
units of selection. First, that I will propose to incorporate different dimensions of 
the different criteria of biological in the notion of the units of selection I will 
favour in this chapter; second, that I agree with Ellen Clarke that what defines a 
biological individual is its capacity to participate in a selection process, and that 
this capacity is multiply realizable.68 
 
 Let me start this section by noting a very basic point about natural 
selection. What is natural selection about? Or, in other words, what does natural 
selection explain?69 In its original Darwinian formulation, natural selection was 
aimed at explaining the existence of adaptations in the living world. That is to 
say, it explained why species are apparently ‘built’ in such a way that they seem 
as if they had been specifically designed to do what they do—i.e. to feed how 
they feed, to reproduce how they reproduce, etc..70 Darwin’s idea to explain why 
                                                          
67 Different versions of this position have been defended by Lidgard and Nyhart 2017b, Love 
and Brigandt 2017. I won’t discuss how my version differs from theirs, as it is outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
68 Although, as the reader will see, I disagree with her favoured view of natural selection (i.e. the 
conditions that a biological ensemble must satisfy to arguably participate in a selection process). 
69 Most of the exposition that I introduce here is based on Ariew and Lewontin (2004): ‘The 
confusions of fitness’. It is, however, partially modified, as what I present is my own 
interpretation of Darwin’s ideas. 
70 Remember that Darwin’s book was entitled On the Origin of Species, not ‘on the origin of 
organisms.’ 
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this was so can be summarized as follows: (1) species are collections of 
organisms with different phenotypic characteristics (natural properties); (2) the 
different phenotypic characteristics among the organisms in a species make 
some of them fit the environment better than others (fitness to the environment); 
(3) there is a ‘struggle for existence’, i.e. organisms compete with each other to 
survive; (4) those organisms that fit the environment better will survive longer, 
and the phenotypic characteristics that allow them to survive longer will spread 
(‘survival of the fittest’)71; (5) as a consequence, the species composition will 
change over time (changes in representation in the population), and thus (6) the 
fittest species will tend to dominate the world (generalized adaptation). This can 
be summarized in the following simple schema 
 
(S) Natural properties → Fitness to the environment –– [Struggle for 
existence] → Survival of the fittest → changes in representation in the 
population → generalized adaptation72 
 
Notice that, in (S), ‘fitness to the environment’ is presented in abstract terms, 
and in relation to the natural properties of the fitness bearer. What is the 
fitness that (S) assumes exists between the natural properties of an entity 
and the environment? To understand well Darwin’s concept of ‘fitness’ one 
must note what Darwin aims to explain by appealing to the ‘survival of the 
fittest’73, namely: the existence of adaptation, or the generalized belief that 
living creatures seem to be designed by a sort of engineer to do what they 
do. Thus, in this sense, Darwin’s theory of evolution as a consequence of the 
survival of the fittest is only an explanation of why living creatures seems to 
be designed, i.e. of why they bear adaptations. In this sense, the concept of 
‘fitness’ entailed by his theory takes the higher reproductive rates of the fitter 
living creatures as a proxy to explain the survival of the fittest—i.e. it is a way 
                                                          
71 Notice that Darwin uses ‘survival of the fittest’ as a (more adequate) synonym of ‘natural 
selection’. 
72 ‘Struggle for existence’ is just the reason why organism’s fit to the environment leads to the 
survival of the fittest. But it is neither caused by the fitness of an organism to its environment, 
nor is it the cause of the survival of the fittest. It is only a background condition that one must 
assume.  
73 Notice that the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’ was originally introduced by Spencer in 1864, 
and later used by Darwin after a suggestion from Wallace. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survival_of_the_fittest. Accessed 29th May 2019. 
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in which the fittest can guarantee their survival and thus the fact that the 
properties that make them fitter spread in the population. But notice that 
fitting the environment is logically prior to surviving (including reproducing the 
type that makes it fit the environment). I wanted to emphasize this point here 
to contrast the notion of fitness that Darwin uses with the notion that appears 
in population genetics, where fitness is the consequence (and not the cause) 
of the survival of the fittest (and thus, of the higher reproductive rates) (see 
Ariew and Lewontin 2004, for an excellent exposition of this point). This point 
is important for the argument in support of HCE I will give in chapter V. 
 
Second, notice that the existence of an entity whose natural properties 
(or phenotype) fit the environment, i.e. an entity that acts as fitness bearer, is 
implicitly assumed, but its nature is left unexplained, in Darwin’s schema.74 
Which is this entity? The debate about the units of selection is, precisely, the 
debate to determine what these units can be, how they can be defined, how 
they can be individualized, and how they can be empirically studied. The 
question is partially scientific—can we empirically discover these entities?— 
although inherently philosophical, insofar as it concerns causality, i.e it is a 
question about the entity on which causality operates in the biological 
process of evolution by natural selection (chapter II, section 5) . Insofar as it 
concerns causality, it creates problems related to how causality must be 
understood, and how it must be applied in this case. Determining which the 
entity (or entities, as we will see) on which natural selection causally acts, 
has worried biologists and philosophers for more than one century. I will 
review the main approaches that have been offered to answer the question.  
 
3.1. Lewontin’s original formulation  
The original formulation of the debate about the units of selection, as this 
debate has been understood in the last half century, is conventionally credited 
                                                          
74 In this paragraph I am motivating the debate in Aristotelian terms: a property (idion) must 
inhere in an entity (ousía), or there is no property! 
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to Richard Lewontin (1970): ‘The units of selection’.75 His paper starts as 
follows: 
 
‘The principle of natural selection as the motive force for evolution was 
framed by Darwin in terms of a “struggle for existence” on the part of 
organisms living in a finite and risky environment. The logical skeleton of 
his argument, however, turns out to be a powerful predictive system for 
changes at all levels of biological organization. As seen by present day 
evolutionists, Darwin’s scheme embodies three principles (…): 
1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, 
physiologies, and behaviours (phenotypic variation). 
2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction 
in different environments (differential fitness). 
3. There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution 
of each to future generations (fitness is heritable). 
These three principles embody the principle of evolution by natural 
selection. While they hold, a population will undergo evolutionary change’ 
(Lewontin 1970: 1) 
 
Interestingly, Lewontin’s formulation is very abstract, as well as quite general 
and broad in scope, two features that Lewontin himself recognises. First, his 
three principles are applicable to individuals—Lewontin conventionally refers to 
‘multicellular organisms’—but they would be applicable to ‘any entities in nature 
that have variation, reproduction, and heritability’ (Lewontin 1970: 1), a point he 
proves clearly in the rest of his paper by applying the principles to organelles, 
cells, gametes, etc, i.e. to different levels in the biological hierarchy. Second, 
the meaning of the key terms in the principles is left completely open. In other 
words, neither a particular mechanisms of inheritance is presupposed by 
Principle 3—‘[n]o particular mechanism of inheritance is specified, but only a 
                                                          
75 The reader might be puzzled that I start with a paper from the 70s, provided that I said that 
the debate has concerned philosophers and biologists for more than one century. Nonetheless, 
starting with Lewontin’s paper is the conventional practise in philosophy, since it is the moment 
when the collaboration between biologists and philosophers started to flourish, and the debate 
became a debate, properly speaking, and not a mere disagreement in opinions (Lloyd 2017c). I 
will thus follow that convention here. 
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correlation in fitness between parent and offspring’ (Lewontin 1970: 1)—nor the 
reason(s) why different phenotypes contribute differently to different generations 
(Principle 2) is given. 
 
 The generality of Lewontin’s principles is such that he believes that they 
could (and must) be applied not only to the convential elements that he 
describes in his hierarchy, but also to higher level entities, such as multispecies 
communities: 
 
‘At yet higher levels, the species and the community, natural selection 
obviously must occur. Species evolve to survive in a certain environmental 
range, and if the environment should suddenly change, some species will 
become extinct but others will survive. The same is true of communities 
whose stability of composition depends upon the interaction among their 
constituent species.’ (Lewontin 1970: 15, emphasis added) 
 
The last point is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, because it shows 
that Lewontin’s self-conception of his framework for the units of selection is 
such that it applies to every imaginable level in the biological hierarchy, 
without exception. Second, because it can be applied to holobionts, as 
holobionts are communities of species. Let me expand on the second 
remark. In Lewontin’s framework, an entity x is a unit of selection if and only if 
x exhibits variability, fitness differences and heritability. If communities of 
species, that is holobionts, are units of selection—which is something 
Lewontin seems to be claiming in the paragraph above—then they must 
exhibit the three properties, in one way or another. And remember that 
Lewontin’s formulation of the properties is merely functional; that is to say, it 
is not tied to any particular mechanism that realizes the properties. 
Therefore, the task for the ‘Lewontinian’ is to discover which are the 
mechanisms that communities of species—or holobionts, in our case of 
interest—have that make them susceptible of materially realizing the three 
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properties, and thus being units of selection.76 But notice that for the 
Lewontinian, the fact that communities of species are units of selection is an 
a priori fact, whose a posteriori (empirical) consequnces would be to discover 
the mechanisms that materially realize the properties that make the 
community a unit of selection. Therefore, and this argument is crucial for my 
doctoral project, and of course for defending HCE from the Lewontinian 
perspective: a) it is legitimate to claim that a conglomerate (superorganism, 
holobiont, etc.) is a unit of selection; b) a consequence of the claim would be 
trying to discover the biological mechanisms that allow the conglomerate to 
realize the properties that make it a unit of selection; c) some of these 
properties must be new or unknown; and, thus: 1) it is illegitimate, from this 
perspective, to argue that a conglomerate is not a unit of selection because it 
does not realize any of the mechanisms conventionally attributed to the units 
of selection (e.g. germ/soma specialization; functional cohesion; bottlenecks; 
etc.); 2) the most rational way of proceeding is trying to discover the 
mechanisms (some of them possibly new, unknown before the entity was 
proposed as a unit of selection) that the conglomerate possesses and that 
allow it to act as a unit of selection.77 A clear implication of this is that there 
must exist a ‘diagnostic criterion’ for identifying units of selection that is 
previous to the discovery of the mechanisms that allow the entity (or 
conglomerate) to satisfy Lewontin’s conditions.78 I will come back to this point 
in section 3.4. 
 
                                                          
76 To avoid confusion, by ‘mechanisms’ or ‘material realization’, I refer to biological properties 
such as having bottlenecks, having germ/some specialization, etc. (specified in section 2), 
which are considered as realizers of biological individuality, or realizers of properties such as 
inheritance. The claim thus is that holobionts must have some of these realizers, even if they 
are different to those conventionally known and described in the literature on biological 
individuality. 
77 Notice that this argument can be perfectly made against Godfrey-Smith’s notion of Darwinian 
individuality, as Sterner (2015) has already noted, although in a different fashion than the one 
proposed here. 
78 Of course, one might wonder how we can decide what counts as a biological assemblage, 
and what does not, as well as whether this already entails a view about biological individuality. 
But notice that this would just generate a chicken-egg problem. It is clear, though, that, as it 
occurs in the case of species, there are some basic ‘diagnostic criteria’ that everyone would 
accept, e.g. the whole set of ‘stuff’ that occupies a position <x, y> at time t, and that seems to 
have a defined boundary. I will assume, thus, that there are basic diagnostic criteria that 
everyone would agree upon to determine what counts as a biological assemblage, and what 
does not. 
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 At this point, a clarification of Lewontin’s framework is required. In his 
framework, he presents the three principles that he takes to be independently 
necessary and jointly sufficient for an entity to qualify as a unit of selection and 
refers to them as: (1) existence of phenotypic variation; (2) existence of 
differences in fitness derived from the differences in the phenotypes; (3) 
heritability of fitness. I want to call the attention to the combination of conditions 
(2) and (3), as he seems to be conflating the notion of ‘fitness’, with the notion 
of ‘phenotypic trait’ (section 3). On the one hand, the requirement, in (2), that 
individuals with different phenotypes ‘score’ differently on fitness appeals to the 
differences in survival and reproduction. And, what is more acute, when 
Lewontin re-takes his formulation again across the paper, he refers simply to 
the concept of ‘reproduction’ to talk about the differences in fitness. On the 
other hand, in (3), Lewontin seems to be using a different notion than fitness, 
when he claims that fitness must be heritable. To start with, because he argues 
that Darwin’s theory explains the distribution of phenotypes in a population (i.e. 
why the organisms of a species have the phenotype they have, and which ones 
are getting ‘selected’). Second, because for this type of explanation to be 
accurate, what needs to be heritable is not the difference in the capacity to 
reproduce (reproduction rate), but the phenotypic feature that is undergoing 
positive selection. And, importantly, the two notions are not equivalent, as 
Godfrey-Smith has demonstrated: fitness does not need to be heritable for the 
traits in the population to be heritable, and only the latter are what matter to 
argue that there is evolution by natural selection going on in a population 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009: 17-27). For this reason, I will rather use a different 
formulation of the general Lewontinian principles that makes the difference 
between (2) and (3) explicit: 
 
‘A sufficient mechanism for evolution by natural selection is contained in 
three propositions: 
1. There is variation in morphological, physiological, and behavioural traits 
among members of a species (the principle of variation).  
2. The variation is in part heritable, so that individuals resemble their 
relations more than they resemble unrelated individuals and, in particular, 
offspring resemble their parents (the principle of heredity).  
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3. Different variants leave different numbers of offspring either in 
immediate or remote generations (the principle of differential fitness).’ 
(Lewontin 1985: 76) 
 
Notice that in this new formulation the possible equivocation with the ambiguity 
of the concept of ‘fitness’ vanishes: evolution by natural selection can be 
detected whenever there is (1) variation in character; (2) heritability of this 
variation; and (3) fitness differences among variants. There are two 
characteristics of the new formulation, though, that should not be left unnoticed. 
First, in the new version, the conditions are introduced as sufficient for natural 
selection to occur, but not as necessary. Second, the point about parent-
offspring resemblance, which in the original version only appeared in 3 (‘fitness 
is heritable’) and was expressed as the necessity of a correlation, is reinforced 
in the new version. In fact, this point is doubly reinforced in the new version, as 
Lewontin complements it with the following remark: ‘[i]f variation exists but is not 
passed from parent to offspring, then the differential reproductive success of 
different forms is irrelevant, since all forms will produce the same distribution of 
types in the next generation’ (Lewontin 1985: 76). These two features are 
fundamental because they provide a good guidance for further debates about 
the units of selection, and they provide good guidance for approaching HCE 
defender’s claim that the holobiont is a unit of selection. Overall, Lewontin’s 
approach can be abbreviated as follows: for an entity to be a unit of selection it 
is sufficient, but not necessary, that the entity exhibits heritable variation in 
fitness, i.e. that there is fitness-mediated transgenerational parent-offspring 
resemblance with respect to type. If these conditions are satisfied, then 
evolution by natural selection will occur. 
 
3.2. The interactor/replicator framework 
Soon after Lewontin provided his original formulation of the ‘recipe’ that units of 
selection must satisfy, Richard Dawkins (1976/2006) published his well-known 
book The Selfish Gene, where he proposed his gene-centred view of the 
evolutionary process and suggested a new way of conceiving the units of 
selection controversy, which in certain sense specifies Lewontin’s framework. 
Dawkins’ view of the evolutionary process was soon made more precise by 
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David Hull (1980, 1981, 1988), and became the standard view among biologists 
and philosophers of biology for the next two decades (Dawkins 1982a, 1982b; 
Brandon 1982, 1988; Sober and Lewontin 1982; Sober 1984; Mitchell 1987; 
Lloyd 1988, 1992, 2001, 2017a; Sober and Wilson 1994).79 Let me put a little bit 
of context here, before I introduce Dawkins and Hull’s framework, since it will be 
useful to fully comprehend why the authors decide to suggest their specific type 
of approach to address the controversy about the units of selection.80  
 
 Before Dawkins published The Selfish Gene, there was an agitated 
debate among evolutionists about which was the entity or entities that natural 
selection could ‘select’, i.e. which was the level of the biological organisation at 
which selection was more effective.81 During the 50s and the 60s, it was 
common among biologists—who mainly followed Darwin’s observation about 
the possible action of natural selection ‘for the good of the group’ (1871, The 
Descent of Man)—to interpret some types of animal behaviour as adaptations 
that benefitted the group or species that the animal belonged to. Such general 
appeal to group benefit was explicitly endorsed by V. Copner Wynne-Edwards 
in his major work (1962): Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour, 
where he acknowledged the general existence of between-group selection in 
nature, and showed no objection in postulating it as one of the main causes of 
evolution and the existence of adaptations. Wynne-Edwards’s views comprised 
a forceful attack on the Darwinian orthodoxy according to which the individual 
organism is the main unit of selection, i.e. it is the main unit on which 
adaptations evolve. Wynne-Edwards views, however, were soon criticized by 
Maynard-Smith (1964) and, especially, by Williams (1966). Williams’ criticism 
was based on the existence of a conceptual distinction between ‘adaptations’, 
and ‘fortuitous benefits’: in his view, adaptations look at the past history of the 
trait, whereas fortuitous benefits look at its future. Wynne-Edwards confuses the 
                                                          
79 A notable exception to this trend is developmental systems theory (Oyama 1988; Griffiths and 
Gray 1994, 1997). 
80 As in most philosophical debates, distinctions and alternative frameworks to conceive the 
same process are usually introduced to overcome one problem or set of problems that 
philosophers see as ‘urgent’ and in need of a solution. The same is true about the units of 
selection controversy, so introducing the context is fundamental, and prior, to introducing 
Dawkins and Hull’s interactor/replicator framework. 
81 The reconstruction is based on Okasha (2001): ‘Why won’t the group selection controversy go 
away?’, Br J Philos Sci 52: 25-50, and in Gould (2002): The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, 
pp. 544-556. 
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two notions and, thus, his arguments about the widespread existence of group 
selection are just misguided. 
 
Let me explain Williams’ idea more succinctly, because his criticism is 
fundamental to understand the debate about the units of selection. According to 
Williams, a trait is said to be an adaptation for doing p if and only if the trait 
evolved because there was selection for the trait, and there was selection for 
the trait precisely because having the trait promoted doing p (Sober 1984: 208). 
Applied to the context of group selection, a trait can be argued to be an 
adaptation for the group if and only if there was group selection for having the 
trait (Sober 1993: 85). However, and this is the key argument to be found in 
Williams’ criticism of Wynne-Edwards, the fact that one trait now benefits the 
group of entities that bear that trait does not mean that the trait was selected in 
the first place because it benefitted the group. Notice the causal language that 
appears here: to say that a trait evolved because it conferred benefits to the 
group whose individuals bear the trait entails that one is able to tell a causal 
story of why the trait is there, a causal story that appeals to the benefits that the 
trait confers to the group. As I said in chapter II, natural selection provides a 
causal explanation of why a trait exists, so the existence of a causal story that 
can be told is fundamental to talk about group adaptations.82 Williams’ point 
against Wynne-Edwards is, thus, that what he regards as traits that have been 
selected for the good of the group might benefit the group now, but this benefit: 
1) might not be the reason why the trait exists on the first place (i.e. it does not 
have the right kind of causal history); 2) might be the consequence of kin 
selection or inclusive fitness theory, which is presented as an alternative to 
group selection that would explain the existence of the same type of traits that 
group selection explains, without appealing to a benefit for the group (see 
Hamilton 1964a, 1964b, for the concept of ‘kin selection’).  
 
                                                          
82 There is a whole debate about what natural selection really explains (Stegmann 2010; Birch 
2012; Díez and Lorenzano 2013; Mogensen 2016), or about whether explanations that appeal 
to natural selection are causal or rather statistical (Walsh et al. 2002; Brandon and Ramsey 
2007; Lewens 2010; Huneman 2012). I will not enter in any of these disputes here, as that is 
outside the scope of this thesis. I will only appeal to the explanatory nature of the notion of 
‘natural selection’ for illustrative purposes. 
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About 1), Williams made the following point: the individuals that compose 
a group have generally shorter living times than the groups themselves; if this is 
so, then the opportunity for between-group selection will systematically be 
eroded by the opportunity for between-individual selection. Why? Because for 
natural selection to be an efficient driver of evolution, it is necessary that the 
degree of variation within the object under consideration is low, so that the 
possible effects that a specific variation v might have on the fitness of the 
objects that bear v allow these objects to outcompete other objects in the 
populatin that do not bear v. However, if each object in the population is 
constantly varying due to selection at the lower level, then natural selection is 
not possible. This condition, he believes, is not satisfied among groups, since 
they experience constant variation and, therefore, the opportunity for group 
selection is rare, compared to the opportunity of individual selection. 
Concerning 2), Williams develops the following line of reasoning: According to 
kin selection, some traits (e.g. offspring caring behaviour) that would in principle 
seem like group adaptations, are in reality individuals adaptations, because the 
individuals that evolve those traits will be in a clear fitness advantage over those 
that do not. Importantly, for an adaptation to be counted as a case of kin 
selection, it is necessary that the trait evolved to benefit those that are alike, i.e. 
to benefit the relatives (offspring, or tightly connected relatives). Those cases, 
detractors of Wynne-Edwards argue, are not to be counted as cases of group 
selection and, furthermore, most cases of what Wynne-Edwards counts as 
group selection are indeed cases of kin selection.  
 
Given the context aforementioned, it is now time to introduce Dawkins’ 
solution to the tension between group selection and kin (or individual) selection, 
which was just the tension between Wynne-Edwards and Williams. It must be 
noted, although in passing, that by the moment when Dawkins introduces his 
solution, this was seen more as a ‘challenge from below’—and Wynne-
Edwards’ model was interpreted as a  ‘challenge from above’—in the sense that 
it also seemed to question the role of the organism as a unit of selection. 
However, this perception was somehow misleading, since one of his points 
consisted precisely in defending that the organism is also a unit of selection, in 
at least one of the two different meanings that the concept can adopt (Dawkins 
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1982a; see Wilkins and Bourrat 2018: section 3). Let me introduce his solution 
to the tension by quoting Dawkins’ own words in the ‘Introduction to the 30th 
Anniversary Edition’ of his opus magnum, where he re-evaluates the 
importance of The Selfish Gene for the debate about the units of selection: 
 
‘I should perhaps have gone for The Immortal Gene. The Altruistic Vehicle 
(…). Perhaps it would have been too enigmatic but, at all events, the 
apparent dispute between the gene and the organism as rival units of 
natural selection (a dispute that exercised the late Ernst Mayr to the end) 
is resolved. There are two kinds of unit of natural selection, and there is no 
dispute between them. The gene is the unit in the sense of replicator. The 
organism is the unit in the sense of vehicle. Both are important. Neither 
should be denigrated. They represent two completely distinct kinds of unit 
and we shall be hopelessly confused unless we recognize the distinction.’ 
(Dawkins 1976/2006: ix) 
 
This paragraph introduces Dawkins’ popular view about the evolutionary 
process. The evolutionary process is, for him, the process by which natural 
selection causes the evolution of two special types of entities: on the one hand, 
the gene, which is the unit of selection in the sense of being a replicator; on the 
other, the organism, which is the unit of selection in the sense of being a 
vehicle. But, what does this jargon exactly mean? And, more importantly, what 
is the significance of introducing two units in a process which originally involved 
the existence of only one?  
 
 Dawkins believes that we must carefully distinguish between: on the one 
hand, the units that have the properties that a successful unit of selection must 
have; and, on the other hand, the larger units that these original units must form 
to foster their own success. Dawkins refers to the first units as replicators. 
Replicators are the entities of which copies are made, and that share three 
basic properties: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity. Why are these three 
properties necessary to determine the degree of success of the replicator? The 
answer to this question is simple: if the phenotypic effects of an entity are going 
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to outcompete the phenotypic effects of another, then the entity must be long-
lived enough so that the effects can accumulate, a lesson we learnt from 
Williams. Longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity guarantee that this is so. The 
unit that fulfils these three properties is the replicator, and the (selfish) gene is 
for Dawkins the paradigmatic case of a replicator.83 On the other hand, Dawkins 
also recognises the existence of a different type of unit of selection that he calls 
the vehicle. The importance of introducing the vehicle and its necessity as a unit 
of selection becomes clear in the following passage taken from Stephen J. 
Gould: 
 
‘I find a fatal flaw in Dawkins’ attack from below. No matter how much 
power Dawkins wishes to assign to genes, there is one thing he cannot 
give them –direct visibility to natural selection–. Selection simply cannot 
see genes and pick among them directly. It must use bodies as an 
intermediary.’ (Gould 1977: 24, emphasis added) 
 
Notice the problem that Gould is pointing at. It might well be true that replicators 
are long-lived, that they have a high-degree of copying-fidelity and that they are 
fecund. However, they are invisible to natural selection, which can only see and, 
thus, proximately select, phenotypic differences among individuals. But notice 
that this is a consequence of the fact that replicators tend to appear combined 
with each other forming chromosomes, cells, organisms, multispecies 
communities, etc. (Lewontin’s hierarchy). All these structures are not 
replicators: they are vehicles that: 1) are directly visible to selection, and 2) their 
success ultimately determines the rate of success of the replicators that 
compose them. In Dawkins’ words: ‘Vehicle selection is the differential success 
of vehicles in propagating the replicators that ride inside them.’ (Dawkins 
1982b). At this point, two things become clearer: first, that part of the 
disagreement about the units of selection turns out to be a semantic question, 
due to the fact that different researchers mean different concepts by using the 
                                                          
83 Notice that the replicator is a conceptual tool, the name to refer to the unit of selection that 
satisfies the three properties, and the gene is the biological entity that satisfies the properties. In 
Dawkins’ framework, however, other entities, such as memes, can also act as replicators and, 
what is more interesting, due to the empirical nature of the category, it is perfectly conceivable 
that other entities apart from genes could also be replicators, provided they satisfy the desired 
properties. 
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same expression (‘units of selection’ is polysemic);84 second, Dawkins’ 
observation in the 30th years Edition of The Selfish Gene, where he claims that 
a more adequate title would have been The Immoral Gene. The Altruistic 
Vehicle.  
 
 Let me start from the beginning. In which sense is the dispute about the 
units of selection semantic? Dawkins gives the following example: ‘The 
controversy about group selection versus individual selection is a controversy 
about whether, when we talk about a unit of selection, we ought to mean a 
vehicle at all, or a replicator.’ (Dawkins 1982b). In Dawkins’ view, Wynne-
Edwards, as well as other defenders of group selection, are referring to the 
vehicles, insofar as groups are in part responsible for the success of the 
replicators that make up the group. On the other hand, Williams, as well as 
other detractors of group selection, usually mean the ‘replicator’ when they talk 
about the unit of selection, and thus strongly oppose Wynne-Edwards’ 
hypotheses about group selection.85 Thus, the dispute between group selection 
and individual selection is partially a semantic dispute, as the authors mean 
different concepts by the expression ‘unit of selection’. However, the dispute is 
only partially semantic, since sometimes they also disagree about which entity 
is the vehicle of selection, and there is a genuine empirical debate, as Dawkins 
reminds us: ‘the organism and the group of organisms are true rivals for the 
vehicle role in the story, but neither of them is even a candidate for the 
replicator role. The controversy between “individual selection” and “group 
selection” is a real controversy between alternative vehicles’ (Dawkins 
1976/2006: 254-255). 
 
Second, Dawkins believes that a more appropriate title for his book 
would have been The Immoral Gene. The Altruistic Vehicle. Why? Because in 
Dawkins’ view of the evolutionary process, the real beneficiary of evolution, the 
                                                          
84 A semantic question, but not a verbal dispute. There is a genuine semantic disagreement 
about the meaning of ‘unit of selection’, the disagreement is not merely about what to call the 
different units of selection. 
85 It is not strange that Dawkins explicitly acknowledges that the properties that he attributes to 
replicators, and that he had polemically expressed in The Selfish Gene by demanding the 
immortality’ of replicators (1976/2006: chapter 3; see also 1982b), derive from the properties 
that Williams attributes to the units of selection. 
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real unit that has the right properties and that pursues its own interests is the 
replicator—which is empirically the ‘gene’, conceived as ‘a piece of 
chromosome which is sufficiently short for it to last, potentially, for long enough 
for it to function as a significant unit of natural selection’ (Dawkins 1976/2006: 
45)— whereas vehicles are there altruistically, just to serve the interests of the 
replicators that make them up. Importantly, in Dawkins’ view, the replicators 
make their vehicles, and the replicators that survive longer are those that make 
better vehicles, as the vehicles are the entities that compete which each other 
to pass on their replicators. Using the conventional distinction between 
proximate and ultimate causation (Mayr 1961), it could be argued that the 
replicators are the ultimate beneficiaries of the evolutionary process, whereas 
the vehicles are only the proximate causes that determine the success of the 
former.86 
 
 Dawkins’ view of the evolutionary process is very controversial, and has 
been subjected to a lot of criticism, that I will not examine here. But one 
important criticism that I will examine came from David Hull, who made a 
fundamental contribution by clearing up the notions of replicator and vehicle that 
Dawkins had originally introduced (Godfrey-Smith 2000: 404-407). For Hull 
(1980, 1981, 1988)87, the process of natural selection encompasses two 
different types of entities: on the one hand, an entity whose structure persists 
throughout evolutionary time; on the other, an entity that has the capacity of 
interacting with others and, thus, causes differential replication. According to 
Hull, these two types of entities had not been clearly defined by Dawkins, and 
even if he had introduced the notion of replicator and vehicle, the distinction 
was not clear enough to make sense of these two roles. The two entities 
introduced by Hull came to be known, respectively, as the replicator and the 
interactor. To quote: 
                                                          
86 Lisa Lloyd would disagree with referring to the replicator as the beneficiary of the evolutionary 
process, because in her view of the units of selection, there are not two, but four different 
questions (Lloyd 1992, 2001, 2017a). I think she is right that the question about which entity is 
the replicator and the question about which entity is the beneficiary of the evolutionary process 
are not necessary the same question. However, this does not refute the claim that Dawkins 
mixes the two categories in one, and that’s the reason why I introduce Dawkins’ replicator by 
calling it the ‘ultimate beneficiary’. 
87 It is conventionally accepted to use the definition of the replicator that Hull uses in his (1980). 
However, I think the definitions that he gives in his excellent (1988), is far more precise, as it 
eliminates the weird requirement of ‘directedness’ from the definition. I will thus take (1988) as 
my referent. 
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‘[I]n an effort to reduce conceptual confusion, I suggest the following 
definitions: 
replicator – an entity that passes on its structure largely intact in 
successive replications 
interactor – an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole with its 
environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be 
differential 
With the aid of these two technical terms, selection can be 
characterized succinctly as follows: 
selection – a process in which the differential extinction and 
proliferation of interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the 
relevant replicators.’ (Hull 1988: 408-409). 
 
I now need to explain more clearly what Hull was getting at with this distinction.  
To do so, let us go back to Gould’s criticism of Dawkins. According to Gould, 
the main problem with Dawkins’ replicator-centred account was that genes (or 
replicators, see fn. 83) were not directly visible to the process of natural 
selection. And this was a non-salvable obstacle for the replicator account. 
Remember again a point I made in chapter II, and that has been repeated 
several times: natural selection is a causal process. Evolutionary change can be 
driven by many different types of processes; those different processes generate 
a sorting among the interacting entities. Among those processes, selection is 
the causal process. Relegating natural selection to the persistence of replicators 
simply misses the main point. Hull’s vision of natural selection, on the contrary, 
overcomes this difficulty: natural selection is a story of both replicators and 
interactors. The replicators are the structures that persist through evolutionary 
time (structural unit). The interactors, on the other hand, are the cohesive 
wholes that causally determine how successful these structures are (functional 
unit). As Hull expresses his thoughts:  
 
‘If an entity is to function as a replicator, it must have a structure and be 
able to pass this structure on to successive generations of replicators. (…) 
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Although replicators might be part of functional systems, they themselves 
need not be functional systems. 
Interactors must exhibit structure but toward quite different ends – they 
must be able to cope with their environments’. (Hull 1980: 318, emphasis 
added) 
 
At this point, I want to make a clarification. What is at stake in this debate? Why 
does it seem so necessary to discriminate between structural units (replicators) 
and functional units (interactors)? Here, again, a bit of history will help. When 
Dawkins wrote The Selfish Gene, junk DNA had recently been discovered. As 
its name suggests, junk DNA is a portion of the DNA in an organism with no 
defined biological function, i.e. a branch of DNA that is not coded into a 
biologically functional protein.88 In those days, to account for the maintenance of 
junk DNA was paradoxical: if natural selection tends to favour variants that 
increase the fitness of their bearers, and junk DNA does not produce any kind 
of biological function, then it does not increase the fitness of its bearers and is 
expected to be selected against. Dawkins was interested in explaining why junk 
DNA was so common, and thus he came up with the idea that the real 
beneficiary of selection, the real and more genuine unit of selection, was the 
structure that was able to copy itself, at zero cost, and guaranteeing its survival 
throughout the cost for a third entity, i.e. the selfish gene. The selfish gene has 
the interesting peculiarity of getting copied despite producing no phenotypic 
effect at all, and mostly thanks to the phenotypic effects produced by other non-
selfish genes that it happens to ‘live with’ within a genome (Doolittle and 
Sapienza 1980). The existence of junk DNA is thus Dawkins’ inspiration to 
formulate his distinction between replicators qua structural entities and vehicles 
qua functional entities, which Hull would later reformulate as a distinction 
between replicators and interactors. 
 
 Notice, thus, that the questions I have asked in the previous paragraph 
get an immediate response here. First, it is necessary to discriminate between 
                                                          
88 The exsistence of junk DNA is now questionable for the fact that a branch of DNA has no 
biological function does not mean that it does not have biochemical activity, i.e. junk DNA might 
be transcribed, but the proteins that are produced fail to have a biological function. See Doolittle 
(2013a). 
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structural and functional units of selection because it is necessary to distinguish 
the units that get selected due to their own interactions with the environment 
(i.e. the phenotypes, and thus the genes that code for phenotypic properties), 
and the units that get selected because they are good at making copies of 
themselves. 89 Furthermore, the existence of junk DNA strongly suggested, at 
least for Dawkins, that the real winner of the evolutionary process was the entity 
that made copies of itself, and that any (possible) phenotypic effect of this entity 
would be, at most, instrumental: it would simply be a way of getting copied 
better. But evolution was not just a tale of making good phenotypes, but a tale 
of using those that make good phenotypes to get copied better, without taking 
the effort of making the good phenotype yourself. These points will be 
fundamental, because most of the problems that gave rise to the formulation of 
the distinction between replicators and interactors will re-appear in the 
discussions of HCE (chapter II), and my response to them will be very similar to 
the responses that have been given in the past (chapter V).  
 
 Having settled the interactor/replicator framework, a fundamental 
question arises: how is this framework connected to Lewontin’s hierarchical 
view of the units of selection? Does the interactor/replicator framework entail 
that the biological hierarchy is just composed by two units of selection, and that 
all the debate that Lewontin (and Wynne-Edwards, and Williams, etc.) started 
about the role of the organism, the superorganism, or the group, as the unit of 
selection must be forgotten? The exact answer to the first question is unclear, 
as Samir Okasha (2006) and Godfrey-Smith (2009) have discussed at length in 
their work. Nonetheless, both the first and the second question might be replied 
to as follows: once the replicator/interactor framework was formulated, it 
became widely assumed that the replicators were, empirically speaking, the 
genes, conceived in Dawkins’ structural sense of ‘an entity capable of making 
copies of itself’ and, thus, they became recognised as the entities that 
                                                          
89 It is questionable that ‘being good at making copies of onselef’ entails ‘getting selected’, as 
Dupré has told me, because the ones that are selected are those that have ‘adaptive 
phenotypic consequences’. I think he is right about pointing that out. However, it is conceptually 
possible to argue that since different genes have different ‘copying capacities’, their capacity to 
make copies of themselves is indeed an adaptive phenotype of the gene. This seems to me the 
most charitable interpretation of Dawins and Hull’s view of natural selection, at least. 
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accounted for the phenomenon of heredity.90 Therefore, the debate about the 
units of selection became a dispute about which entity is the interactor; in other 
words, to put it in Robert Brandon’s terminology, the scientific relevant problem 
became to identify ‘the hierarchy of interactors’. Thus, the interactor/replicator 
framework somehow subsumes Lewontin’s view under the proviso that all 
heredity will be carried out by replicators, and thus one should not worry about 
hereditary relations when she is trying to discover which entities play the role of 
the interactor. The debate about the units of selection, thus, became 
reformulated as the debate about the entities that interact cohesively so that, as 
a consequence, replication is differential.  
 
 I have highlighted ‘as a consequence’ for one simple reason: what 
became relevant during the 80s and the 90s of the 20th century was to discover 
at which level natural selection causally acts. And remember that in Hull’s 
definition of the interactor and the replicator, the only entity that plays a genuine 
causal role in evolution is the interactor. This is thus another argument to 
support my view that the entity that played a philosophically significant role for 
those decades was the interactor, and the replicator was just seen as a ‘lucky 
survivor’ of the process of selection. Importantly, many of the philosophers that 
proposed elaborated accounts to cope with the problem of causality did so 
thinking about interactors (see Brandon 1985; Lloyd 1988). And, indeed, as I 
already said in chapter II, the main issue about the units of selection is how to 
distinguish sorting from selection, that is, how to distinguish a random effect of 
sampling from a causal effect derived from having a fit phenotype. I will come 
back to these issues later, now it is time to revise the main problems that the 
interactor/replicator framework has. 
 
                                                          
90 Of course, this opinion needs to be put into context, since some people have also argued that 
there were both a hierarchy of interactors and a hierarchy of replicators (e.g. Brandon 1988), 
under the assumption that each interactor requires the existence of a specific replicator that 
accounts for the parent-offspring similarity at that level of the biological hierarchy. Brandon’s 
view is nonetheless not the standard one, and in fact the most popular view of the replicator 
recognizes two entities that can play this role: the gene and the meme, the last being the unit of 
cultural heredity. 
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3.3. Problems with the interactor/replicator framework 
As I said at the beginning of the last section, the interactor/replicator framework 
developed by Hull and Dawkins was the dominant view about the units of 
selection for about two decades. However, after some powerful critiques, that 
framework became widely questioned, and has been slowly abandoned. What 
are the main problems that the interactor/replicator framework created, and that 
has moved researchers to abandon it? I will present three different types of 
criticism that, in one way or another, have been formulated in the literature. The 
first one, which is partially derived from Gould (2002), and refined by Godfrey-
Smith (2009), concerns the empirical correctedness of the view of the selection 
process that the interactor/replicator framework presumes. Secondly, I will 
introduce a criticism partially derived from James Griesemer (2000a, 2000b), 
and the major transitions in evolution research project, which questions the 
necessity of the replicator as a category, on the basis that it leaves too much 
unexplained. Finally, I will introduce an ‘Ockham razor’s’ type of criticism, which 
basically states that the replicator/interactor framework multiplies the units of 
selection beyond necessity, postulating the existence of two entities for a 
process that could perfectly be explained by postulating the existence of one. 
 
 First of all, in his extensive (2002), zoologist Stephen J. Gould strongly 
opposes the interactor/replicator framework based on his strong opposition to 
the concept of ‘replicator’. According to him, while it is true that the concept of 
the ‘replicator’ captures the role of the gene as a very important entity in the 
evolutionary process, he thinks that the role of replicators in natural selection is 
completely irrelevant. Let me present his argument with his own words: 
 
‘Replication identifies a valid and important criterion for the crucial task of 
bookkeeping or tracing evolutionary change; but replicators cannot specify 
the causality of selectionist processes, which must be based upon the 
recognition and definition of interactors with environments’ (Gould 2002: 
72) 
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Notice what it is at stake here. To do so, it is useful to go back to a point I made 
in chapter II, about the distinction between sorting and selection, as well as to 
the point made at the beginning section 3 of this chapter, concerning the two 
different notions of ‘fitness’ that Lewontin and Arriew (2004) pointed to. The 
point I made there is that natural selection is a question of finding causes, i.e. of 
finding the reason why biological individuals have the traits they have and that 
make them fit their environments. And, precisely, the problem with population 
genetics, replicator-based models of natural selection is that, at most, they can 
track the effects of selection on the genetic pool. But this is a far cry from 
identifying the actual causes that operated in the population on the first place, 
and that in the end caused that distribution (see also Sober and Lewontin 
1982). The primary problem that makes Gould suspicious of the 
interactor/replicator framework is, thus, that it conflates the effect of selection 
with its actual cause, i.e. it conflates sorting with selection. 
 
 But this is not the only problem that Gould sees with the 
interactor/replicator framework. There is a more fundamental problem that 
affects the conceptual necessity of replicators for selection processes. 
Remember that, in the interactor/replicator framework it is generally assumed 
that the genes play the role of the replicator, insofar as they are capable of 
making copies of themselves and thus maintaining their structure for the longest 
time. However, there is a historical and, I would say, empirical paradox in this 
account. When Darwin first presented his theory he was completely unaware of 
the existence of entities that could perfectly copy their structure, i.e. he was 
completely unaware of the existence of genes. He simply formulated his theory 
on the basis of his empirical observations on artificial selection experiments, as 
well as some field observations, both of which were completely disconnected 
from any knowledge about the material basis of heredity. This criticism against 
the interactor/replicator framework is relevant for two reasons. First, because it 
makes the valid and substantial point that what is empirically necessary to 
‘presume’ the action of natural selection is simply parent-offspring resemblance, 
however this is understood; second, because it puts the focus on why the 
transmission of a subset of particles from parent to offspring, while empirically 
relevant, is nothing but a historical contingency of the course of evolution. It is 
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perfectly plausible that evolution would have been different, and that natural 
selection could act on individuals with a completely different hereditary basis to 
the one living creatures happen to have (see also Godfrey-Smith 2009: 36-39). 
In fact, the existence of other non-genetic channels of inheritance, like 
epigenetic inheritance, or cultural inheritance, put stress on the notion of the 
replicator and, importantly, question its validity as a scientifically relevant 
category (Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Pontarotti 2016). 
 
 Secondly, a substantial argument against the interactor/replicator 
framework derives from the work on the major transitions in evolution and, 
especially, from the work of James Griesemer (2000a).91 The best way of 
appreciating this criticism is, I think, going back to the original definitions of the 
replicator and the interactor. According to them, the replicator is an entity with a 
high degree of copying-fidelity, insofar as it has the capacity of getting its 
structure preserved, and the interactor is a highly cohesive entity that interacts 
with its environment as a single unit. The paradox of these definitions is this: are 
not the capacity of making highly accurate copies of oneself and the property of 
being a highly cohesive unit already highly evolved biological characteristics 
whose existence needs to be explained by natural selection? Notice the 
problem here. Let us assume that the interactor and the replicator are the only 
units of selection that exist now. If this is so, then evolution by natural selection 
will only occur in the empirical objects that happen to have the features of the 
interactor and the replicator. However, what becomes paradoxical is that the 
very existence of these objects needs to be explained by the same principles 
that explain why they evolve by natural selection now.92 That is, we need 
natural selection to explain why certain objects became, say, ‘paradigmatic’ 
units of selection. But this immediately puts the cart before the horse, since it is 
at least conceptually perplexing to explain the existence of the units of selection 
by the action of natural selection on objects that are not themselves units of 
selection!  
                                                          
91 A similar criticism appears in many other works, most notably in the work on group selection 
by Wilson and Sober (1989), and Sober and Wilson (1994, 1998). 
92 Notice that when I use the expression ‘evolve by natural selection’ I mean evolve in response 
to selection. That is, evolve according to the formula R = h*S, which I introduced and explained 
in chapter II. In other words, it is about which entities evolve according to the breeder’s 
equation. 
151 
 
 
 The tradition of thinking of the levels of selection diachronically, that is to 
say, the study of the evolution of the canonical units of selection that we know 
nowadays (i.e. the real biological entities that play the roles of interactors and 
replicators respectively), is conventionally traced back to the original work by 
Buss (1987). Buss, however, did not exactly think that his work supposed a 
challenge to the interactor/replicator framework per se, but a framework for 
tracking a different type of question: on the one hand, the identification of the 
interactors and the replicators will give us information about the entities in which 
biological adaptations will appear; on the other hand, the study of the origins of 
individuality will provide information about how new units of selection (i.e. units 
that can evolve adaptations) came to exist in the first place. In this sense, the 
two questions, although related—identifying how new units appear would be 
somehow conceptually prior to the discovery of how the current units can evolve 
their own adaptations, are conceptually different (Fontana and Buss 1994; 
Griesemer 2000a; Okasha 2006). However, Buss’s view of the problem is not 
completely correct. Because new units of selection will only evolve if there is a 
group adaptation that evolves so that two previously extant units become one.93 
But this process, even if seen as a transition in individuality, is the process of 
evolving an adaptation that fuses two previously extant units into a single unit, 
and thus it is not true that the questions about the entities that become new 
levels of selection and the entities that evolve adaptations can be conceptually 
separated. This objection puts a fundamental tension on the replicator/interactor 
framework, since it makes clear that, although it might be a good framework for 
identifying some candidate units that would presumably evolve adaptations, it 
falls short of being a sufficiently general view of the process of natural selection. 
 
 Finally, there is a substantial problem that results from the appreciation 
of the previous two problems, in combination with Ockham’s principle of 
parsimony. By separating the properties of ‘interacting with the environment’ 
(i.e. bearing fitness) and ‘standing in hereditary relations’, and attributing them 
                                                          
93 Which these group level adaptations are is, of course, a question whose answer depends on 
the author who studies the problem. I will later consider the view of Ellen Clarke, who argues, 
following Michod (1999) and Queller and Strassmann (2009), that the key adaptation is the 
appearance of a policing mechanism. See section 3.3.1.1. 
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to two different types of entities, the interactor/replicator framework multiplies 
the type of biological entities to study to two instead of one. That multiplication 
would be legitimate if and only if the role played by the two types of entities 
were: (1) completely necessary for natural selection to happen; and (2) the 
entities that play these two roles were completely independent from each other. 
In other words, the postulation of two types of entities that participate in the 
process of natural selection would be necessary if and only if the type of 
properties whose existence is explained by appealing to natural selection were 
so radically apart from each other that it would be impossible to imagine that a 
single entity could play both roles (i.e. heredity and fitness bearing). Otherwise, 
Hull and Dawkins would be multiplying the number of entities beyond natural 
necessity, which contradicts the principle of parsimony dictated by Ockham’s 
razor. Personally, I think the intuitive appeal of parsimony is, at least, 
philosophically questionable and, at most, completely unjustified from an 
empirical point of view: why should nature be parsimonious? In any case, 
setting aside possible methodological discussions about general philosophical 
principles, this type of criticism to the interactor/replicator framework is a way of 
making a valid point. It is not just the case that the interactor/replicator 
framework separates two types of properties and links them to two different 
types of entities. In addition to that, it partially blocks every type of research on 
every other mechanism of inheritance that is not channelled by replicators, thus 
limiting importantly the concept of inheritance. And, in this sense, the strict 
separation of the two types of entities might turn out to be epistemically harmful 
and ontologically mistaken. 
 
Let me make a thought experiment to show why this issue is of vital 
importance, and especially acute for the topic of my dissertation.94 Imagine that 
we discover a foreign planet where there are creatures like us, that reproduce 
and produce offspring, that these offspring resembles their parents on average 
more than they resemble the offspring of any other random member of the 
same population, and so on and so forth. The only substantial difference 
between these creatures and us is that when they reproduce they do not pass 
any structural particle to their offspring, but those are created de novo following 
                                                          
94 In chapter V I will elaborate on this with the real-world example of holobionts. But for the 
moment, a thought experiment will illustrate this point more abstractly and I think more clearly. 
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a mysterious recipe that every member in the population knows. Now imagine, 
for the sake of the argument, that the repetition of this process several times 
gives rise to different generations and, with time, those individuals that are 
better suited to their environment happen to be dominant in the population. I 
have no doubt we would say that the process that gave rise to the dominance of 
the fitter types in our imaginary planet was natural selection. Now suppose we 
believe that natural selection only occurs when we have two entities, the 
interactor and the replicator, as in Hull and Dawkins framework. It is easy to see 
what the interactors would be in our thought experiment, as I made it easy when 
I said that the foreign planet was inhabited by ‘creatures like us’. So, our duty as 
scientists is finding out the replicators. Can we identify the particles that account 
for the features we perceive in the population and that lead to the dominance of 
the fitter type? Actually, we cannot, because in my example the parent-offspring 
similarity was due to the capacity of the parent to follow a recipe and 
agglutinating previously extant material so that the offspring would resemble 
them. For the defender of the replicator/interactor framework, thus, the 
observed similarities are not a consequence of selection, but of a different, and 
unknown biological process. But this conclusion is highly counterintuitive. Would 
not the duty of the biologist be to look for whatever substance or process (in this 
case, the mysterious recipe and the materials taken to make each offspring) is 
responsible for the observed parent-offspring similarity, no matter how different 
this might be from canonical replicators? And, importantly, would it not be more 
ontologically accurate to say that inheritance, in this foreign planet, is 
channelled through the mysterious recipe? I suspect everyone would answer to 
that question affirmatively, which suggests that replicators are definitely not 
necessary for natural selection. 
 
The thought experiment just explained is in line with the first criticism 
against the interactor/replicator framework, as this was explained by Gould. But 
in my case, the experiment has a different purpose. I wanted to show that any 
argument based on the claim that ‘there are no replicators’ to justify that natural 
selection is not occurring at one biological level is simply misguided, as it is 
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simply a case of inappropriate reification (or ‘misplaced concretenes’).95 In 
general, the discovery of the entities that account for the observed similarities 
will always be an a posteriori task. The way of discovering new levels of 
selection, thus, cannot consist in identifying both the interactor and the 
replicator, but rather in identifying transgenerational similarity relations that 
need to be accounted for. Thus, in this case, the Ockham’s parsimony principle 
must be applied for, as I have proven, not doing so would not only not benefit, 
but even damage, scientific research. 
 
3.3.1. Brief reflection. Is there a way out for the interactor/replicator framework? 
A proposal to reconceive the problem of the units of selection 
The three types of criticism I have just presented put a serious challenge to the 
interactor/replicator view of the selection process. However, I think that 
defenders of the framework were correctly pointing at something that no one 
before them had pointed to, namely: that there is a genuine distinction to be 
made between the set of structural properties that guarantee (even if only 
contingently) that a concrete pattern of similarity reappears, and the functional 
properties that make that pattern environmentally efficient (i.e. efficient in 
competition with other patterns), and thus increase its probability of 
transgenerationally reappearing. Or, in other words, there is a distinction to be 
made between the phenotypic properties that determine the fitness of a 
biological individual vis-à-vis other individuals, and the hereditary basis of those 
properties. In canonical units of selection it might happen that there is a one-to-
one equivalence between the processes that instantiate these properties (one 
interactor / one replicator), but it must be noticed that the two are logically 
distinct and, thus, it is possible to imagine the former without the latter, and vice 
versa. Precisely, I suspect that what the framework of the major transitions in 
evolution entails is that the two properties can be biologically disconnected, that 
this is so in many cases, and that a transition occurs precisely when both 
properties get tightly intertwined with each other.  
 
                                                          
95 As presumably there must be a process of inheritance, but this does not need to consist in the 
transmission of particles. Thanks to Dupré for reminding me of the fallacy of ‘misplaced 
concreteness’ to define what occurs in this scenario. 
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 This said, I want now to propose a way out for the interactor/replicator 
framework, i.e. a possible way of rethinking it so that it can be applied 
extensively in evolutionary biology, and thus can still be used as a model.96 This 
way out, as announced in section 1, mirrors Kevin de Queiroz’s resolution of 
the species problem;97 so let me start by presenting it. First, what is the species 
problem? Briefly described, the species problem consists in that existence of 
different, scientifically relevant, and non-overlapping criteria for determining 
when a new species has appeared, and thus for deciding when two species, 
instead of one, exist.98 I will assume, but not argue, that there is such a 
problem, since it is not strictly relevant, as I will only use de Quieroz’s solution 
as an inspiration for my own solution to the PBI, which I have already proven to 
be a real problem.99 
 
 In his (2005a), Kevin de Queiroz notices that despite the enormous 
divergence among different species concepts (i.e. different criteria for 
determining species membership and, thus, for determining when there are two 
instead of one species), all the definitions share a basic commitment: ‘species 
are segments of lineages at the population level of biological organization’ (de 
Queiroz 2005a: 196). The only disagreement among different concepts 
concerns not the basic meaning of the category, but the diagnostic criteria that 
are used to determine whether and when a concrete segment can be 
considered a separate species or not. Let me explain this more succinctly, by 
making use of one example. For some biologists—e.g. ecologists like van 
Valen—the decision of whether a conglomerate of biological individuals can be 
divided into one species or must be divided into two separate species depends 
on whether the individuals share the same adaptive niche. In their opinion, if 
                                                          
96 The reader might wonder what my motivation in is trying to ‘force’ a way out for a framework 
that simply does not work. But my motivation has been clearly stated in the previous paragraph: 
I think that Hull, Dawkins, and others were pointing to a distinction that needs to be made, and 
that it is useful.  
97 Interestingly, B. Sterner has also used de Queiroz’s resolution to propose a very original 
account about how to individualte population lineages (Sterner 2017). I only came across with 
his paper after I had written this section, and even finished the whole draft of the thesis, so I had 
not enough time to think about how his ideas and mine can be related to each other. 
98 To be clear, this is just one of the species problems, namely, the problem of deciding between 
competing criteria for species membership. But that’s not the only philosophical problem that 
has been considered under the name of ‘the species problem’. For a brilliant exposition of the 
different types of species problems see Dupré (1993: 37-59). 
99 Solid arguments that motivate the existence of the species problem can be found in Dupré 
(1993), Hey (2001), Richards (2010), and Suárez (2016). 
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two groups of biological individuals live in different ecological niches, then they 
are two species. On the other hand, for other biologists—e.g. Paterson—the 
criterion of the niche is not valid: what matters, and what must be considered 
fundamental in deciding whether the two groups constitute one single species 
or two, is whether they can recognise each other as potential mates.  
 
Notice that the existence of these two criteria can generate conflicts in 
deciding whether two groups belong to the same species, or to two different 
species (Figure 20).  
 
 
Figure 20. Three possible scenarios where different species criteria would provide different 
verdicts. Each blue box represents a niche; the dashed line between two blue boxes represents 
a geographic obstacle that isolates the individuals from each niche from the individuals of the 
other niches; finally, the spots represent individuals. By convention, the individuals represented 
in black can only recognise and mate with individuals in black, and the same is true for 
individuals represented in white. Notice that, in A, there would be two species according to van 
Valen, but only one according to Patterson, whereas in C the opposite is the case. In situation 
B, both van Valen and Paterson would recognise the existence of two species, but they would 
delineate them differently. 
 
Why does this situation occur? De Queiroz’s response is simple, but very 
convincing: speciation is a process during which the members of a group 
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became dissociated and form two different groups. The process occurs slowly, 
and it is realized by different types of subprocesses: at some point, the two 
groups might start living in different niches; later in time they might stop 
recognising each other as potential mates; still later, they might stop generating 
fertile offspring; and so on and so forth. There is no biological or metaphysical 
reason to expect that all the subprocess that drive speciation would occur at the 
same time: on the contrary, it is probably a more plausible biological hypothesis 
that the processes will occur in different times. There will probably be a moment 
in time in which all the subprocess will have occurred, and thus it will be clear 
that the two groups form two different species. However, in between, there will 
be a period in which only some of these subprocesses will have occurred, and 
thus different biologists will give different responses to the question about how 
many species are there (Figure 21).100  
 
 
Figure 21. De Queiroz’s schematic representation of the process of speciation. SC1-SC8 
represent different subprocesses that can be used as diagnosis criteria for determining the 
existence of two species instead of one. At some point, everyone will agree that the two groups 
constitute two separate species, whereas at another everyone will agree that there is one single 
                                                          
100 Notice that this solution is not very different from what John Dupré (1993: 47) has suggested. 
Nonetheless, where Dupré wonders why it is not legitimate to assume that there are different 
‘ways of being a species’, if different species have different origins (conceived as different 
criteria), de Queiroz provides a common manner of harmonizing these different ‘ways of being a 
species’. 
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species. In between, the decision will depend on the subprocess that the biologist is interested 
in studying. (From de Queiroz 2005a: 204, Fig. 3) 
 
The question now is, how is de Queiroz’s resolution to the species problem 
relevant to think about the PBI and, particularly, to defend the 
interactor/replicator framework? I think the answer to this question lies, 
precisely, in the processual nature of biological individuals (Dupré 2012; 
Nicholson and Dupré 2018). Remember that the point of de Queiroz was that 
speciation was a process that included a series of subprocesses. The same 
logic applies to biological individuality: biological conglomerates are individuated 
always in virtue of the biological processes they participate in (Bouchard 2018). 
This is clear when one reads the different criteria of biological individuality that I 
presented in section 2: all of them refer to one type of process (physiological, 
immunological, developmental, etc.) and, importantly, the PBI arises precisely 
because the entities that are individualized in virtue of their participation in 
certain types of processes do not necessarily participate in all the other 
processes that are used to define biological individuality. In section 2, this was 
illustrated with the case of clonal individuals but, of course, it generalizes more, 
applying to absolutely every candidate for being a biological individual, and for 
every diagnostic criteria that can be applied for its identification. Now the 
question is: is it true that, like in the case of de Queiroz’s resolution of the 
species problems, all criteria of individuality share something in common that 
has remained unnoticed due to the pervasiveness of disagreement over 
different diagnostic criteria? And, if so, how is this relevant for the 
interactor/replicator framework? 
 
The answer to the first question is, in my view, affirmative. Indeed, all the 
different diagnostic criteria of biological individuality share a very important 
feature in common: biological individuals are the entities that participate as a 
whole in at least one relevant biological (sub)process of interest and, thus, the 
entities that need to be studied—manipulated, preserved, cured, compared, 
counted, etc.—if we want to gain knowledge about the biological 
(sub)processes in question. Thus, each criterion of biological individuality gives 
us a way of diagnosing when two entities become one, in the sense of realizing 
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a biological (sub)process together. In some cases, some ‘conglomerates’ 
participate as a unique object in more than just one single (sub)process, and 
thus we could arguably say that they are a ‘paradigmatic individual’, to use 
Godfrey-Smith’s terminology. However, it is not less true that any of the criteria 
point to interesting (sub)processes that deserve empirical treatment, and thus I 
suggest that it is reasonable to accept that a conglomerate should be 
considered a biological individual if it participates in at least one of these 
processes (Figure 22). Notice, however, that this does not mean that because it 
participates in at least one of these processes, and thus it would count as a 
biological individual according to my definition, then it needs to be studied as a 
single individual with reference to all the other biological (sub)processes. That 
would be simply mistaken and might obfuscate understanding, at least as much 
as not considering the conglomerate a biological individual if it participates in at 
least one process would obfuscate understanding. I will elaborate on this more 
in chapter IV. 
 
 
Figure 22. The processes of biological individuality. In contrast with the case of species, in 
which the key question was deciding if there are two rather than one, for biological individuality 
the opposite happens: the question is deciding when there is one rather than two. In the figure, 
B1-B8 refers to different candidate criteria. If two individuals meet the eight criteria, then we 
would rather say that there is only one, whereas if they only meet some, but not others, then the 
answer will depend on the criteria we adopt. (Adapted from de Queiroz 2005a: 2004, Fig. 3) 
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The answer I have given to the first question does not however reply to the 
second question. How is my definition of biological individuality relevant for the 
interactor/replicator framework of the units of selection? For one simple reason: 
Because the interactor/replicator framework strictly separates two properties—
inheritance and interaction with the environment—whose separation is crucial to 
get a better understanding of the units of selection. My way of thinking biological 
individuality saves the interactor/replicator framework insofar as it also 
separates the two properties, as they are different biological (sub)processes 
that, thus, account for different dimensions of biological individuality. In my 
account, a conglomerate would count as a unit of selection provided that it can 
be shown to participate in at least one significant biological (sub)process of 
interaction with the environment (the role of the interactor). Once this is so, 
then, it becomes necessary to look for the set of factors that might be involved 
in the hereditary process, i.e. in the process that has made the two entities join 
and participate together in this biological (sub)process. These factors might well 
be replicators, but they do not need to be, as I will argue in chapter V. In this 
sense, my account takes a lesson from the interactor/replicator framework 
without falling prey to its vices, namely: leaving too much unexplained.101 
 
Notice, thus, that my requirement for a conglomerate to qualify as a unit 
of selection is very unrestrictive. As I will explain, inheritance needs to be found 
at some point, but it must always be widely conceived. Why do I want to have 
such an unrestrictive view of natural selection? Because otherwise we run the 
risk of leaving too much unexplained. Natural selection is normally used as the 
explanans of many evolutionary innovations. It makes sense to limit its 
explanatory scope so that it does not become a trivial, quasi-tautological 
explanans. This is precisely the spirit of the works of Gould, Vrba, Brandon, 
Sober, Lloyd, Okasha, and others. However, I suspect that the limitation must 
always be dependent upon: 1) the explanandum we aim to account for; 2) the 
                                                          
101 I suspect that my account of when to argue that the entitites at a level are a unit of selection 
roughly corresponds to what Jantzen (2017), has mathematically argued. He argues that 
concentrating on whether the objects at one level have certain properties is question begging, 
and the debate should concentrate on whether the objects have certain dynamics, which he 
elaborates mathematically. I think his way of making the point is a mathematical way of 
demonstrating what I have argued only verbally.  
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existence of alternative explanans for the same explanandum; and 3) how much 
of the explanandum can be assumed to be random (i.e. due to non-causal 
factors). It seems to me that a key element of my account is that it allows 
developing alternative explanations for the same phenomenon and which would 
probably lead, for instance, to the discovery of new channels of inheritance. Of 
course, it might happen that for some of the conglomerates that are considered 
biological individuals there is not a common selective explanation that accounts 
for why they bear the traits they bear. But in assuming that such explanation 
could in principle exist, we would have gained a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon. I have made this point in most of my published—and my yet 
unpublished—papers, which I have mentioned in the Introduction, so I won’t 
repeat the same points here. In any case, an exploration of the alternative I 
suggest here will be developed in chapter V for the specific case of holobionts 
and HCE. 
 
3.3.1.1. Comparison of my ‘resolution’ of the problem of biological individuality 
with Ellen Clarke’s solution 
One might now object that my ‘resolution’ of the PBI is indeed no different from 
what Ellen Clarke proposes in her (2013). There, Clarke argues that there are 
many different ways of being a biological individual (being a biological individual 
is multiply realizable), but despite this, biological individuality can be defined in 
terms of two necessary and sufficient functional conditions: A biological 
individual is an object that possesses simultaneously at least one mechanism 
that limits its capacity to experience selection from below (policing mechanism) 
and at least one mechanism that increases its capacity to be selected vis-à-vis 
other objects of the same type (demarcation mechanism) (adapted from Clarke 
2013: 427). As both policing and demarcation mechanisms are multiply 
realizable, and will very likely be realized differently in different objects, then 
Clarke believes that her definition is sufficiently general to define biological 
individuals. And, in addition, she believes that the existence of these 
mechanisms provides a good way to spell out more clearly Lewontin’s criteria 
for being a unit of selection (section 3.1). 
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 While I believe that Clarke’s definition is on the right track, I also believe 
it is too restrictive. First, what would happen if an object—call it “object*”—just 
exhibits one of the two mechanisms that she believes are necessary and 
sufficient for being a biological individual? That the object* simply would not 
qualify as one. But, again, that option seems to leave too much unexplained. 
Let us assume that we have a real-world example of an object* which is formed 
by two more basic primitive entities linked to each other by a policing 
mechanism (say, one entity coerces the other if it does not cooperate). Now, let 
us assume for the sake of the argument that the object* happens to evolve a 
demarcation mechanism. What would be a good explanatory account of why 
the object* evolved the demarcation mechanism? Probably that appeals to 
natural selection for the object*. But, for Clarke, that would not be possible, 
because by definition object* is not a unit of selection. Then the explanation 
would be that there was selection for the entities that compose object*, and thus 
sorting at the object* level caused* the appearance of the demarcation 
mechanism. Why caused*, and not simply “caused”? Because, remember, 
sorting at one level is just a mere consequence of causation at a different level 
(the lower level), so sorting at one level is, by definition, never causal (chapter 
II, section 5). But this is paradoxical, because a demarcation mechanism is a 
group level adaptation, or it is nothing. That is, it is an adaptation that appears 
at the level of the object*, and thus, necessarily, there must have been selection 
for object*, according to what Sober and Wilson (2011) call Williams’ principle 
(from Williams 1966). Therefore, Clarke’s definition, by considering that the two 
criteria are both necessary and jointly sufficient leaves too much biological 
complexity unexplained. 
 
 As a follow up from this criticism of Clarke’s view, it becomes clear that, 
while I share her view about the multiple realizability of biological individuals, I 
cannot share her views about the definitional criteria to consider that an object 
is a biological individual. My definition is, thus, less stringent than hers. And, as 
I will develop extensively in the next two chapters, the criteria we should accept 
as individuating criteria do not even need to be considered either policing or 
demarcation mechanisms in any sense. 
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3.4. The diachronic view of natural selection: Multilevel selection theory 
Until now I have presented two approaches to the topic of the units of selection 
that have been characterized as synchronic approaches: they are oriented to 
determining the characteristics that a biological object must satisfy in order to 
evolve in response to natural selection now (Okasha 2001, 2006). However, this 
type of approaches fails to explain how the objects that are units of selection 
now came into existence in the first place. To overcome this difficulty, a 
diachronic approach, i.e. one that explains how these objects came into 
existence, is needed. The task of developing a diachronic approach, while 
important for many decades, acquired a special sense of urgency in the mid 
90s, connected to the research on the major transitions in individuality 
(Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995). That was simply because the study of 
the major transitions in individuality made clear that: 
 
‘[T]he levels-of-selection question is not simply about identifying the 
hierarchical levels(s) at which selection now acts, (…) but about identifying 
the mechanisms which led the various hierarchical levels to evolve in the 
first place.’ (Okasha 2006: 16) 
 
Why? Because as I explained before, the question of how new objects with the 
properties of a unit of selection evolved requires knowing how natural selection 
made possible that the mechanisms that confer these very properties to these 
objects evolved in the first place. Or, in other words, a selectionist story of how 
the mechanisms which guarantee heritable variance in fitness (to use 
Lewontin’s formulation) in certain biological objects needs to be told. To 
accomplish this task, neither Lewontin’s hierarchy of objects, nor Hull/Dawkins’ 
hierarchy of interactors and replicators can play any significant role, because it 
is their very existence that needs to be explained in the first place. It is in this 
context that MLS theory becomes especially relevant (Damuth and Heisler 
1988; Okasha 2001, 2006; Kramer & Meunier 2016). The framework of MLS is 
thought to account for the evolution of particles that are nested within 
collectives, as well as for the evolution of collectives, by appealing to: (1) the 
evolutionary (Lewontinian) properties of the particles within the collective, and 
(2) the evolutionary (Lewontinian) properties of the collectives. MLS offers thus 
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a diachronic perspective to the study of the units of selection which 
encompasses two different types of scenarios: MLS1, in which the particles are 
the focal units whose level of reproduction is calculated, and the collective is 
taken to be the unit composed of the entities that engage in fitness-affecting 
interactions with each other; MLS2, in which the collectives are the focal units 
whose number of offspring is tracked (Figure 23; Sober & Wilson 1998; Okasha 
2006; Clarke 2014). I will now outline more extensively the essence of the MLS 
approach to natural selection. 
 
 
Figure 23. Difference between MLS1 (left hand) and MLS2 (right hand). The ellipses represent 
the collectives; the coloured and non-coloured circles represent particles with different traits; 
and the dashed rectangle represents the global population of particles (which is not itself a 
collective) produced by a collective. In MLS1, what matters is how many particles the collective 
releases to the global population of particles, and thus collective parent-offspring relations are 
not tracked. In MLS2 on the contrary, what is measured is the number of offspring collectives 
that a single collective produces. (From Suárez, under review, Fig. 1). 
 
Let me start explaining MLS from the beginning.102 The first question is: when is 
a MLS framework preferred to a single-level model of evolution? When there is 
a suspicion that a set of particles engages in a fitness-affecting relationship with 
                                                          
102 My presentation of MLS will be qualitative, in the sense that I will not make use of the 
mathematimatical aparatus derived from the Price approach to MLS, since I think it is neither 
needed to understand the essence of MLS, nor required to understand the application of MLS to 
HCE. For a brilliant exposition of MLS that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis, see 
Okasha (2006: 40-75). 
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each other that, somehow, modifies its evolutionary success. In other words, 
when the evolution of the collection of particles is different from what their 
evolution would be like if they did not engage in fitness-affecting interactions 
with each other, and, importantly, this outcome is a consequence of their 
engagement in fitness-affecting interactions with each other—remember that 
natural selection is supposed to provide a causal story of why certain objects 
bear the traits they bear, so it is essential that the ‘distorted’ outcome occurs as 
a consequence of the interactions. Therefore, MLS will be applicable to every 
set of particles that engages in fitness-affecting interactions with each other that 
alter their expected evolution. And, additionally, it will be required in these cases 
precisely because the evolution of the particles will be conditional upon the 
collectives they form.103 
 
 Secondly, what is the difference between MLS and one-level scenarios? 
In contrast with single-level scenarios, MLS requires considering the evolution 
of each particle in the context of the whole collection of particles, i.e. in the 
context of the global population; and, additionally, MLS requires considering the 
evolution of each collective in relation to other collectives in the population. To 
do so, a MLS framework requires two types of counting: first, how much do 
particles reproduce within the collective (that is, how selection acts within 
collectives); second, how much collectives reproduce and form new collectives 
(that is, how selection acts between collectives). Therefore, in any MLS 
framework, two different types of scenarios must be taken into account: one 
where the particles are the focal unit (MLS1), and one where the collectives are 
the focal unit (MLS2).  
 
 Thirdly, what has to be looked for in each MLS scenario, that is, in each 
case of MLS1 and MLS2? Basically, the extent to which the particles satisfy 
Lewontin’s conditions for evolution by natural selection. That is to say, to which 
extent the objects manifest heritable variation that is causally connected to their 
fitness, so that the objects that possess a concrete form of variation are fitter 
                                                          
103 Technically speaking, MLS theory would be perfectly applicable to one level scenarios, 
providing one considers that the level of reproduction—and thus, of possible cross-level 
influence—of the objects below and above the focus level is zero. 
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than the objects that possess a different type of variation, and this variation is 
heritable (i.e. there is parent-offspring regression). The challenge, in a MLS 
framework, is how to conceive these properties at two different levels or, in 
other words, to establish which is the object that must manifest these 
properties. Are they the particles, each of them individually? Or is it rather the 
collective? Or are they both? In the MLS framework, a strict separation between 
particle-level selection and collective-level selection is required, and that is 
precisely the difference between the two types of MLS: MLS1 (particle-level 
selection, selection within collectives), and MLS2 (collective-level selection, 
selection between collectives). Importantly, in MLS, the collective is a unit of 
selection in both scenarios, as I will explain in detail. 
 
 Let me start with MLS1. In MLS1, the entities whose heritable variation in 
fitness is measured are the particles within the collective. In this sense, MLS1 
particle-fitness will simply mean that number of offspring particles that a given 
particle produces, and MLS1 collective-fitness will be measured in virtue of how 
many particles each collective produces and releases to the environment so 
that they can form new collectives in the next generation.104 Let me describe 
this process in detail. 
 
• MLS1 particle-level fitness. In MLS1, the collective provides exclusively 
the population structure where the particles evolve. The key point that 
MLS1 emphasizes is that the particles bear the traits they bear, and they 
evolve how they do, because they engage in significant fitness-affecting 
interactions within a collective, and part of their evolution will depend on 
the response of the other particles within that very collective. That is to 
say, the particles within the collective are mutually responding to each 
other (competing, cooperating, etc.) in a way that affects their evolution, 
i.e. that affects how their trait distribution will change over time.  
 
                                                          
104 By ‘fitness’ I will always mean ‘reproductive output’, i.e. entity whose offspring is ‘counted’. 
Nonetheless, there might be other ways of counting the fitness of entities, as some people have 
emphasized (e.g. Bouchard 2008, 2011; Triviño and Nuño de la Rosa 2016). MLS would be, in 
principle, also applicable in these cases, although I will not discuss here how this could be 
done. 
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• MLS1 collective-level fitness. Furthermore, in a MLS1 scenario, 
collectives are expected to expel part of their particles to the 
environment, and these particles are expected to mix up and make new 
collectives. In the ‘mixing up’ stage, the competition of particles with each 
other to form new collectives is essential to understand particle evolution. 
Why? Because those collectives that survive longer will have more 
chances of releasing their particle types to the environment, and thus the 
probability that new collectives that are composed of the same particle 
types as the particles types that are more abundant in them increases. In 
other words, collective selection in MLS1 means that some collectives 
survive longer than others in virtue of the particle types they are 
composed of and, as a consequence, their longer survival causes an 
increase in ‘the parent-offspring resemblance in the global population of 
particles’ (heritability condition) (Okasha 2006: 72, emphasis added).  
 
There is one lesson that can be extracted from this analysis, and that results 
from the combination of two theses: First, in MLS1, the entities whose 
reproduction rate is measured are the particles, not the collectives; second, in 
MLS1, the fitness of the collectives is measured by measuring how they 
contribute to the global population of particles, and thus how they will affect the 
population of particles in subsequent generations, and not by how many 
offspring collectives they leave.105 Therefore, in MLS1, the collective, despite 
not being counted as the ‘reproducing’ unit, is as much a unit of selection as the 
particles are, simply because the longer the survival of the collective, the more 
the collective will affect the global population of particles in subsequent 
generations. 
 
                                                          
105 Notice that the decision of not counting the collectives as the entities that reproduce, i.e. that 
form parent-offspring lineages, is rather ideosyncratic. It is mainly conditioned by the fact that, in 
some MLS scenarios, we simply do not know how to recognise parent-offspring lineages. 
Okasha (2006: 51-52) uses the slime mould as an example of this problem, and argues that in 
some cases it might be better to apply MLS1 simply for the epistemological difficulty of knowing 
whom is parent of whom. But the reader must keep in mind that this is just based on our lack of 
knowledge of how to trace lineages for some ‘weird’ biological objects, but it is not a conceptual 
necessity. This point will gain its significance in chapter V. 
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 Let us go now to MLS2. In contrast with MLS1, the focal unit whose 
reproduction rate is measured in MLS2 is the collective, and thus what has to 
be analysed is the competition between collectives in forming parent-offspring 
lineages. In other words, the type of parent-offspring regression that matters in 
this case is ‘collective parent / collective offspring’ regression. What needs to be 
studied in MLS2, thus, is how much a collective offspring resembles its 
collective parent. Again, I will now describe this process in detail. 
 
• MLS2 collective-level fitness. In MLS2, the objects whose fitness is 
measured, that is, the objects for which parent-offspring regression 
matters are the collectives. Thus, to apply MLS2 to a collective it is 
necessary to find a way to discover parent-offspring lineages, and to 
measure parent-offspring regression or resemblance with respect to 
traits under investigation. In other words, it is necessary that the 
collectives satisfy the Lewontin’s conditions at least to a certain extent.  
 
• MLS2 particle-level fitness. Measuring particle-level fitness in MLS2 is a 
complex issue, as the translation between levels is not as immediate as 
in the case of MLS1, where MLS1 collective-level fitness was interpreted 
simply as the average of MLS1 particle-level fitness. That is because in 
MLS2 particle characters’—that is, particle phenotypic traits—will also be 
selected within each collective, and their response to selection will 
depend on the magnitude of parent-offspring resemblance of each 
particle for the trait under study. This could eventually, although not 
necessarily, have effects on the collective character, for example by 
biasing collective-level reproduction. However, and this is important, this 
does not need to be taken into account in most cases: in most occasions, 
MLS2 will lead to two independent evolutionary responses, which will be 
measured in different units (how many offspring collectives vs. how many 
offspring particles), and that will, at most, bear a contingent relation to 
each other. 
 
Now I have described the difference between MLS1 and MLS2, let me 
summarize the key points of MLS: First, both in MLS1 and MLS2, the collective 
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is a unit of selection; what changes in these two scenarios is the object whose 
parent-offspring relations are tracked, but this does not rule out the fact that the 
collective is a unit of selection in both scenarios. Second, that reproduction (in 
the conventional sense of parent-offspring regression) at the focal level is not 
necessary for arguing that a collective is a unit of selection; it is sufficient that 
the existence of a collective of entities engaged in fitness-affecting interactions 
biases the evolution of the particles, so that changes that were not expected to 
occur had the collective not existed are indeed produced—and, conventionally, 
these changes are called group-level adaptations, as they are selected because 
there are groups. Third, that a transition in evolutionary individuality is precisely 
the process by which there is a shift from the MLS1 scenario to the MLS2 
scenario; for a transition in individuality to happen, the collective needs to 
evolve biological mechanisms to guarantee that: (1) there are parent-offspring 
lineages; (2) there is parent-offspring resemblance at least to certain extent.  
 
4. The holobiont through the lens of multilevel selection theory 
 
Now I have examined the debate about the biological individuality and the 
problem of the units of selection, it is time to connect the two conceptions of the 
units of selection (synchronic and diachronic) to the issues raised by HCE. I will 
start this section with a quote from an old paper of mine, which reflects and, to 
my knowledge, makes explicit for the first time, the main point about holobiont 
evolution that I will advance here, and develop in detail in chapter V:106 
 
‘[E]very time that there is a process of symbiogenetic fusion (…), natural 
selection will act simultaneously in at least two levels. On the one hand, 
inside the new organism, which I have called “symbiome” [holobiont], 
where some symbionts and some hosts will be naturally selected in virtue 
                                                          
106 The paper I am referring to is J. S. Díaz (2015): ‘El mecanismo evolutivo de Margulis y los 
niveles de selección’. Contrastes XX (1): 7-24. The paper, which summarizes the main point I 
developed in my undergraduate dissertation, focuses exclusively on the most provocative work 
by Lynn Margulis (see Suárez 2018a, and this thesis, chapter I), and not on the hologenome 
tradition that starts after the original publications of Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg. The 
conclusion, as well as the argumentative strategy, is nevertheless also valid for HCE. Notice, 
however, that the terminology I use is slightly different from the terminology used by HCE 
advocates, e.g. I use ‘symbiome’ instead of ‘holobiont’; or I use the ad hoc terms 
‘intraorganismic’ and ‘supraorganismic’. 
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of their respective traits and whether they are (or not) beneficial in their 
new environment. On the other hand, in the relationship which is 
established between the symbiome [holobiont] and its environment. 
Making the hypothesis more precise, I will coin two terms to refer to 
these two levels of selection. First, the intraorganismic level of selection, 
which refers to what occurs within the symbiome [holobiont]. In this level of 
selection, the symbiome is the environment where selective processes 
occur, and both the symbionts and the host will be the units of selection. 
(…) [In line with this], we can assume that natural selection will favour the 
perpetuation of those that will increase their fitness within the symbiome 
[holobiont] […] 
Second, the supraorganism level (…). This level refers to what 
happens outside the symbiome [holobiont], that is, in the relation between 
it and its proximate environment. In this environment, there will be prey, 
predators, climate conditions, etc. that will foster the survival of some 
supraorganisms and the death of others. In this level, (…) the symbiome 
[holobiont] is the unit of selection (…). [and thus] natural selection will 
foster some fitness advantages for the symbiome [holobiont], which are 
determined by its interaction with the proximate environment and will 
occasionally go against the intraorganismic “advantages.”’ (Díaz 2015: 15-
16) 
 
That paragraph, even if focused mainly on Margulis’ ideas about the role of 
symbiosis and symbiogenesis in evolution, encapsulates what I take to be the 
main lesson of HCE. Or, in other words, it expresses faithfully the conception of 
natural selection that underlies HCE, namely: a diachronic, multi-level 
perspective. Notice that the point in the paragraph is not to say that 
holobionts—or the ‘symbiome’, as the expression I used in that paper, following 
Jan Sapp (2003, 2004)—are units of selection qua interactors or qua 
replicators. The holobiont is in many cases neither cohesive enough, nor has 
the hologenome the high degree of copy-fidelity that is demanded for 
replicators.107 But this is irrelevant. The lesson to take from HCE is that natural 
                                                          
107 Of course, in some species it might well happen that this is not true, and that it is possible to 
argue that the hologenome is a replicator with the same degree of fidelity transmission as 
genomes. But notice that this does not need to be the norm. 
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selection must be thought of as MLS—i.e. it must be understood 
diachronically—at least if one aims to make sense of certain evolutionary 
innovations that multicellular organisms possess. And also, and importantly, the 
paragraph expresses why the diachronic perspective does not neglect the 
possibility that selection processes also occur within the holobiont, and not only 
between holobionts108: From a diachronic perspective, the force of selection 
acts in both units, ‘forcing us to accept a plurality of simultaneous levels [of 
selection]’ (Díaz 2015: 17).109  
 
 Why is this so relevant and so novel? The diachronic approach to the 
units of selection is common, and has been applied before, as I showed in 
section 3.4, so there seems to be no particular ‘novelty’ in HCE: it just 
demands that we apply an approach that is available and has been applied 
before. This is correct, but only to certain extent: while it is true that MLS is not 
a ‘weird’ approach to the units of selection, the approach is normally applied to 
cases where a transition of biological individuality has already occurred, not to 
cases where it is arguably occurring now. This makes sense, as the result of a 
transition in individuality is hard to predict: will the entities overcome the 
difficulties of transitioning, or will they rather go back to the original state, the 
one previous to their ‘coming together’?110 The point of HCE, however, is that 
that worry, while legitimate, should not preclude us from studying holobionts as 
units of selection from a MLS perspective, on the risk that ignoring that 
possibility could mask many cases of real selection. In this sense, HCE is novel, 
as it encourages us to study transitions that, presumably, are still happening 
(see chapter IV for an ontological justification of the application of MLS to 
holobionts). 
 
 I will not review here the implications of applying a diachronic view to the 
study of holobiont evolution. It is enough to settle the problem, and frame it 
                                                          
108 What in the quoted paragraph I call ‘outside the holobiont’. 
109 The necessity of the interaction of the two levels, as well as the necessity of recognising that 
the outcome of selection would result from their interaction, was presented in a figure that 
supported the explanation (Díaz 2015: 16-17, Fig.1). 
110 I use ‘coming together’ because I am assuming the transition has not been completed, and 
thus I cannot say that the entities go to the stage ‘before the transition has occurred’, even 
when that would be the most logical sentence. 
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adequately, since my model will be presented and defended in detail in chapter 
V. But the consequences of the presentation of HCE in terms of MLS I have just 
sketched here should at least be anticipated, even if still not argued for. The 
consequences are threefold: first, if MLS is the right way of thinking about HCE, 
i.e. about the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection, then the arguments 
against HCE that claim that holobionts are not interactors and hologenomes are 
not replicators are automatically invalid—as are invalid, of course, the 
arguments in support of HCE which are framed under the interactor/replicator 
framework. Second, that there is no possibility of saying that HCE would have 
negative epistemological implications, like ignoring the possibility of selection 
within the holobiont. So expressed, the criticism is clearly misguided: MLS 
theory precisely emphasizes the existence of selection within the holobiont. 
Third, that there is an urgent need to think about holobiont evolution from a 
MLS, and this perspective must overcome the species-specific understanding of 
the holobiont. Remember that I argued that a MLS could be applied to any level 
provided that at least one biologically significant process occurs at that level 
(section 3.4). However, I have not presented the way in which the entities at 
the level should be individualized. Saying how this is so in the case of 
holobionts is not a simple task to accomplish, and that is why it deserves 
independent treatment. 
 
5. Brief summary of chapter III: The problem of biological individuality 
meets the holobiont 
 
In this chapter, I have introduced and discussed extensively the PBI, with 
special emphasis on the problem of the units of selection, as I take it as the 
main problem that is at stake in the discussions about the HCE. The key points 
that I have presented in the chapter can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. There is a genuine problem of biological individuality, which derives from 
the facts that: (a) biological objects are individuated in virtue of the 
biological (sub)processes they participate in, and (b) the objects 
individuated by these (sub)processes are not necessarily co-extensional. 
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2. One criterion of biological individuality is considering whether the object 
studied is a unit of selection. 
3. There are two main approaches to the topic of the units of selection: (a) a 
synchronic approach (which objects participate in the process of 
selection now); (b) a diachronic approach (hot the objects that 
participated in the process of selection have evolved). 
4. The interactor/replicator framework is a way of approaching the question 
of the units of selection synchronically. 
5. The interactor/replicator framework has many problems, especially for 
the commitments it makes about the existence of two highly evolved 
entities. 
6. Multilevel selection theory is the conventional way of presenting the 
diachronic approach. 
7. Holobiont thinking, in its HCE version, entails that some types of 
biological entities must be studied through the lens of multilevel selection 
theory now, and thus multilevel selection does not need to be applied 
exclusively to how some biological objects evolved in the past. 
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Chapter IV 
 
‘Starting afresh at each level. Towards a 
hierarchical-non-nested view of the biological 
world’ 
 
This chapter derives a consequence of the processualist perspective of 
biological individuality that I introduced in chapter III, to provide a reply to 
the arguments by Chiu and Eberl, and by Bourrat and Griffiths (chapter II). 
Drawing upon the case of gut development via Bacteroides fragilis in mice, 
and the study of the life cycle of B. fragilis, I make three points. First, I 
argue that the application of process-based individuation criteria to 
symbiotic assemblages reveals that the dependency relations among the 
entities that constitute the collective are non-reciprocal. Whereas the host 
in the collective depends on the symbionts for realizing the developmental, 
immunological, and physiological processes that characterize it, the 
dependency relation is not necessarily mutual and, thus, while the 
holobiont appears to be an individual from the host-perspective, it turns out 
not to be one from the symbiont-perspective. Second, I take issue with 
Chiu and Eberl, and Bourrat and Griffiths. They assume that biological 
individuality requires the existence of a co-dependency between the host 
and its symbionts, and thus they reject the notion that holobionts are 
biological individuals. I argue that their position derives from view of 
biological individuality, which is grounded on the assumption that the 
biological world is hierchical and nested, which leads to an incorrect 
account of the ‘boundaries’ of the holobiont. I defend that, since the 
process-based criterion for individuating biological entities is not 
committed to a hierchical-nested view of the world, it can explain why 
holobionts are biological individuals and units of selection, as well as it can 
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explain away the concerns expressed by Chiu and Eberl, and Bourrat and 
Griffiths.111 
 
“All our knowledge is linked and governed by 
metaphysics; metaphysics is the network that 
makes cohesive every piece of matter we 
interact with. But this network, and its nodes, is 
embedded within our ordinary consciousness 
under different states of affairs (…). The 
universal edges of the network were neither 
made explicit, nor became elements of our 
reflection.” 
 
G.W.F. Hegel (1807) Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, my translation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that there are many different and non-co-
extensional ways of individuating biological entities, a phenomenon that I 
referred to as the PBI. There, I also proposed a processual and pluralistic 
picture for conceiving individuality, according to which a collection of entities 
can be considered a biological individual if the collective participates in a 
significant biological (sub)process as a whole (metabolic, developmental, 
immunological, etc.) (chapter III, section 3.3.1). In this chapter, I want to use 
the pluralistic and process-based approach presented there to question the 
standardly assumed hierarchical and nested picture of the biological world. In 
my view, the problem that HCE entails for the debate about biological 
individuality and the units of selection is, precisely, that it questions this 
                                                          
111 This chapter is almost completely based on my work with Adrian Stencel: Javier Suárez and 
Adrian Stencel (under review): ‘A part-dependent account of holobiont individuality’. There is, 
though, a substantial difference, for, as Adrian does not share my intuitions about HCE, in our 
draft we do not commit ourselves to any of the evolutionary implications that I draw here, and 
that I will develop in detail in the next chapter. 
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hierarchical-nested view in many ways.112 According to the latter, the biological 
world would be like a set of Matryoshka (Russian) dolls, such that each new 
level would contain absolutely every entity that belongs to the level that is 
immediately below, as well as the hereditary basis of the entities in lower levels. 
In this sense, a superorganism would be a collection of organisms, which would 
be a collection of cells, which would be a collection of genes, etc. Applied to the 
holobiont, this view entails that the holobiont is a collection of genomes, or 
organisms that are member of different taxa. This type of structure of the world 
is also very popular among those who have worked on the topic of the units of 
selection (Lloyd 1988; Gould 2002). However, as Okasha (2006, 2011)113 has 
noticed, precisely in the context of discussing the units of selection, this seems 
to be a non-argued a priorism, and biological processes are perfectly 
compatible with a hierarchical-non-nested conception (Figure 24). To quote:  
 
‘[O]n one standard conception of multi-level selection theory, higher levels 
of selection arise via fitness-affecting interactions between lower-level 
units. Though models of this process often assume a nested hierarchy 
[hierarchical-nested view, in my terminology], the underlying causal 
mechanism does not require nesting; it could work equally well with 
overlapping groups of lower-level units.’ (Okasha 2006: 44, emphasis 
added) 
 
 
                                                          
112 And, importantly, defenders of the HCE have not noticed this consequence sufficiently well. 
113 Notice that in his (2011), Okasha only discusses the non-nested nature of phylogenetic 
hierarchies as elaborated by cladists, but not of the hierarchies generated in the debate on the 
evolutionary transitions in individuality, which according to him needs to be (is) strictly nested. 
Concerning the later, Okasha only argued that the way of ranking the individuals across levels 
should be free, and thus we should eliminate disputes about whether the new level is a group, a 
superorganism, etc. In this chapter, I will only argue for the possibility of classifying physiological 
and developmental individuals hierarchically but in a non-nested way, and in the next chapter I 
will apply the same logic to the MLS scenario, thus extending Okasha’s framework to a domain 
where he has not extended his ideas yet. Nonetheless, as Lisa Lloyd has told me (personal 
communication), applying these ideas to MLS is not equivalent to apply them them to the 
context of the evolutionary transitions in individuality, as MLS is applicable to more scenarios 
than the scenario of the evolutionary transitions in individuality, as this was conceived by 
Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry. For similar hypothesis about the non-nested nature of biological 
hierarchies see e.g. McShea and Simpson (2011). 
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Figure 24. Comparison of a nested (left) and a non-nested (right) hierarchy. In a nested 
hierarchy, if x belongs to two higher level units (blue circle, orange circle), then one of the levels 
must necessarily contain mereologically all the elements that belong to the other level. In a non-
nested hierarchy, on the contrary, it is possible that x belongs to two levels, one higher than the 
other (in this case, represented as ‘wider’ circles), without the necessity that the lower level is 
completely included in the higher level. As the figure also shows, in a nested hierarchy, levels 
do not overlap, but are subsets of each other. On the contrary, in a non-nested hierarchy levels 
can intersect, and thus only parts of the lower level, rather than the whole lower level, are a 
subset of the upper level. 
 
In this chapter, I will argue that the precessual view of biological individuality 
that I presented before contradicts the hierarchical-nested view of the biological 
world in a way that is perfectly consistent with Okasha’s (2006) intuition. The 
account is based on a contrastive case study that suggests that the holobiont is 
a biological individual from the perspective of the host, whereas it is not from 
the perspective of symbionts that compose the host’s microbiome (as these are 
individuated according to16S rRNA analysis).114 In other words, the type of 
biological (sub)processes that the host participates in requires the inclusion of 
the microbiome as an essential component (that is, as a part of the process, 
and thus as part of the individual that the process individuates), whereas the 
same is not usually the case if one is studying the biological (sub)processes 
that each of the symbiotic species that compose the host’s microbiome engages 
                                                          
114 Elsewhere I have speculated that 16S rRNA bacterial species classification might not be very 
appropriate for the type of classifications that are needed in symbiosis research (Suárez 2016). 
This section is thus, in part, a further development of that idea. 
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in. This analysis provides a particular view of the way in which the microbiome 
must be individuated. In my account, the microbiome must not be individuated 
according to the taxa that compose it (hologenome = collection of genomes), 
but rather functionally, according to the role that these taxa play, and the traits 
that allow the taxa to play these roles (hologenome = host + traits encoded by 
the microbiome). Building on that claim I argue that evaluations of the 
individuality must always start afresh at each level. Each level must be 
considered a genuine biological level independently of some possible problems 
that could theoretically arise ‘from below’ or ‘from above’, and thus ascriptions 
of individuality might generate a cross-classification of the biological hierarchy 
(Karaça 2019, for a similar argument).115 I will argue that holobionts are a 
canonical example of this type of cross-classification, as there are important 
differences between the kind of biological (sub)processes that a host engages 
in, and the kind of biological (sub)processes that a bacterial taxa in the host 
microbiome engage in. Applied to evolution, my account entails that 
hologenome selection results from the coevolution of the host genome and the 
traits that compose the host microbiome, rather than from the cospeciation of 
the host with the bacterial taxa that compose its microbiome (chapter V).116 
 
Simulteneously, this chapter constitutes a critical response to the 
arguments presented by Chiu and Eberl according to which holobionts are very 
‘blurry’ objects to be considered biological individuals (chapter II, section 2). I 
argue that my way of accounting for biological individuality overcomes their 
problem. On the one hand, it explains why holobionts are perceived as ‘blurry’ 
objects by some authors (basically, because they assume a hierarchical-nested 
view of the biological world that leads them to hold a mistaken interpreted of 
HCE). On the other hand, it explains why the blurry nature of holobionts is not 
                                                          
115 In line with what I argued in chapter III, section 3.1, the key ideas are that first, the 
processes that cause the appearance of the phenotypic properties must be studied apart from 
the hereditary basis of these properties, and, second, that the study of the processes that cause 
the appearance of the phenotypic properties at different levels generate a cross-classification of 
the individuals in the biological world, even when some of these levels would theoretically (in a 
Matryoshka-looking world) incorporate the individuals from below. 
116 I am making a distinction here between the notion of ‘cospeciation’, which means ‘species-
species coevolution’, and the notion ‘coevolution’, which does not necessarily mean ‘species-
species coevolution’, but it could also mean ‘trait-trait coevolution’. In my view of the holobiont, 
the holobiont is a unit of selection because it creates the conditions that make the existence of 
‘host genome-microbe trait’ coevolution biologically possible, rather than ‘host species-microbe 
species coevolution’.   
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problematic to assert their individuality (for the existence of biological 
(sub)processes that generate a cross-classification of the biological world 
necessarily gives rise to a ‘blurry’ perception of some of these individuals). At 
the same time, the chapter constitutes a partial response to Bourrat and 
Griffiths’ criticism to the ‘part-of-the-system’ arguments (chapter II, section 3). 
 
The chapter will be driven by assuming that the biological (sub)processes 
of interest, and thus the ones that will determine the ‘boundaries’ of the 
biological individual, are development and physiology (chapter III, section 
2).117 Bearing this in mind, I will proceed as follows. First, I will present some 
research on the development and physiological behaviour of the gut in mice 
that, I argue, shows the necessity of taking the holobiont seriously from a 
developmental and a physiological perspective (the host / macrobe 
perspective). Building on that, I explore the evolutionary implications of that 
observation. Second, I present some recent evidence about the mode of life of 
Bacteroides fragilis, which is the bacterium that happens to be essential for 
mice’s gut development and physiology (the symbiont / microbe perspective), to 
suggest that the taxa is physiologically and evolutionarily independent from the 
holobiont.118 Drawing on these two cases, I argue that the commitment to a 
hierarchical-nested view of the biological world is invalid, as the latter would 
entail a wrong interpretation of the boundaries of the biological individual (in this 
case, of the holobiont). Finally, I show how this overcomes the problem of the 
‘blurry’ nature of the holobiont.119  
 
 
                                                          
117 Keep in mind that, in my account, this means that these processes will determine the 
phenotypic properties of interest and thus, indirectly, where the hereditary basis of these 
processes must be investigated.   
118 I will use ‘macrobe perspective’ as synonymous to ‘host perspective’, and ‘microbe 
perspective’ as synonymous to ‘symbiont perspective’, because in the case of the holobiont, the 
host is conventionally a macrobe, and the symbionts are microbes. Nonetheless, I am 
conscious this is not necessary in other cases of host / symbiont relationships. But as I will 
make my case for holobionts, I will take them as synonymous.  
119 A cautionary note for the reader. This chapter is about metaphysics. It is about how the 
biological world would look like if our current empirical evidence about how some biological 
(sub)processes occur was taken seriously. I will make a case about how ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘individuality’, conceived as abstract metaphysical concepts, must be understood. In this sense, 
the biology, while important, is partially irrelevant, because the claims aim to be much broader. 
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2. The host perspective – when the holobiont is the biological individual 
 
To prove the case that holobionts are biological individuals from the perspective 
of the host,120 I will study the influence of the gut microbiome in the 
development and physiological maintenance of mice. Concretely, I analyse the 
role that the microbiome plays in the normal maturation and maintenance of the 
gastrointestinal tract, as this has been widely documented in the scientific 
literature. I make two points. First, that from the point of view of developmental 
and physiological processes, the microbiome is an essential component of 
mice, and thus it is part of the biological individual (i.e. mice are holobionts). 
Second, that therefore mouse evolution will strongly depend on the composition 
and on the evolution of its microbiome, to the extent that the ‘evolving object’ is 
the holobiont. 
 
2.1. The case of gut development and gut physiology in mice 
In mice (as it is also the case in humans, and many other mammals, particularly 
ruminants), the gastrointestinal tract presents a very high density of bacterial 
species from different phyla, the species of the families Bacteroides and 
Firmicutes being the most predominant. One of the main characteristic of these 
microorganisms is that they are innocuous in that environment, which does not 
entail that they are completely innocuous for their host; on the contrary, most of 
them will become very virulent in the case of ‘bacterial infiltration’, that is, if they 
happen to cross the intestinal mucus layer and travel to any other tissue or 
organ. Interestingly, several studies that compared gut development in germ-
free mice with gut development in conventionally raised mice have shown that 
the microbiome plays a fundamental role in two essential processes for the 
survival of mice: first, the maturation of the intestinal layer; second, its 
maintenance. Germ-free mice, in contrast with conventionally raised mice, show 
                                                          
120 The word ‘perspective’ should not be understood in any anthropomorphic sense. By using 
‘perspective’, I will only refer to the element of the group whose individuality is being studied. In 
this sense, ‘host / macrobe perspective’ means that I am studying the individuality of the host, 
whereas ‘symbiont / microbe perspective’ means the opposite. In this chapter, I concentrate 
exclusively on the study of these two perspectives because the problem is to discover whether 
the study of some biological (sub)processes from the perspective of any of them would justify 
the consideration of the holobiont as a biological individual, and whether the consideration of 
the holobiont as a biological individual is equally applicable to all the taxa that belong to the 
symbiotic assemblage. 
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a considerable reduction in the thickness of the mucus layer of their gut, which 
is combined with its denaturalization, that is, with an alteration in its normal 
physiological properties. It has been hypothesized, and some current empirical 
evidence supports this hypothesis, that these two alterations result from the 
essential role that gut microbiome plays in inducing the differentiation of 
RORγt+NKp46+ natural killer (NK)-like cells. These are a very specific type of 
lymphocyte that is known to induce the construction of the gastro-intestinal tract 
(Zheng et al. 2008; Sanos et al. 2009; Jakobsson et al. 2015).  
 
It is important to note here that these empirical findings support the 
hypothesis that the microorganisms that compose the gut microbiome are at 
least partially integrated with the mouse, a point I will develop extensively later. 
Why is that? Because it is not only that these microorganisms must simply be 
present during the process of maturation of the mucus layer. They are also 
required to interact with their host in sophisticated ways (by producing very 
concrete biomolecular components) to induce the differentiation of the 
lymphocytes that would later induce the construction of the gastro-intestinal 
tract. Furthermore, for gut maturation to occur normally, the interaction between 
the host and the microbiome is temporally restricted; that is to say, it must 
necessarily occur during the developmental stage, or otherwise the process is 
not possible, not even if the inducers are provided at some point later in time 
(Olszak et al. 2012). As in every other homeorhetic process, this observation 
suggests the importance not only of the existence of a process of interaction, 
but also that this interaction is mediated by the right kind of components, and 
that it occurs in a particular moment during development. The maturation of the 
mucus layer in the gut of mice requires thus, first, that the appropriate set of 
interactions between the mouse and its microbiome are triggered; and, second, 
that these interactions are accompanied by a series of consecutive co-
responses which alter the nature of the mouse, as well as the nature of the 
microbiome, to make both objects ‘partners through development’ (Gilbert 
2017). If these interactions fail to be triggered, maturation is not possible and, 
thus, mice are not expected to survive in their standard environmental 
conditions. 
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In addition to the role it plays in the maturation of the intestinal barrier, 
the gut microbiome in mice is also hypothesized to play an essential role in 
maintaining the intestinal homeostatic equilibrium. It does so by balancing the 
fragile equilibrium that exists between pro- and anti-inflammatory T cells 
(another type of lymphocyte), which are the cells that actively maintain the 
intestinal barrier. How does the microbiome contribute to the maintenance of 
this homeostasis? It has been experimentally proven that the level of iNKT pro-
inflammatory cells is higher in gnotobiotic (= germ-free) mice than it is in 
conventionally raised mice. This disproportion has been shown to correlate with 
a higher incidence of colitis among gnotobiotic individuals (Smith and Garret 
2011). Furthermore, it has also been experimentally shown that germ-free mice 
need to be colonized at birth, or their level of iNKT pro-inflammatory cells never 
reaches an equilibrium level, which suggests that the process of gut maturation 
is strongly linked to the processes that maintain the homeostasis of the gut. 
Otherwise, if mice are for instance colonized when they are adults, their 
homeostatic levels are never restored (Olszak et al. 2012). This evidence 
suggests that the microbiome is essential not only for gut development, but also 
for keeping its homeostasis; and, second, that the processes of gut 
development and gut homeostasis are intimately connected with each other in 
ways that still need to be investigated.  
 
Drawing on the previous observations, recent research driven under very 
specific lab conditions has allowed the identification of the bacterial taxa that 
are responsible for the pro-inflammatory and anti-inflammatory cell responses 
that have been documented in mice. Round et al. (2011) have shown that B. 
fragilis is in control of some of these processes, since it has the capacity of 
activating some of the pathways—particularly, the toll-like receptor pathways—
that suppress the inflammatory response. Concretely, B. fragilis suppresses the 
pro-inflammatory response of T-helper 17 (Th17) cells, while simultaneously 
inducing the differentiation of CD4+ T cells into regulatory-T cells (Treg) (see 
also Mazmanian et al. 2008). These two processes—fundamental for gut 
colonization and, thus, for gut maturation—are mediated by polysaccharide A, 
which is one of the most common compounds in the bacterial wall of B. fragilis 
(Round and Mazmanian 2009).  
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This last point is especially remarkable to understand the role that the 
microbiome plays in the physiology of the host, and the level of 
interconnectedness that exists between the host and the microbiome. The 
microbiome will trigger the appropriate physiological responses in mice if its 
interaction occurs during a very precise moment of mouse development and if 
the right type of elements composes it. That is, if some, among the whole set of 
elements that compose the microbiome, have the capacity to induce the 
appropriate responses in the host, so that cell differentiation occurs, and the 
pro-inflammatory response of Th17 cells is supressed. The question now is to 
determine ‘the right types of elements’. 
 
These observations however shows the intrinsic connection that exists 
between the host and its microbiome, as well as why the microbiome cannot 
simply be conceived as a ‘background’ condition. Let me go a bit deeper into 
this observation. One standard argument against the consideration of the 
microbiome as a part of the biological (sub)process(es) that the host 
participates in is that the ‘part-of-the-system’ arguments do not work (chapter II, 
section 3). According to that criticism, the symbionts can be conceived as 
‘background conditions’ that are required for the biological (sub)process to take 
place, in the same sense as some inorganic elements (oxygen, 
polysaccharides, or even the gravitational field, to use an example that Bourrat 
and Griffiths use) are sometimes conceived. That interpretation, while 
legitimate, is misguided, because the continuity that exists between the 
microbiome and the host’s genome is larger than the continuity that exists 
between the microbiome and any of the elements that are conventionally 
considered ‘background’ conditions. I will explore this point in what follows. 
 
2.2. The continuity between the host and the microbiome: the microbiome 
is more than a mere background condition 
In what sense does the evidence about gut development and gut maintenance 
support the existence of continuity between the host and the microbiome, and 
how does this continuity support the individuality of the holobiont? First, I will 
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argue that the entities that compose the microbiome, in contrast with standard 
background conditions, play a role as evolutionary agents—in the sense in 
which genes are evolutionary agents, i.e. as entities that are subject of the 
evolutionary process—in the biological (sub)processes of development and 
physiology and, in this sense, it is possible to tell them apart from background 
conditions.121 Second, I will connect this claim to the discussion about the units 
of selection by arguing that, insofar as the elements of the microbiome play a 
role as agents in these (sub)processes, they do therefore play a fundamental 
role in the evolution of the host. 
 
2.2.1. The microbiome as an ‘evolutionary agent’ 
The evidence in the previous section shows that, during the development of the 
gut in mice, the microbiome plays a fundamental role via the action of B. fragilis. 
Notice that the role played by B. fragilis in this process depends on how it 
interacts with some elements of the immunological system of the host and, 
more precisely, it is strongly connected to the existence of an appropriate peer-
communication mediated through polysaccharide A (Round and Mazmanian 
2009). Importantly, B. fragilis plays a similar role in this process to the role that 
a gene (or set of genes, if the process is controlled by more than one gene) of 
the host could play. To show why, let us assume the following scenario. 
Suppose that a gene that gets expressed within undifferentiated CD4+ T cells 
would trigger their differentiation of the into Treg. If this were shown, it is 
possible that we could deactivate the expression of that gene (or set of genes) 
under strict laboratory conditions. Call that gene (or set of genes) XYZ. If we did 
so, we could probably argue that XYZ plays a basic role in the development of 
mice, i.e. that it enters the process of development. Notice, though, that XYZ 
deactivation would not stop gut development. It would only ‘make it worse’ as 
the gut that will be denaturalized. Importantly, for what we know about gene 
expression, it can be asserted that a necessary and sufficient condition for mice 
to have a ‘normal’ gut is not only that they bear XYZ within their genome. As 
                                                          
121 Notice that the practice of endogenizing background conditions and making them part of the 
system that one aims to explain, is common in evolutionary biology, as Okahsa has argued 
(2018). Importantly, to stop seeing a phenomenon as a background condition and start seeing it 
as part of what needs to be explained, it is first necessary to find a way of thinking of the 
phenomenon holistically. That is what I argue needs to be done with the microbiome, in virtue of 
the evidence currently available. 
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important as bearing XYZ is that XYZ expressed itself during the stage of 
development when it is required. A mouse whose XYZ gene fails to express will 
have a failure in gut development. Because this is so, we would say that XYZ is 
a part in the process of development in mice and, thus, it is part of the biological 
individual that is developing. XYZ is hence a difference-maker in the process of 
mouse development, and thus it is part of the system that ‘unfolds’ during 
development. 
 
 The same logic that applies to XYZ in my hypothetical scenario applies to 
the polysaccharide A in the wall of B. fragilis. Polysaccharide A is a difference 
maker for gut development, despite nor belonging to the host genome, but to its 
microbiome. This is so because all the properties that I argued XYZ would have 
in my hypothetical scenario are now ascribed to polysaccharide A. Indeed, the 
lack of polysaccharide A in the walls of B. fragilis would have the same effect in 
mice than the lack of XYZ in the host genome. The fact that XYZ was a physical 
part of the host genome, whereas polysaccharide A is not, does not invalidate 
the fact that polysaccharide A is part of the developmental individual insofar as 
it is a difference maker in development. And, thus, polysaccharide A is part of 
the developmental individual. 
 
 If my analogy works, then I would have proven that the ‘part-of-the-
system’ arguments invoked by defenders of HCE are legitimate, thus 
contradicting the thesis defended by Bourrat and Griffiths (chapter II, section 
3). However, they work differently to what some defenders of HCE have 
assumed. First, because if in my thought experiment XYZ would be ‘part-of-the-
system’ in virtue of its participation in development, and in reality 
polysaccharide A plays the role of XYZ, then what should be considered ‘part-
of-the-system’ is polysaccharide A, including the gene (or set of genes) that are 
responsible for its expression in B. fragilis, rather than B. fragilis. Second, 
because if my argument is correct, then the way of setting the boundaries of the 
holobiont is radically different from the way that defenders of HCE tend to 
favour, and that Bourrat and Griffiths have argued against. In the process-based 
view of biological individuality that I favour, the microbiome would consist in the 
set of traits that are involved in the relevant biological (sub)processes. 
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Assuming that these traits need to be localized in the genome of the host, or 
otherwise will not be part of the process, is an unjustified apriorism that commits 
a fallacy of misplaced concreteness (cf. Stencel and Proszewska 2017 for a 
similar argument). 122   
 
2.2.2. The microbiome as an evolutionary agent for the host. A response to 
Bourrat and Griffiths 
How does the evidence just presented connect to the claim that holobionts are 
units of selection? A full argument to support that idea will be developed in 
chapter V, but I will now outline the master lines of my response, and connect 
them to the case study I have just presented. Notice that my argument will be 
connected to the view about the units of selection I presented in chapter III, 
section 3.3.1, where I argued that the set of entities that participates as a unit 
in a significant biological (sub)process must be considered a unit of selection (at 
least from a MLS perspective), or otherwise the evolution of some traits would 
be unexplained. Let me now apply that reasoning to gut development in mice to 
argue that the host is not the unit of selection, but the holobiont is, and thus 
some of the most significant traits involve in mice development are the result of 
group selection. 
 
 First, CD4+ T cell differentiation is a basic stage in the development of 
mice and, more importantly, our current evidence suggests that it is mediated 
by the action of polysaccharide A in B. fragilis. Let me make a thought 
experiment now, which partially follows the thought experiment from the 
previous section. Imagine that the process of CD4+ T cell differentiation is 
mediated by XYZ. And, also, imagine, for the sake of the argument, that every 
single member of a population of mice bears XYZ within its genome. If this were 
so, then there would be one legitimate biological question about XYZ, namely, 
how the process by which XYZ was selected worked. A plausible answer would 
be that XYZ conferred a fitness advantage to its bearers, and thus, mice with a 
functional copy of XYZ in their genomes would produce more offspring than 
                                                          
122 Notice that this is response to Bourrat and Griffiths because it was my personal decision (for 
different reasons, see footnote 46) to analyse their arguments against the claim that the 
holobiont is an individual. Nonetheless, notice that my comments also refute the arguments 
given by Booth (2014), and Queller and Strassmann (2016). 
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those without it, and hence in the long term all the members in the population 
would have a copy of XYZ. This would be a conventional selective explanation. 
But notice that the same type of explanation is possible if the members of the 
population of mice had been able to transgenerationally ‘kidnap’ an entity123 
from their environment that produced the same effect without being integrated 
in the genome of the mice. Could not mice, say, ‘externalize’ the entity 
(resource)124 that is needed to carry out their development? If this happens, is 
there any solid reason to reject the idea that the factor that is externalized 
belongs to a common unit on which natural selection can act?  
 
 The answer to these two questions is affirmative. In fact, the case 
described in this section proves that this can be so. But, more importantly, in 
chapter I, I reviewed part of the evidence that supported, according to HCE 
defenders, the thesis that holobionts are units of selection. There, I avoided to 
make any claims about how to interpret their position from the perspective of 
the debates about the units of selection, because I had not presented my 
analysis of the concept of biological individuality yet (chapter III). However, now 
I am in a condition to make a stronger claim about the relevance of some of the 
evidence gathered by HCE defenders. Their evidence points to a proxy for 
detecting the existence of a common (host + microbiome) unit of selection 
because if a host necessitates the active intervention of its microbiome to 
realize a biological (sub)process, then it is likely that the object that is being 
naturally selected is not the host itself, but the host plus some of the traits of its 
microbiome. If the microbiome had not been part of the units of selection the 
evolution of the biological (sub)process would have been radically different. 
Ignoring the role that the traits of the microbiome have played in the evolution of 
these processes would mask the evolution of some of the adaptations that 
sustain the (sub)process. Or, alternatively, they would be explained as a result 
of drift, despite the connection between these traits and the fitness of the 
biological object. Therefore, if we (now) regard these traits as adaptations—and 
taking into account that an adaptation is a feature that has been selected for 
                                                          
123 ‘Entity’ should not be equated with ‘microbial taxon’ here, as I will make the claim that the 
entity is the trait that plays the functional role irrespectively of the microbial taxa that carries it. 
124 I use ‘externalize the resource’ meaning ‘not integrating the factors responsible for its 
appearance within the genome’. 
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(chapter III, section 3.3)—then it must have been selected for the good of the 
whole, i.e. for the good of the holobiont. And this is only possibly if the host plus 
its microbiome are conceived as a unit of selection.125  
 
 Notice that my response dispels the concerns raised by Bourrat and 
Griffiths about the differences between the microbiome and a background 
condition, such as the gravitational field. ‘Background conditions’ refers to a set 
of physicho-chemical factors that are essential for the life of organisms and/or 
that partially determine that an individual has the propiertes that characterize it. 
One standard example would be oxygen in aerobic organisms. The main 
difference between the physicho-chemical interactions between a host and its 
microbiome, and the physicho-chemical interactions between an organism and 
its background conditions is that the former, but not the latter, depend on the 
expression of some traits on the host and on its microbiome, as I have argued 
in this section. Therefore, even while the interactions between the host and its 
microbiome are directly mediated by physic-chemical elements (and it could not 
be otherwise, unless one believe in the existence of non-material objects), 
these physic-chemical elements appear and are transgenerationally maintained 
as a consequence of the traits that are coded in the microbiome, and that are 
responding to these interactions. 
 
Second, my response also explains why Bourrat and Griffiths’ disregard 
of the holobiont is based on an ungrounded premise. In their view, the only 
entities that must be considered ‘part-of-the-system’ are those that are coded in 
the species genome. While it is true that this compartmentalization grants the 
existence of a higher degree of transgenerational fidelity in the transmission of 
the traits, it says nothing about their common history of selection. Conceptually 
speaking, the compartimentalization could just be a historical accident in the 
evolution of species. The fact that many phenotypic features of a species can 
be explained by appealing to how the traits in the genome have been selected 
does not mean that this must be so for every phenotypic feature. Conceptual 
necessity cannot be predicated from biological contingency. Indeed, the case I 
                                                          
125 I will not make any appeal to MLS here, but I obviously mean unit of selection ‘from a MLS 
perspective’. See chapter III, section 4; and chapter V. 
189 
 
have reviewed here suggests that, if it is sound to consider that the processes 
of development in mice requires the intervention of microbiome traits, then it is 
conceptually sound to extend the ‘boundaries’ of the unit of selection beyond 
the genome, to the hologenome. In that vein, it can be said that the evolutionary 
history of mice (i.e. the evolutionary history of the host, or the macrobe) cannot 
be understood unless some of the traits it bears are relativized to its 
hologenome. And this is what defenders of HCE have been claiming for several 
years, as I showed in chapter I. 
 
3. The symbiont perspective – when the holobiont is not the biological 
individual 
 
In the previous section, I argued why the host’s perspective requires the 
holobiont ‘lens’, that is, why the evolution of the host needs to be studied as a 
story of how the holobiont evolves. An immediate interpretation of the position I 
held in the previous section would be to consider that, insofar as mice need to 
be considered holobionts for their interactions with B. fragilis, then B. fragilis 
must necessarily be part of the holobiont, and thus mice and B. fragilis will be 
cospeciating. However, I think that interpretation of the case, while intuitive, is 
not sufficiently fine-grained, because it would mask some of our current 
knowledge about the species B. fragilis that suggests that mice and B. fragilis 
are cospeciating. In this section, I will review part of this evidence and derive 
some consequences about the boundaries of the holobiont. Concretely, I argue 
that B. fragilis participates in a series of biological (sub)processes at a different 
temporal scale than the (sub)processes that define the boundaries of the 
holobiont and, thus, B. fragilis is not part of the holobiont. 
 
3.1. The life mode of B. fragilis: some basic considerations 
B. fragilis is a bacterium and, in discussing the notion of biological individuality, 
this feature has particular relevance, because bacteria are, in general, 
unicellular organisms.126 Insofar as bacteria are unicellular organisms, there are 
                                                          
126 Of course, the case of biofilms is an important exception, because in that case it seems that 
the individuality of the bacterium gets ‘diluted’ in the individuality of the ‘multicellular’ biofilm 
(Ereshefsky and Pedroso 2013, 2015, 2016). 
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two key features of their biological nature that cause that the kind of biological 
(sub)processes that define the boundaries of their individuality are given at a 
different temporal scale than the kind of biological (sub)processes than define 
the boundaries of multicellular organisms, and this has important biological 
consequences.127  
 
 B. fragilis is a Gram-negative bacillus, that is, it is a rod-shaped 
bacterium, whose body-boundaries are limited by a peptidoglycan layer and a 
lipid membrane. Their diameter oscillates between 0.5 and 0.8 µm, and their 
longitude between 1.5 and 9 µm. B. fragilis does not form spores, and it does 
not have any elements that would allow motility (flagella, cilia, etc.). Despite its 
immobility and its reduced size, B. fragilis engages in a series of biological 
(sub)processes. It engages in a set of physiological processes that maintains 
each bacterium alive, it develops to a certain extent by multiplying its body 
structures, and it reproduces by binary fission. All these processes occur within 
the boundaries of its cellular membrane and its bacterial wall (being channelled 
by a process of exchange of matter and energy with its external environment) 
and occur in very short periods of time. The temporal scale at which these 
biological (sub)processes occur is dictated by the reduced size of the 
bacterium, and its short life cycle. Due to these two features, the bacterium can 
only interact with some of the elements of its immediate surroundings, and thus 
its possibility of generating an extensive network of interactions with other 
biological individuals is strongly limited.  
 
 In contrast with B. fragilis, multicellular organisms are composed by a 
wide variety of cell types (epithelial, muscular, etc.). Each of the cells of a 
multicellular organism, taken individually, engages in its own biological 
(sub)processes. However, the multicellular individual that is formed by these 
different cell types is given at different temporal scales. Its boundaries are 
necessarily differently, because of the different type of biological 
(sub)processes that the multicellular engages in. There are necessarily 
ontological differences between any multicellular individual and any unicellular 
                                                          
127 I have chosen B. fragilis because it is the species that triggers development in mice. But 
notice that my arguments should generalize to most microorganisms. 
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individual, even when the unicellular individual only acquires its properties 
because it is a zygotically-derived part of the multicellular individual (e.g. 
specialized cell types).  
 
  The biological (sub)processes that B. fragilis engages in and that 
determine its individuality can occur in a wide spectrum of ecological niches. 
The presence of B. fragilis is well documented in hosts that have a very different 
evolutionary history than mice. For instance, it is abundantly found in humans 
(Mazmanian et al. 2008), bears (Sommer et al. 2016), camels (Paul and Dey 
2015), and pigs (Tajima and Aminov 2015), among others. It is widely 
acknowledged that the species composition of each of these holobionts is 
different (Ley et al. 2008), which suggests that the range of environment where 
B. fragilis can grow and reproduce is very diverse. This is important for it entails 
that the individuality of B. fragilis—conceived in relation to the biological 
(sub)processes that it engages in—does not depend on its relationship with any 
specific species of host, or any other specific bacterial species. Of course, its 
ecological range depends on some of its biological properties, and thus some of 
the environments will be more suitable than others for realizing its biological 
functions and forming a population. However, even while that is so, none of 
these factors will necessarily determine the phylogenetic evolution of B. fragilis, 
as I will argue in what follows.128   
 
3.2. The discontinuity between the symbiont and the holobiont: why B. 
fragilis is not a part of the evolving holobiont 
My argument above supported the thesis that the species B. fragilis is not part 
of the evolving holobiont, despite the influence that it has in mice development. 
Furthermore, even in the case that its influence in mice development had been 
a result of slection, that would not necessarily entail that B. fragilis evolves as a 
member of the holobiont. Let me explain these points more clearly. In section 
2.2.3 I had introduced the notion of interchangeability, i.e. the thesis that it is 
possible that a holobiont realizes the same capacities (i.e. bears the same 
phenotypic traits), despite the fact that the species that compose its microbiome 
                                                          
128 Notice that I will later connect the evolutionary independence of the bacterial lineage to the 
fact that these are individuated according to their 16S rRNA composition. 
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are not the same. I argued there that it is enough that the species that form the 
host’s microbiome have the functional capacity of acting as ‘agents’, i.e. they 
have the capacity of functionally expressing the traits that the holobiont needs 
to develop. Because different bacterial species usually carry similar information 
(factors, genes, etc.), this situation is to be expected, and this creates an 
apparently strange asymmetry: while the host is a unit of selection qua a 
holobiont (i.e. host + microbiome are the unit of selection for at least some 
phenotypic traits), the same is not necessarily true for the species that compose 
the host microbiome. In other words, while the phylogeny of the host is 
inseparable for the evolutionary history of the holobiont, the phylogeny of the 
microorganisms that compose the host’s microbiome is not necessarily linked to 
the evolutionary history of the holobiont. The case of B. fragilis revised in this 
section reflects the biological reasons why this is so. 
 
 First, the ontogeny and reproduction rate of each bacterium is such that 
their tempo of evolution is quicker than the tempo of the holobiont, so that every 
evolutionary change that might be triggered as a consequence of living within a 
concrete holobiont can always be explained by appealing to the evolutionary 
history of the bacterial lineage, rather than appealing to the evolutionary history 
of the holobiont. In other words, the biological (sub)processes that a bacterium 
engages in are necessarily not co-extensional with the biological 
(sub)processes that the holobiont engages in. This is so even though the 
microbiome functionally defined participates in the same biological 
(sub)processes that the host. This situation is especially remarkable for those 
cases when a bacterium can live in more than one environment, such as B. 
fragilis. Insofar as the bacterium can live in different holobionts, and even in 
different populations that are not necessarily linked to any host, it is 
unreasonable to assume that the evolutionary changes that could occur in B. 
fragilis were a result of its cospeciation with any of the hosts it interacts with. In 
other words, any evolutionary change that the bacterium could experience and 
that would benefit a concrete holobiont can perfectly be explained as a ‘fortuitus 
benefit’ that makes the bacterium apt to survive in a concrete environment. As 
such, this fortuitous benefit will be expected to disappear as soon as bacteria 
change their environment. 
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 Second, but related. As the most widely accepted criterion for 
determining bacterial phylogeny is the evolution of 16S rRNA, precisely due to 
its low rate of evolution compared to other components of the bacterial genome, 
the evolution of those lineages of microorganisms whose interaction with a 
specific host lineage is contingent is not expected to be linked to the evolution 
of the host lineage. In other words, host lineages and bacterial lineages are not 
expected to cospeciate. If the changes in the bacterial lineages are required to 
affect the 16S rRNA to be considered phylogenetically significant, then the 
interaction between a bacterial species and a host species must be much 
longer than the time that most host-symbiont interactions last. Only some cases 
of obligatory host-symbiont interaction that have become evolutionarily 
established (e.g. aphid-B. aphidicola) would satisfy this criterion. These are the 
cases that, in chapter I, I referred to as the ‘hereditary holobiont’. Notice, 
however, that the point I am making in this section is not that the holobiont 
should be defined as the ‘hereditary holobiont’. I am only posing some problems 
to including the bacterial species—as these are defined according to the 16S 
rRNA criterion—that compose the microbiome of a host within the definition of 
the holobiont; that is, within the holobiont as an independently evolving entity. 
Or, to use the vocabulary that I employed before, I am posing problems to the 
notion of the ‘ecological holobiont’, on the basis of my review of the ecological 
ranges of B. fragilis. Bearing this in mind, in the next section I will present my 
account of the boundaries of the holobiont as a mid point between these two 
extremes. This will only be possible by getting rid of the commitment to a 
hierarchical-nested view of the biological world. 
 
4. Biological individuality must be ascribed afresh at each level. Towards 
a hierarchical-non-nested view of the biological world 
 
The cases I examined illustrate the existence of two non-co-extensional 
responses to the question about the individuality of holobionts, depending on 
the perspective that one adopts. On the one hand, I argued that the host 
perspective requires considering the holobiont as the biological individual—and 
the unit of selection—because the biological (sub)processes that define its 
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individuality include some traits of the microbiome as part of the system (contra 
Bourrat and Griffiths, chapter II). On the other hand, I have argued that the 
symbiont perspective does not require considering the holobiont as the 
biological individual, for symbionts are usually shortlived unicellular organisms 
that can live in a wide range of ecological niches. In this sense, the fact that a 
concrete bacterial taxon resides in the tissues of a host can be the result of 
chance, rather than a result of host-microbe cospeciation. I connected that 
claim to the fact that bacterial phylogeny is usually traced by 16S rRNA 
analysis, a gene that was chosen, precisely, for its low rate of 
mutation/evolution. In this vein, I argued that the symbiont perspective clashed 
with the host perspective for both generate apparently contradictory responses 
about the individuality of the holobiont. Is there a way of solving this 
inconsistency? Or, in other words, is there a reason (a ‘hidden’ metaphysical 
assumption) why this inconsistency appears? And, if so, can we explain away 
the inconsistence by getting rid of the ‘hidden’ metaphysical assumption? 
 
 Before giving a reply to the questions, I want to go back to the distinction 
between the interactor and the replicator that I presented in chapter III, section 
3.2. I had argued that, while it was true that the distinction between the two 
categories was problematic (chapter III, section 3.3), it captured the essence 
of a very important distinction that should be kept for subsequent discussions 
about the units of selection. That distinction was the difference between the 
phenotypic properties that determine the fitness of a biological individual vis-à-
vis other individuals, and the hereditary basis of those properties. I said that the 
biological (sub)processes that lead to the realization of these properties are 
very heterogeneous. Furthermore, these (sub)processes can be materially 
realized at different temporal scales in the biological hierarchy, and this can 
potentially generate a multiplicity of biological individuals, each at a different 
timescale. Drawing on that distinction, plus the lessons derived from the cases I 
reviewed here, I now argue that the apparent contradiction derives from the 
assumption that the biological hierarchy needs to be strictly nested, and that 
this nestedness must be traced according to the entities that can participate in 
Mendelian relations of inheritance. These two assumptions entail a view of the 
hologenome that equates it with the sum of genomes (i.e. the collection of 
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organisms that are member of different taxa) that compose the symbiotic 
assemblage. According to it, the holobiont would be a unit of selection if and 
and only if all the taxa that compose it cease to be units of selection in their 
own. Or, in other words, the holobiont would only be a biological individual if all 
the microbial taxa that compose its microbiome were, so to speak, under the 
service of the holobiont, i.e. if they evolved according to the necessities of the 
host, rather than according to their own evolutionary interests—i.e. they should 
evolve to reduce conflict with the host. But, is there any way of judging when 
such type of evolution has occurred?  
 
From the perspective of those who assume a hierarchical-nested view of 
the biological world the answer to the last question is obvious. A set of species 
would have evolved as a single object when the set of dependency relations 
that make the species participate in the same evolutionary process are 
reciprocal (i.e. when the species are cospeciating). And this general view would 
apply to every biological (sub)process that is used to define individuality129 
(physiology, immunology, development, etc).130 In this vein, a holobiont would 
be a biological individual if and only if all the taxa that are structurally included in 
the whole are necessarily involved in the (sub)process. If some of the parts of 
one taxon (e.g. the 16S rRNA gene that is used to characterize the taxa of the 
microbiome) are not involved in that process, then the holobiont is not a 
biological individual. (Figure 25). Elwick (2017) provides an elegant argument 
suggesting that the hierarchical-nested view of the biological world has 
historically been—and still is—the standard metaphysical conception of 
biological individuality. Furthermore, both parties in the HCE dispute assume 
the nestedness of the biological hierarchy, irrespectively of whether they 
concive the holobiont as the ‘ecological holobiont’ or as the ‘hereditary 
holobiont’, and irrespectively of the fact that it contradicts hologenome selection.  
 
                                                          
129 Remember that, in the view I am putting forward, a biological individual can only be 
individuated in virtue of the set of processes it participates in. 
130 Notice how this assumption is the same that underlies Maynard-Smith’s criticisms to the view 
of Margulis about the role of symbiosis in evolution (chapter I, section 2). 
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Figure 25. Simplified view of the dependency relations in a holobiont, and its boundaries, 
according to the hierarchical-nested view. The arrows stand for dependency relations with 
respect to a biological (sub)process. According to the hierarchical-nested view, only the host 
and the yellow taxa would constitute a biological individual, as their dependency relations 
suggest that they are cospeciating (right figure, ‘hereditary holobiont’). However, the ‘ecological 
holobiont’ (left figure) would not be a biological individual, for even if the host depends on each 
microbial species, only the yellow species depend on the host, and thus the holobiont is merely 
a community of species evolving independently from each other.  
 
The cases I analysed in this chapter shows why the hierarchical-nested view of 
the biological world is mistaken, as it obliges us to decide either that holobionts 
are individuals (and, thus, that all the species that compose the host’s 
microbiome are necessarily cospeciating), or that holobionts are not biological 
individuals (and, thus, that except in rare occasions, the species that interact 
evolve independently from each other). The problem is that neither of these two 
extremes seems the right one, as I have shown, because the very nature of 
symbiosis leads to scenarios in which the relationships of dependency are not 
established between taxa, but between the traits that the taxa bear, especially 
when the biological (sub)processes that are being studied are biological 
(sub)processes that definife the individuality of the host. My hypothesis is that 
the holobiont is a unit of selection because the host genome is constantly 
coevolving with some of the traits of its microbiome, whereas the taxa (as they 
are determined by the 16S rRNA analysis) that compose the host microbiome 
are in most cases evolving independently from the host genome. If my 
hypothesis were true, it would create a dilemma about the unit of selection for 
some of the traits of the microbiome for, while these traits are physically 
connected to the bacteria taxa that bear them (they are parts of the bacterial 
genome, and thus they reproduce with the bacteria), they would be coevolving 
with the host genome.  
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 I believe that my way of describing holobiont works, first, because our 
current biological evidence suggests that complex niche specializations of a 
host are usally a consequence of hologenomic evolution. Second, because it 
explains why the dependency relations between the host and the taxa that 
compose its microbiome are usually non-reciprocal. I will make this point more 
vivid in chapter V, where I will explain how these facts would work 
evolutionarily by using the tools of MLS. For the moment, though, it is enough to 
point out that some of most salient evolutionary innovations of certain animals 
depend on adaptations in their microbiome (Mendoza et al. 2018). In other 
words, some specializations (e.g. dietary specializations) that require strong 
cumulative selection could not be explained if the adaptations were looked for 
exclusively in the host genome. The functional contributions of the microbiome 
need to be investigated too, or it is not possible to explain why the host has the 
specific lifestyle that it has. Furthermore, some of these niche specializations 
have been argued to underlie the existence of speciation events is some animal 
clades. This suggests, first, that hologenomic evolution must have played a role 
in the evolution of some animals and, importantly, that it has been a result of the 
coevolution between the host and the traits of its microbiome, rather than a 
coevolution between the host and the taxa that compose its microbiome.131  
 
 Notice that, if my account of the boundaries of the holobiont were correct, 
then it would dramatically question the validity of the hierarchical-nested view of 
the biological world, especially when it comes to evaluate the hereditary basis of 
the phenotypic properties that biologists are interested in explaining. I propose 
to adopt instead a hierarchical-non-nested metaphysics for thinking about 
biological individuality, where hereditary relations are realized in different ways, 
and even sometimes between traits that are not bound to the same genome, 
but to different genomes. Possible conflicts between levels appear thus in virtue 
of the non-nestedness of the hierarchy. But its non-nested nature allows 
explaining why the functional microbiome is evolving with the host genome (as 
                                                          
131 Notice that this suggests that symbiosis could play a role in speciation events, as Brucker 
and Bordenstein (2012a) had hypothesized. However, notice that its role is very different from 
the role they assumed, as in the view I am putting forward hologenomic incompatibilities would 
be a consequence of trait incompatibilities, rather than of species incompatibility. See chapter 
1, section 3.4.1. 
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some evidence suggests) while the bacterial taxa are evolving independently 
from the host (as critics of HCE insistently point out). (Figure 26).132  
 
 
Figure 26. Simplified view of the boundaries of the holobiont in a non-nested-hierarchical world. 
The arrows stand for dependency relations with respect to a biological (sub)process. The non-
nested-hierarchical view of the biological world entail that the holobiont is a biological individual 
that includes the host and the functional parts of the bacterial taxa it interacts with, rather than 
the whole taxa, except for the yellow taxon as it establishes relations of codependency. 
According to this view, the individuality of the host, and thus its evolution, is a consequence of 
its interaction with the traits of the bacterial taxa of its microbiome, while simultaneously the 
evolution of these traits is partially conditional on the evolution of the bacterial taxa that bear 
them. Under my interpretation of HCE, these traits part of two independently cospeciating 
entities. First, they are part of the host, despite the lack of physical connection to its genome. 
Second, they are part each of the microbial taxa in virtue of being physically bounded to their 
genomes, and thus reproduce with them. In this sense, holobiont evolution entails a non-
nested-hierarchical view of the biological hierarchy. 
 
My reason for defending that the biological hierarchy is non-nested is intimately 
connected to my process-based view of biological individuality. In a process-
based view, ascriptions of individuality must start afresh at each level, and must 
be established depending on the (sub)processes of interest, and the temporal 
scale that is being studied (which will also constrain the (sub)processes). As 
this is so, different timescales and/or the different biological (sub)processes will 
probably generate a non-overlapping classification of biological individuals, in 
which the phenotypic properties of the individual and the hereditary basis of this 
                                                          
132 My proposal is not unwarranted, but a way of fleshing out the type of metaphysical 
committments about the world that HCE entails. 
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properties are realized differently. And thus, the hierarches of entities generated 
in virtue of these (sub)processes would necessarily be non-nested. Applying the 
same logic that John Dupré applies to the case of species, I argue that if 
different biological individuals participate in different processes, then it is not 
expected that we must have a unique, and perfectly overlapping classification of 
biological individuals, nor a unique and perfectly overlapping classification of 
relations of inheritance.133 Importantly, the point is ontological. Because if 
different biological individuals have different ontological properties derived from 
the different processes they engage in, then it is expected that they will evolve 
differently, and possibly in conflict with each other. As this is so, and some traits 
are most likely evolving as a consequence of two opposing selective forces, the 
perspective of MLS provides a perfect framework to model the evolution of 
holobionts. 
 
4.1. The non-nested hierarchy and the ‘blurry nature’ of the holobiont 
Once the commitments of a non-nested-hiearchical view of biological 
individuality have been presented, it becomes easy to explain away the problem 
of the ‘blurry nature’ of the holobiont. To recapitulate, the problem of the ‘blurry 
nature’ of the holobionts dereives form the observation that the symbiotic 
microbiome (defined in virtue of the species composition) of any hosts is usually 
very transient, contingent, and highly dependent on environmental factors such 
as host’s diet. Because of this, any hypothesis about holobiont individuality will 
necessarily ‘suffer from imprecision’ (Booth 2014: 670), because the holobiont 
will not keep its identity over time (chapter II, section 2). Notice that, as it is 
formulated, the problem immediately vanishes from the perspective of my 
approach to HCE. Of course, it is expected that the species that compose the 
microbiome of the holobiont will change over the host’s lifetime, as it is 
expected that each of the zygotically-derived cells will change. It would be 
surprising, though, that the functions of the microbiome would change; that is, 
that the microbiome would not remain functionally stable over time. But, of 
course, as neither holobiont thinking, nor HCE entail necessarily that there is 
                                                          
133 Dupré applies a similar logic to the case of lineages, in his (2017). 
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cospeciation, changes in the species composition of the microbiome are 
irrelevant to discard any of the holobiont hypotheses.134 
 
 In my paper with Vanessa Triviño we even went further to argue, contra 
the specific case of Chiu and Eberl (2016), that they seemed to be neglecting 
several facts that strongly suggested the existence of a conceptual and 
biological continuity between host individuality qua monogenomic multicellular, 
and the individuality of the holobiont qua polygenomic multicellular.135 
Particularly, we pointed out that, first, they neglected the possibility of 
considering functional integration—or what I have called in this chapter 
‘dependency’—a correct criterion for determining the existence of a biological 
individual. This, we argue, is a strange decision, because, as they explicitly 
acknowledge, in some cases microorganisms substitute a whole organ of the 
host. It strikes us as surprising to claim that even in these cases the 
microorganisms are not part of the host, as Chiu and Eberl do, and seems to us 
rather an ungrounded decision, unless they apply the same criterion for every 
organ of the host.136 Second, but related, they seem to defend a strange view 
about the concept of ‘proper part’, i.e. about the necessary conditions to 
determine when a type belongs to a compound (that is, it is a part of the 
compound), and when it does not. In their view, a necessary condition for a type 
to belong to an ensemble is that at least one token of this type is always 
interacting with other parts of the ensemble. But, as we see the situation, this 
criterion is very weird, because it would entail that proper parts of an object 
cannot change their type during the time that the object exists. This criterion 
would exclude things such as transplanted organs, which seems paradoxical. If 
someone gets her heart replaced by the heart from a donor, the new heart is 
indubitably a part of herself! 
 
                                                          
134 Notice that the criticism based on the notion that either HCE is a hypothesis about 
cospeciation, or it is simply non-meaningful, is a common place in the literature, as I showed in 
chapter I and chapter II (e.g. Maynard-Smith 1991; Leggat et al. 2007; Chandler and Turelli 
2013; Hester et al. 2015; Moran and Sloan 2015; Douglas and Werren 2016; Hurst 2017). 
Obviously, as the non-nested-hierarchical view of the biological world entails that we have to 
start afresh, at each level, cospeciation is not necessary for holobiont evolution. 
135 I follow the distinction made by Dupré (2012). 
136 Of course they could always say that their criterion is strictly genetic, but this would not solve 
the problems at all, due to the fact that most living creatures are indeed chimeras. 
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 These two points seem paradoxical, but I think they are a consequence 
of Chiu and Eberl’s commitment to the nestedness of the biological hierarchy. If 
one renounces to the nested-hierarchical view of the biological world, their 
problems are easily explained away. The authors are disregarding the facts 
that, first, there is a distinction to be made between the host perspective and the 
symbiont perspective, and second, that evaluations of individuality need to start 
afresh at each level. Since they disregard both facts, their arguments tend to 
emphasize how different the symbiont is from the host, and how this challenges 
thinking of the holobiont as a biological individual. But in doing so, they are 
throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead of focusing on the continuity 
between the multicellular host and its symbionts (host perspective), the authors 
focus on the discontinuity that exists between the symbionts and the host 
(symbiont perspective), and thus their criticism would automatically apply to 
other elements that are clear parts of the host. As a consequence, their account 
automatically ‘dissolves’ the individuality of the host, which becomes 
immediately de-individualized. Had the authors started afresh at each level, 
their problems would have been different, and thus the picture of holobiont 
individuality that would have emerged from their application of DT and the ICP 
would have been very different. 
 
4.2. Reinterpretation of Sharon et al. experiment and Brucker and 
Bordenstein’s experiment in the light of the non-nested-hierarchy 
It is important to see how the experiments carried out by Sharon et al. (2009) 
(chapter I, section 3.3) and Brucker and Bordenstein (2013a) (chapter I, 
section 3.4.4) acquire their entire significance and justification when they are 
reinterpreted under the definition of the holobiont I am putting forward. 
Remember that, for the authors, their cases supported HCE. In the first case, 
because mating preferences in Drosophila had been consistently correlated to 
some components of the microbiome; in the second, because they could prove 
that there was a correlation between the microbiome and hybrid lethality in 
wasps of the genus Nasonia. The reader might remember that both cases 
raised similar concerns: why should we consider that the new microbiome is a 
part of the evolving holobiont instead of a ‘new environment’ where the ‘old’ 
host develops so that, in the end, it will trigger host evolution? An obvious 
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answer could be as follows. Assume, for the sake of argument, that the traits of 
the microbiome that determine the outcome of these processes could persist 
transgenerationally due to their fitness effects on the host, and no other 
changes in the host genome take place. In that case, could we possibly explain 
causally the persistence of any of these traits? The intuitive answer for those 
who are committed to the claim that natural selection is only effective on 
genomes would be negative for natural selection cannot ‘select’ anything in the 
host genome. But there seems to be something wrong in this answer because it 
seems that there must be a causal basis for this process. How can this tension 
be resolved? 
 
 A first answer would consist in arguing that the ‘ecological holobiont’ is 
the unit of selection, and thus a cospeciating entity such that the ‘ecological 
hologenome’ is its replicator.137 But this answer would be obviously misguided, 
because it is not the case that all the species that a macrobe hosts during its life 
time get transgenerationally transmitted. A second answer, which is the one I 
am putting forward in this chapter, consists in renouncing to the nestedness of 
the biological hierarchy. If one accepts the claim that the holobiont is a unit of 
selection, and rejects the necessity of host-microbiome cospeciation,  then one 
can argue that the host and its functional microbiome have been selected 
together, as a unit. In that vein, and combining this claim with the committment 
to MLS, I argue that the host has not changed its environment in any of the 
experiments, but rather its functional microbiome. This change in the functional 
microbiome triggers the two phenotypic traits observed, mating preference in 
Drosophila and hybrid sterility in Nasonia. At the same time, none of the 
bacterial taxa that compose the microbiome of the host has been selected as a 
unit with it. They have rather changed their environment and, thus, acquired 
some fortuitous benefits. In chapter V I will explain how this type of response 
can give a satisfactory solution to the HCE controversy. 
 
                                                          
137 Notice that the problem is saying that the hologenome is the replicator, not saying that it is a 
unit of selection. 
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5. Brief summary of chapter IV: The non-nested nature of the biological 
hierarchy and the holobiont 
 
In this chapter, I have presented a view of the biological hierarchy that, relying 
on some empirical evidence on mouse development and contrasting it with the 
life mode of B. fragilis, entails an important breakdown with standard accounts. I 
have argued that standard accounts of biological individuality fail to appreciate 
the individuality of holobionts because they assume that holobionts could be 
biological individuals only if the relations of dependency between all the species 
that compose the microbiome of the host are reciprocal. I have argued that such 
type of view is grounded on the belief that the hierarchy of objects that compose 
the biological world needs to be strictly nested, like a set of Russian dolls. I 
argued that such assumption is a misguided apriorism that first, disregards the 
distinction to be made between phenotypic properties of a whole, and the 
hereditary basis of these properties; and second, it disregards the possible 
existence of hierarchies of biological objects that are made in relation to 
different temporal scales in cirtue of the processes that are being studied and 
are, thus, non-overlapping. Drawing on this observation, I have argued that: 
 
1. Ascriptions of biological individuality must start afresh at each level, 
without considering the possible disruptions that might come from 
‘below’. 
2. In symbiotic assemblages, the host perspective, and the symbiont 
perspective must be always separated when biological individuality is 
being ascribed, as they will be in most cases species that are 
evolving independently 
3. Because of the different temporal scales between the host and the 
symbionts, the host perspective entails that the holobiont (host + 
functional microbiome) is the unit of selection, whereas the symbiont 
perspective entails that the symbiont species, rather than the 
holobiont, is the unit of selection. 
4. Therefore, the holobiont is a unit of selection from the host 
perspective, and its evolution must be studied from the perspective of 
a MLS framework.  
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Chapter V 
 
‘Stability of traits as the kind of stability that 
matters in units of selection: An account of the role 
of the holobiont as a unit of selection from a 
multilevel selection perspective’ 
 
This chapter builds on the non-nested-hierarchical view of the biological 
world and presents a conceptual model to test the hypothesis that 
holobionts are units of selection. I start reconsidering the arguments 
against the claim that holobionts are units of selection presented in 
chapter II and argue that they are misguided, since they misidentify the 
target of selection, as they reduce the debate of the units of selection to 
the debate about identifying the replicators. Second, drawing on this 
criticism, and the necessity of applying a multilevel selection framework for 
thinking the role of holobionts as units of selection, I present a multilevel 
selection approach to think about HCE. I first elaborate a conceptual 
framework to test the hypothesis that holobionts are units of selection from 
the MLS1 perspective, and I later elaborate a model to interpret the claim 
that holobionts are units of selection from a MLS2 perspective. Concerning 
MLS2, I suggest an alternative definition of ‘inheritance’ that would serve 
to test whether my model applies, and how often, in real biological 
systems. 
 
 
205 
 
1. From the non-nestedness of the biological hierarchy to the multilevel 
selection perspective 
 
The previous chapter provided a philosophical story about the metaphysical 
properties of biological individuals and what this entails for the biological 
hierarchy. Concretely, I argued that: 1) ascriptions of biological individuality 
must start afresh at each level because 2) the biological world is hierarchical 
and non-nested. I grounded my claims on recent observations about the 
physiology and development of mice. Even though the chapter contained some 
suggestions about the role of holobionts as units of selection, I did not properly 
develop an account of what holobionts would look like as units of selection. This 
is problematic because, first, HCE is the claim that holobionts are units of 
selection (chapter I) and, second, my project is to develop an account of what 
they would look like as units of selection (Introduction). To overcome that gap, 
this chapter articulates a new conception of how the holobiont could be 
conceived as a unit of selection from a process-based perspective to biological 
individuality. To do so, it is essential to keep in mind three theses that I have 
developed, and that justify the account of HCE that I elaborate in this chapter: 
 
Thesis 1. If a biological object participates in a significant biological 
(sub)process, then it is minimally a unit of selection (chapter III, section 
3.4). 
Thesis 2. The role of the holobiont as a unit of selection needs to be 
thought from the perspective of a MLS framework (chapter III, section 4) 
Thesis 3. The holobiont is a unit of selection in virtue of the association 
between the host species and its functional microbiome (chapter IV) 
 
The result of conjoining the three theses is the MLS framework I will elaborate 
here.138 But before doing so, I need to to show why the last family of arguments 
against the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection is invalid. 
                                                          
138 Notice that what I will present is just a ‘sketch’ of a possible endogenization in terms of 
evolutionary biology of the type of knowledge gathered by defenders of HCE. 
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2. ‘Stability of species’ is not a valid criterion to determine whether 
holobionts are units of selection.  
 
In chapter II, section 4, I presented what I took to be the main criticism that 
had been raised against HCE, namely, that the species that compose the 
microbiome of a host are not transgenerationally co-transmitted together with 
the host (i.e. there is no partner fidelity), and thus this invalidates the claim that 
the holobiont is a unit of selection. I said there that, while it is true that the 
species that compose the microbiome of a host are not transgenerationally co-
transmitted with the host, the validity of the argument depended on the 
assumption of SoS: 
 
Stability of species (SoS): A holobiont in generation n+1 will be a unit of 
selection only if the symbionts S1, S2, ..., Sn, that occur within the host Hn+1 
belong to the same species as the symbionts S1, S2, ..., Sn, that co-
occur(ed) with the host Hn.139 
 
Building on my discussion about the topic of the units of selection in chapter III, 
section 3, I am now going to argue that SoS is an incorrect criterion to 
characterize the units of selection for it is based on the replicator/interactor 
framework, and a hierarchical and nested view of the biological world, and it is 
thus prey of the very same problems that affect that account of evolution. 
Second, based on what I suggested in chapter III, section 4, I will argue that 
HCE must be interpreted from the perspective of MLS, and not from the 
perspective of the interactor/replicator framework, and thus the criticism against 
HCE based on SoS is completely invalid. 
 
  Let me start from the beginning. A criticism to HCE on the basis of SoS 
could only be consistently held if the same type of criterion of inclusion—perfect 
transgenerational transmission—would be applied to every single level of the 
                                                          
139 See footnote 54. 
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biological hierarchy where selection at the lower level could disrupt selection at 
the higher level. One such case would be a multicellular organism. When could 
one argue that a multicellular organism is a unit of selection? Assuming, for the 
sake of the argument, that all cells in a multicellular organism share the same 
genome (so that the match one-organism/one-genome is satisfied), and 
assuming that a genome is a collection of nucleotides (the minimal entity of 
which copies are made), a multicellular organism would be a unit of selection if 
and only if there is a perfect transmission of nucleotides. Call that ‘nucleotide 
fidelity’. Following the same scheme of reasoning against HCE I presented in 
chapter II, section 4, one could argue that: 
 
1*. Definition: Multicellular organisms are entities composed by the 
collection of nucleotides that constitutes their genome.   
2*. Lewontin conditions for natural selection: For natural selection to act 
on a given entity in a population it is necessary that the entity (a) 
exhibits phenotypic variation that (b) affects its fitness and that (c) the 
phenotypic variation is inherited with sufficient fidelity.   
3*. Nucleotide fidelity: The only way of guaranteeing the satisfaction of (c) 
among multicellular organisms would be that the whole collection of 
nucleotides of their genome co-occurs transgenerationally.   
4*. Therefore, the existence of nucleotide fidelity is a necessary condition 
to claim that multicellular organisms are units of selection.  
 
One could even condense these four premises in one single criterion similar to 
SoS, namely: stability of nucleotides (SoN, hereafter): 
 
Stability of nucleotides (SoN): A holobiont in generation n+1 will be a unit 
of selection only if the nucleotides N1, N2, ..., Nn, that appeared in the 
multicellular organisms Mn+1 are the same as as the nucleotides N1, N2, ..., 
Nn, that appeared in the multicellular organism Mn. 
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But to take a criterion as SoN as a necessary condition for having a unit of 
selection would be very problematic, for it would simply rule out the possibility 
that any organism that reproduces sexually is a unit of selection! And that would 
obviously be an unacceptable response for any biologist. Interestingly, 
Benjamin Fitzpatrick has mathematically demonstrated a very similar point to 
the one that I am making here. Like me, he also believes that the disanalogy 
between sexual reproduction and microbiome transmission is not as abrupt as 
some critics of HCE assume, at least in the case of horizontal transmission of 
the microbiome. To quote: ‘[t]he conclusion that horizontal transmission rapidly 
erodes extra-genomic associations is equivalent to the conclusion that 
recombination rapidly erodes associations between genes within a genome’ 
(Fitzpatrick 2014: 1). Nonetheless, in contrast with my criticism to SoS, 
Fitzpatrick’s argument against critics of HCE still assumes that SoS is a 
necessary condition for claiming that holobionts are units of selection. He only 
points out that, where critics of HCE perceive a sharp discontinuity (SoN in 
sexual reproduction versus SoS in holobiont ‘reproduction’), there is indeed a 
continuity, and SoS can be maintained by some means that critics of HCE have 
not thought about (horizontal transmission in a structured population or in a 
population where selection is acting). How does my criticism of SoS differ from 
Fitzpatrick’s? I think the real problem with SoS is not empirical, but conceptual. 
Insofar as SoS is simply a way of restating SoN at a different level of the 
biological hierarchy, it has the problem of reducing the question about the units 
of selection to the question about which entity is the replicator. And, as I argued 
in chapter III, section 3.3, the replicator/interactor framework of the units of 
selection is simply invalid to describe some basic dimensions of the debate 
about the units of selection.140  
 
 The way in which I have reasoned that there is an immediate conceptual 
move from SoS to SoN can be criticized as a sort of straw man argument. 
Indeed, defenders of SoS would argue, the logic that requires the existence of 
SoS for holobionts does not apply to the genome of multicellular organisms, and 
                                                          
140 In fact, some critics of HCE have excplitly stated that all that the debate on units of selection 
should be about is about replication, and since HCE defenders have for the moment failed to 
prove that hologenomes are replicators, then their theory is simply wrong. This is, for instance, 
the position that comes out from reading Skillings (2016: 886, ft. 7), or from reading Bourrat and 
Griffiths (2018).  
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thus accepting SoS does not necessarily commit them to accept SoN. Why? 
Because it could be argued that there is a sharp difference between, say, 
paradigmatic multicellular organisms and holobionts. How could this difference 
be captured? Both Moran and Sloan (2015) and Douglas and Werren (2016) 
argue that the key distinction between these types of ‘assemblages’ is that in 
the case of holobionts there is no ‘fitness alignment’ among the entitites that 
compose the microbiome of the host, whereas the same is not true for 
multicellular organisms, where it is possible to identify different mechanisms 
that guarantee that the fitness of the objects that compose the whole is de facto 
aligned (e.g. bottlenecks, germ/soma specialization, etc.). As a consequence of 
the lack of similar mechanisms in the holobiont (for there is no SoS, and SoS 
would either be the only possible mechanism, or the precondition for these 
mechanisms to evolve), the different partners that compose it will enter in a 
permanent ‘arms race’—for the microbes could ‘escape’ from the microbiome to 
a different environment—that would erode any possibility for natural selection to 
act on the collective.  
  
 I suspect their reasoning is partially correct, and I think these authors 
have actually made a good point. If there are no, say, ‘policing mechanisms’ 
that guarantee that selection at the upper level is not disrupted by selection at 
the lower level, then all the changes that are attributed to selection on the upper 
level might indeed be mere sorting that results from selection at the lower level 
(chapter II, section 5). Nonetheless, after the discussion I introduced in 
chapter III and chapter IV, we are now in a position to see why this line of 
criticism, as persuasive as it might sound, is completely irrelevant to refuting 
HCE. First, it departs from a wrong concept of ‘unit of selection’, fot it assumes 
the paradoxical situation that the existence of ‘fitness alignment’ is prior to the 
existence of the object that is being selected. But, as I argued, this would leave 
the existence of ‘fitness alignment’ unexplained, and for sure biologists would 
demand a causal explanation of why the parts of a concrete conglomerate have 
their fitness interests aligned. To have such a story, we need to think of the 
units of selection from a MLS perspective. Second, it mischaracterizes the 
concept of ‘holobiont’ that is used in the HCE. As I argued, the concept of 
holobiont does not demand the existence of cospeciation, at least as species 
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are defined according to 16S rRNA criterion. HCE only demands that the host 
and its microbiome coevolve to a certain extent, and this coevolution can take 
sometimes the form of cospeciation, or it can also take the form of coevolution 
between the host and some of the rapidly evolving elements of the microbiome. 
In that vein, individuality has to be ascribed afresh at each level, and instead of 
thinking which are the elements of the lower level that could disrupt selection at 
the upper level, we must think about how to conceive the action of natural 
selection at the concrete level we are investigating. 141 
 
3. The holobiont as a unit of selection from a MLS1 perspective 
 
I will now present a MLS1 perspective to study the evolution of holobionts, and 
to conceive their role as units of selection. First, I will motivate the introduction 
of the MLS1 perspective to think about holobiont evolution by relying on two 
recent biological studies that, I argue, implicitly rely on a MLS1 conception of 
the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection. Second, I will introduce my MLS1 
model for the evolution of the holobiont. 
 
3.1. Toxin exposure and vampire bats 
The first case study I consider derives from Osmanovic et al.’s (2018) 
population genetics model of a symbiotic community. In their study, the authors 
evaluate how a host and its vertically-transmitted population of bacteria jointly 
adapt to an environment that is polluted with a toxic agent. The details of the 
model are irrelevant, but the results are significant for the point I will make in 
section 3.2. First, Osmanovic et al. observed that the stress created by the 
exposure to the toxin can be alleviated by changes in the traits of the host’s 
associated bacterial community, and that these occurred during a single host 
generation—thus referred to as ‘Lamarckian adaptations’, see chapter I, 
section 3.2. Their discovery was, therefore, that for a concrete environmental 
pressure, a host-microbiome system could overcome it by selection on the traits 
of the microbiome, an opportunity that is not feasible in germ-free macrobes. 
                                                          
141 Notice that this is a consequence of the metaphysical conclusion according to which the 
biological world is structured in a non-nested hierarchy, so that different levels overlap with each 
other.  
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Notice that this type of response depends on the different timescales on which 
the traits of the microbiome and the traits of the host can evolve and, thus, on 
the different scales on which selection for each of their traits is possible. 
Importantly, selection for microbiome traits determines selection for hosts (and 
for host’s traits) within a single host generation: hosts whose microbiomes 
evolve to overcome the toxin exposure will survive longer than those that fail to 
do so and, thus, will release more microbes with the appropriate traits to cope 
with the toxin and will produce more hosts with their very same traits.  
 
 Second, but related, Osmanovic et al. study how selection acts 
transgenerationally on the host-microbiome system, assuming that there is 
vertical co-transmission of both elements. They observe that, over multiple host 
generations, there is a substantial reduction in the physiological stress caused 
by the toxin, which results from an increase in the total amount of detox 
secreted by the microbiome.142 That leads the authors to conclude that the 
selection of hosts is ‘based on a collective property of the bacterial community’ 
(Osmanovic et al. 2018: 8). In other words, assuming vertical co-transmission, 
selection will favour those hosts whose microbiomes evolve the traits that allow 
them to cope with the environmental challenges posed by the toxin. The authors 
do not analyse, though, what would happen in host-microbiome systems where 
there is no host-microbiome co-transmission. Nonetheless, they speculate the 
following: ‘Horizontal transmission is not expected to compromise the 
acquisition of toxin tolerance, but rather to promote sharing of the benefits with 
offspring of other hosts’ (Osmanovic et al. 2018: 8, emphasis added). The 
reason for their conclusion is obvious: in evolutionary host-scales, only these 
hosts that acquire toxin tolerance will survive. 
 
 The second case comes from the study on the evolution of vampire bats 
carried out by Mendoza et al. (2018). In their research, they explicitly argue to 
be applying a hologenomic approach to study the evolution of obligate 
hematophagy (blood-sucking diet) in the common vampire bat (Desmodus 
rotundus). Their research is presented in two stages. First, the authors show 
                                                          
142 Another population model of holobiont evolution that relies on vertical transmission can be 
found in Roughgarden et al. (2017). 
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that, whereas a taxonomic analysis of the gut associated microbiome in the 
common vampire bat shows the phylogenetic influence of the host in the 
composition of the microbiome (with more proximity to the taxonomic 
composition of carnivorous and insectivorous bats than to the taxonomic 
composition of frugivorous bats), this similarity masks a striking dissimilarity at 
the functional level. In their words: ‘While there is little differentiation between 
the functional gut microbiomes of carnivorous, insectivores [sic] and frugivorous 
bats, the common vampire bat functional microbiome is almost completely 
distinct, and exhibits the least intra-species variation between the samples’ 
(Mendoza et al. 2018: 661). The data is relevant because it suggests that the 
vampire bat microbiome might harbour some functions that are specialized to 
the extreme type of diet that vampire bats have, which means the microbiome 
could play a key role in the evolution of their lifestyle.  
 
Second, the authors analyse whether their last observation was true by 
determining which of the adaptations—in their research, ‘traits undergoing 
positive selection’—that allow vampire bats to cope with the challenges posed 
by hematophagy were located in the bat genome, and which were located in its 
microbiome. Mendoza et al. observed that many of the traits of the bat 
microbiome that were undergoing positive selection were causally involved in 
coping with some of the challenges posed by sanguivory, including both 
nutritional and non-nutritional challenges (Figure 27). Thus, they conclude:  
 
‘It is clear from our results that the common vampire bat has adapted to 
sanguivory through a close relationship between its genome and gut 
microbiome. (…) We showed that extreme dietary specializations, such as 
that of the common vampire bat, provide a comparative framework with 
which to tease apart the relative roles of genomes and microbiomes in 
adaptation. In conclusion, our study illustrates the benefits of studying the 
evolution of complex adaptations under a [sic] holobiome framework, and 
suggests that vertebrate adaptation studies that do not account for the 
action of the hologenome may fail to recover the full complexity of 
adaptation’ (Mendoza et al. 2018: 664, emphasis added). 
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Figure 27. Mendoza et al.’s ‘hologenomic’ vampire bat. The figures indicate the dietary 
challenges that the common vampire bat has overcome. a) Adaptational contributions to 
sanguivory accountable to genomic changes alone (blue labels). b) Adaptational contributions 
to sanguivory within a hologenomic context (blue labels for host genes; red labels for gut 
microbial traits). (From Mendoza et al. 2018: 661, Fig 2). 
 
In the next section, I will review the exact implications of this type of research 
for the debates about the units of selection, and for how the main claim of HCE 
should be conceived.  
 
3.2. Stability of traits as the kind of stability that matters from a MLS1 
perspective143 
The research just presented has shown the usefulness of considering the 
holobiont as the unit of selection to uncover the evolution of complex lifestyles 
and thus indirectly discover the origin of some adaptations.144 Notice that the 
                                                          
143 Part of this section is based on my paper J. Suárez and V. Triviño (2019) ‘A metaphysical 
approach to holobiont individuality: Holobionts as emergent individuals’. Quaderns de Filosofia 
6(1): 59-76. 
144 The term ‘adaptation’, or ‘adaptive trait’ is ambiguous in the scientific and philosophical 
literature, as it can express at least two different concepts. Sometimes, a trait is considered an 
adaptation of an organism if it serves a purpose, that is, if it makes that the organism looks as if 
it were ‘designed’ by an engineer to fit its environment now (‘engineering concept’ of 
adaptation). However, sometimes the term is used to refer to traits that have been selected 
for—in Sober’s terminology—because they were useful to perform certain activity in the past. In 
the latter sense, a trait is an adaptation for performing a concrete activity if it has the right type 
of causal history, which is the reason why the trait is there (Williams 1966; Sober 1984; Sober 
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research implicitly assumed—even though it did not explicitly discuss—a MLS1 
approach to hologenomic evolution. The purpose of the studies was to discover 
which traits were undergoing (or had undergone) positive selection in the 
particles that integrated the holobiont.145 The explanation of why these traits 
were undergoing positive selection was attributed to the existence of a common 
selection pressure affecting the group, so that, in each case, trait-frequency 
evolves towards an optimal state for the group. In the case of Osmanovic et al. 
(2018), though, the research had a profound limitation, as it assumed that the 
microbiome species were vertically transmitted, and thus hologenome evolution 
was somehow reduced to host-species and microbiome-species cospeciation, 
in which the holobiont has the capacity to form parent-offspring species-
lineages.146 Notice that this way of accounting for holobiont evolution has a 
serious limitation since, as I argued in section 2, assuming that SoS is 
necessary for holobiont selection is a wrong characterization of HCE and 
conflates MLS1 and MLS2. Despite this limitation, Osmanovic et al.’s result 
shows an important consequence. From a MLS1 point of view, particle evolution 
can be traced by considering the holobiont as the ‘collective’ unit of selection in 
which particle demography is studied. 
 
 On the other hand, the case of Mendoza et al. (2018) does not offer the 
same limitations as Osmanovic et al.’s model, since their analysis sticks not 
only to the taxonomic level, but also—and especially—to the functional level.147 
Given an organism with a highly specialized diet (obligate blood-sucking), 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Wilson 2011). This notion of adaptation has been called ‘selection product’ (Lloyd 1992, 
2001, 2017a). This second meaning is the one I want to explore here because my argument will 
be the following: each taxa in the microbiome might bear a trait that is being positively selected 
because it is useful for the taxa now, in that concrete environment (chapter 4); but the reason 
why the trait is there, in the microbiome, and thus why the trait has been acquired by the taxa 
now is because the trait has been useful in the past for the holobiont. In other words, I will argue 
that, historically, the reason why those traits are there and are adaptations is because they have 
been selected at the level of the holobiont. 
145 I use ‘particle’ intentionally, to avoid any commitment to the nature (or the way of 
individuating) the components of the microbiome. Indeed, as my claim is that the components 
are usually (but not always) the traits of the microbiome, rather than the taxa that bear the traits, 
using ‘particle’ introduces a necessary degree of ambiguity. 
146 Nonetheless, their reflection about what would happen in the case in which transmission 
were horizontal is glossed in MLS1 language. But, importantly, it is only a reflection, and not 
something that the authors have been able to mathematically prove yet, probably for the 
complexity of computing horizontal transmission. 
147 Other approaches to holobiont evolution have suggested doing the same. The most 
noticeable defence of this approach is probably Lemenceau et al. (2017), although a previous 
informal version of it appeared in Catania et al. (2016). 
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Mendoza et al. seek to understand which are the functional traits that make that 
behaviour possible, as well as whether they are undergoing positive selection. 
To discover the traits that underlie the evolution of the specialized diet, 
Mendoza et al. study not only the genomic level, but also the hologenomic level. 
That is to say, they study the traits that are undergoing or have undergone 
positive selection both in the host genome and in the microbiome. Why is this 
so? It is now necessary to introduce a brief digression about the notion of 
scientific explanation.148 First, what is the explanandum in Mendoza et al.’s 
research? The evolution of a specialized diet (sanguivory). Their explanandum 
is simply:  
 
(Explanandum) Why does sanguivory evolve in the vampire bat? 
 
Second, what is their explanans? As sanguivory has necessarily have evolved 
by cumulative selection, i.e. it is clearly a lifestyle that can only evolve as a 
consequence of the accumulation of adaptations—in the historical sense—their 
explanans will necessarily be natural selection. That is to say: 
 
(Explanans) Because some traits have been evolving by natural selection 
in a cumulative way such that sanguivory is possible in the vampire 
bat. 
 
Third, in virtue of what do the scientists think that the explanans accounts for 
the explanandum? In virtue of the existence of a pattern or a regularity that 
allows natural selection and only natural selection, to causally produce that type 
of outcome in some individuals.149 Assuming that natural selection has 
                                                          
148 This digression does not come out of the blue. It is a reconstruction of what leds Mendoza et 
al. to postulate the existence of hologenomic selection which is partially based in José Díez’s 
theory of scientific explanation (Díez 2014), as Roger Deulofeu and I have understood it and 
applied it in our papers (see Deulofeu and Suárez 2018, Deulofeu et al. 2019, Suárez and 
Deulofeu 2019; see also Moreno and Suárez (submitted)). To avoid extending myselef too 
much, I will not discuss the issue of scientific explanation here, nor why we rely on Díez’s 
account. Such discussion can be seen, however, in Roger Deulofeu’s dissertation.  
149 ‘Only natural selection’ because natural selection is the unique factor that stabilizes causally 
trait distributions in biological populations. The other possibility—drift—would be a form of 
sorting (chapter II, section 5).  
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produced the outcome, a second question arises. What is the material basis on 
which natural selection has operated to produce the outcome? At this point, 
scientists need to find the structures that have produced that complex lifestyle, 
that is, the traits that have been selected for, as well as the mechanisms that 
have guaranteed the transgenerational continuity of these traits in the 
population. In their research, the scientists will depart with an advantage, as 
they will know a priori which traits need to exist so that sanguivory evolves 
(namely, those that allow the vampire bat to cope with the nutritional and non-
nutritional challenges posed by its lifestyle).  
 
 The hologenomic approach is thus indispensable because the genome of 
the vampire bat encodes only part of the traits that allow sanguivory. However, 
the bat microbiome offers itself as a possibility, as it encodes part of the traits 
that allow sanguivory. The vampire bat microbiome seems to have adapted (be 
adapting) to cope with sanguivory. Therefore, the evolution of sanguivory has 
only been possible because the bat genome and its microbiome are evolving 
together. Thus, the bat genome and the bat microbiome constitute a unit of 
selection. But, to recall the message I conveyed in chapter IV, this does not 
mean that the host and the taxa that compose its microbiome have necessarily 
cospeciated. They might have cospeciated but notice that this is irrelevant. All 
that is needed to argue that the holobiont is the unit of selection is to show that 
the host evolves as a holobiont, that is, that the host evolves together with its 
microbiome. And, importantly, this coevolution might leave a mark exclusively at 
the functional level, which is what in fact Mendoza et al.’s results suggest.  
 
The last claim explicitly connects with the fact that HCE defenders claim 
to embrace a MLS perspective. To summarize what I already showed in 
chapter I, for HCE defenders, coevolution, cospeciation, or cocladogenesis are 
highly evolved states that require of a selective explanation. The hypothesis that 
the holobiont is a unit of selection, when it is conceived from the perspective of 
MLS, does not a priori require the existence of any of these states, at least 
when it comes to the MLS1 approach. The only requirement is that some 
collectives (i.e. holobionts) survive longer than others in virtue of the traits of the 
particle types that compose the collectives. Because of this, these particles 
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types—the entities whose fitness is tracked in MLS1—spread more, and thus 
their probability of eventually forming new collectives increases. To recall, a 
collective is a unit of selection in MLS1 in virtue of the parent/offspring lineages 
that the particle types form, and how some particle types increase in the 
population because they belong to the collective (chapter III, section 3.4).  
 
Notice that so far, I have used the notion ‘particle type’ to remain as 
neutral as possible about the biological commitments of MLS in the context of 
HCE, but it is now time to unpack its meaning. In HCE, ‘particle type’ might 
either refer to the host, or to its microbiome, though not necessarily to the 
concrete species or taxa that compose the microbiome, but rather to the 
functions that are encoded in the microbiome (Catania et al. 2016; Lemenceau 
2017). This should not sound strage to the reader, as this is the logical 
consequence of the processual-based analysis of biological individuality I 
presented in chapter III and chapter IV, as this is applied to the evolutionary 
holobiont. HCE is a framework to tell the story of how hosts evolve, in virtue of 
the functions that their microbiome encodes. It is a story of how the host 
genome evolves—or does not evolve—in virtue of the functions that can be 
‘externalized’ in its microbiome. It is, thus, a story of how the collection of traits 
that is instantiated in a host-microbiome system gets ‘filtered’ by natural 
selection and is shaped by other forces, such as neutral evolution.150 But it is 
not a story of how the bacterial species that mereologically compose the host’s 
microbiome speciate. Therefore, the types that evolve are the host genome, or 
traits that are encoded in the host’s microbiome for, in principle, host and 
microbiome are exposed to the same environmental pressures in virtue of 
mereologically forming the holobiont.  
 
With this notion in mind, there is now a way of formalizing the role of the 
holobiont as a unit of selection from a MLS1 perspective. My claim is that 
holobionts can be regarded as units of selection provided that the notion of SoS 
is substituted by the notion of ‘stability of traits’ (SoT, hereafter), or simply trait-
                                                          
150 It is important to bear in ind that HCE does not assume that everything that occurs in the 
holobiont is necessarily a product of natural selection (i.e. it is not committed to a radical 
adaptationism). Thanks to Seth Bordenstein for emphasizing this point to me in several email 
exchanges. 
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recurrence at the particle level. The idea might be explained as follows. To 
detect possible cases of holobiont selection, one needs to regard the different 
traits that can be recognized in the microbiome of the holobiont. If there is an 
increase in the distribution of particle traits in virtue of their capacity of making 
some hosts survive longer than others in the host population, then holobionts 
are units of selection for the trait from a MLS1 perspective. To put it more 
formally:  
  
Stability of traits (SoT): A holobiont will be a unit of selection if and only if 
for at least one trait Tx that appears in the microbiome of a host n, its 
appearance increases the probability that Tx increases its frequency in the 
global population of particles, provided Tx increased the survival and 
reproduction of the host n. 
 
The main notions that support my account are that, first, SoT is possible without 
SoS. Or, in other words, that it is logically possible that the frequency of a trait 
increases in the global population of particles due to its effects on the survival of 
the host, even though the frequency of the microbial species does not increase, 
as the trait increases its frequence in different bacterial lineages. Second, that 
SoT is the way in which holobionts evolve. Let me now develop the two 
ideas.151 
 
First, our current evidence suggests that SoT and SoS can be logically 
disconnected. On the one hand, the functional traits that are encoded in the 
microbiome are usually redundant (Boon et al. 2014; Vieira-Silva et al. 2016), 
which indicates that different microbial species in the microbiome can—and 
do—carry the same traits, despite belonging to different lineages. On the other 
hand, bacterial microorganisms are known to constantly engage in horizontal 
gene transfer (HGT, hereafter) with each other, which had led some 
philosophers and biologists to argue that microorganism evolution follows a 
web-pattern, rather than tree-pattern (Bapteste et al. 2009). Importantly, our 
                                                          
151 My argument will be conceptual. It is about logical possibility, rather than about biological 
contingency. Nonetheless, it is based on some of our current biological evidence. 
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current evidence suggests that the frequency of HGT is substantially increased 
in the host’s microbiome, which had led some researchers to argue that the 
holobiont is a ‘hot spot’ for HGT (Liu et al. 2012; Lerner et al. 2017; Blow et al. 
2019; Schnorr, personal communication). The conjunction of these two pieces 
of evidence suggests that the functional traits encoded in the microbiome are 
not as strongly linked to the 16S rRNA as it might seem for the way in which 
bacteria reproduce (by binary fussion), and thus some of these traits can be 
evolving simultaneously in different bacterial lineages. Moreover, this suggests 
that the longer the host survives, the higher the probability of HGT that leads to 
the increase in the frequency of these traits in the microbiome that increase the 
fitness of the host, as they will be subject to natural selection due to the 
environmental pressures that the host experiences, as Osmanovic et al. (2018) 
have demonstrated. And, inversely, the shorter the host survives, the lower the 
probability for HGT, and thus the lower the probability that the microbiome traits 
that increase the fitness of the host spread, first, in the microbiome, and 
second, in the global population of particles. Therefore, this shows that the host 
and its functional microbiome engage with each other in fitness-affecting 
interactions, such that the higher the increase in host fitness, the higher the 
increase in the fitness of the traits encoded by its microbiome. And this is 
conceptually possible because the traits can be encoded by different microbial 
species in the microbiome of the host, which suggests that the species 
composition of the microbiome is to a certain extent irrelevant to conceive the 
role of the holobiont as a unit of selection.152 153 
 
 Second, viewing holobiont evolution from a MLS1 perspective framed in 
terms of SoT entails a new view on holobiont evolution that has not been 
analysed in the literature yet (cf. Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg 2008, 2014; 
Roughgarden et al. 2017; Doolittle and Booth 2017), but that corresponds to the 
type of reasoning that underlies the study by Mendoza et al. (2018). Remember 
that from the perspective of MLS1, whether holobionts form parent-offspring 
lineages is irrelevant to decide whether they are units of selection (chapter III, 
                                                          
152 It is obviously important, though, in the case of tight genotype-genotype connections, such 
as vertically transmitted endosymbionts. 
153 These two observations also relate to the interest that HCE defenders have in developing 
concepts such as ‘phylosymbiosis’ and ‘community heritability’. See section 3.2. 
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section 3.4). It is enough to determine, first, that the particles that compose the 
holobiont engage in fitness-affecting interactions and, second, that the 
differential contribution to the global population of particles is a consequence of 
the mutual interaction between the particles that compose the holobiont. In our 
case, it is enough to show that the differential replication of the traits in the 
microbiome, or the differential reproduction of the hosts that form the holobiont 
is a consequence of the fitness-affecting interactions between the host and its 
functional microbiome. In that vein, it is possible to determine how the traits in 
the microbiome must evolve to consider that the holobiont is the unit of 
selection. I will now offer an argument to support that the results by Mendoza et 
al. (2018) suggest that the holobiont is a unit of selection from a MLS1 
perspective.154 Notice, though, that the argument I will offer is conceptual. To 
test its validity for every biological system it is necessary to empirically validate 
whether the microbiome has evolved how I suggest here that the microbiome 
must evolve if the holobiont is a unit of selection.155 
 
 The key elements of my argument for holobiont selection in terms of SoT 
are sketched in Figure 28. According to my account, a holobiont will be a unit of 
selection for a trait Ta of the microbiome if and only if SoT is true. On the 
contrary, if SoT is not satisfied, then the holobiont will not be a unit of selection 
for Ta. MLS1 holobiont selection is possible in the following circumstances. 
Suppose we have a population formed by two variants of a host species (red, 
blue, in the figure), and that each variant interacts with a maximum of three 
microbial species, each taxon represented by a different colour (green, yellow, 
grey). Following the account of the holobiont that I presented in chapter IV, 
                                                          
154 I explore the consequences of this argument in a paper with Vanessa Triviño (under review) 
‘Holobionts as emergent manifestors of adaptation’. There, we argue that the case of the 
vampire bat suggests that the traits are dispositional adaptations of the bacterial lineages, and 
etiological adaptations of the holobiont. We need to develop the approach further and explore 
the possible consequences, as well as the set of biological mechanisms that could support the 
validity of our approach, but notice that if our hypothesis were true, it would dramatically change 
the extension of the concept of ‘lineage’, thus having serious consequences for MLS2. 
155 Notice, however, that by arguing this way I am not neglecting that an account of holobiont 
evolution in terms of MLS2 (i.e. in terms of collectives that stand in parent-offspring relations) 
could be provided. Indeed, in section 4 I will suggest what that type of account would look like. 
Rather, what I am arguing is that (1) from a conceptual point of view, that type of account seems 
unnecessary to argue that holobionts are units of selection (chapter IV, section 3.4); (2) the 
account I am presenting squares with part of the current scientific practice without the necessity 
of discussing how to determine the existence of inheritance (i.e. parent-offspring lineages) at the 
holobiont level (section 3.1); (3) it agrees with the claims made by HCE defenders that they 
embrace a MLS framework for the study of holobionts (chapter I). 
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assume that at t1, the host interacts only with one of the species of the 
microbiome in virtue of a trait that admits two variants, represented by the white 
and the black circles within the bacterial taxa, respectively. In this scenario, the 
holobiont (represented by the dashed red circle) would consist in the host plus 
the traits in the bacterial taxa. Now assume, by hypothesis, that the host that 
bears the black trait survives longer than the host that bears the white trait, so 
that at t2 it is still alive, while the red host (and thus, its holobiont) is not.156 
Assume that the black trait can participate in events of HGT, such that at t2, it is 
present in all the taxa that compose the microbiome of the blue host. In this 
scenario, the blue host would have reproduced in t1 and in t2, and so would 
have done the microbes of its microbiome, whereas the red host would have 
only reproduced at t1. Importantly, this has the following consequences in the 
global population of particles: 
 
- There will be two blue hosts, and only one red host; 
- Four microorganisms will bear the black trait, and one individual will bear 
the white trait; 
- There will be five members of the green taxon, three members of the 
yellow taxon, and one member of the grey taxon. 
 
There three effects are consequence of the effects of HGT, and the effects of 
the trait in the survival of the host and are disconnected of the taxa that used to 
bear the trait at t1, as the growth in the members of the yellow taxon suggests. 
My hypothesis is that this model runs for several generations the black trait will 
become stable in every microbiome of the host population, or it will reach a 
situation of equilibrium with the white trait, in case that the latter were 
advantageous in the case that two taxa with the white and the black trait were 
competing in the same host. SoT, thus, can be used to model holobiont 
evolution from a MLS1 perspective, without assuming the necessity of species 
transmission. Everything that is required for holobiont evolution is that the traits 
encoded in the microbiome can be preserved outside the holobiont, and that 
                                                          
156 Importantly, in this scenario, t1 and t2 correspond to reproductive events, i.e. moments 
during the ontogeny of the host when it can reproduce. 
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they increase their presence in the global population of particles as a 
consequence of their effects on the fitness of the host. 
 
 
Figure 28. The holobiont as a unit of selection from a MLS1 perspective, according to the SoT 
account.  
 
3.3. The relevance of phylosymbiosis and community heritability from a 
MLS1 perspective. A brief proposal 
As I discussed extensively in chapter III, section 3.4, what is relevant to 
determine whether there is MLS1 is that the collective has an influence on the 
fitness of the particle types that form the collective since the fitness of the 
collective equals the averge fitness of the particles types that compose it 
(Figure 23). To repeat, whether collectives stand (or do not stand) in 
parent/offpring relations is irrelevant for MLS1. As, in my account, the particle 
types are the different variants of the host and the traits encoded in the 
microbiome, and what is counted is how the traits that the lattest encodes 
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evolve in different host generations, what is traced in MLS1 is how the traits 
encoded by the microbiome increase, and how their increase affects the 
increase in the variant of the host that harbours them. I said before that a 
consequence of the non-nested structure of the biological hierarchy is that the 
host is the focal unit of HCE, as HCE only aims to explain host evolution 
(chapter IV). It is now time to connect my MLS1 through SoT account to some 
of the concepts and research that biologists working under the framework of 
HCE have developed. In this section, I will briefly relate the research on 
phylosymbiosis and community heritability to the MLS1 approach to holobiont 
selection. 
 
 Phylosymbiosis refers to the ‘eco-evolutionary pattern in which 
evolutionary changes in the host associate with ecological changes in the 
microbiota.’ (Brooks et al. 2016: 3). In other words, a phylosymbiotic pattern 
between two (or more) species obtains when the evolutionary patterns of the 
species mirror each other, such that their changes are concordantly related in a 
statistically relevant manner. For the case of the holobiont, a phylosymbiotic 
pattern exists when the sets of species that compose the microbiome of the 
host mirrors the phylogeny of the latter (chapter I, section 3.4.2; Figure 9). So 
stated, phylosymbiosis seems to have little connection with the claim that 
holobionts are units of selection according to MLS1, at least as I have 
interpreted it in terms of the notion of SoT. But this interpretation would be 
different if phylosymbiosis research were reframed functionally, that is, in terms 
of the OTUs, rather than in terms of the taxa. If they did so, then defenders of 
HCE could discover how some microbiomes reproduce their types more, as well 
as how some host species reproduce their variants more than other host 
species, and thus show how holobionts are units of selection from a MLS1 
perspective. Why from a MLS1 perspective and not from a MLS2 perspective? 
Because these functional groups can increase independently of causing the 
formations of holobiont parent/offspring lineages. Each host might produce 
offspring that are not required to acquire the same functional microbiome as 
their parents. The key element for MLS1 evolution is that certain variants of the 
host species increase over time, and that certain variants in the functional 
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microbiome increase over time, due to the existence of holobionts157 (Figure 
28). If phylosymbiosis were studied this way, then it could serve as a proxy for 
MLS1 holobiont selection. 
 
 What about community heritability, H2c? Remember that H2c measures 
how the degree of differences in the genetic makeup of hosts in a population 
determines the structure of their microbiomes, or whole-community phenotype. 
This is sharp contrast with traditional heritability measures h2, which measure 
how hosts with different genetic backgrounds might bear different microbial 
species in their microbiome (chapter I, section 3.4.3; Figure 10). In this vein, 
H2c can represent three possible states: host control of microbiome assembly; 
host susceptibility to microbiome ‘infection’; or a combination of host control and 
host susceptibility. Why and how is this relevant for MLS1? Because it could be 
used to measure the probability that the SoT in the microbiome and/or in the 
hosts would be preserved, even in the abscense of parent/offspring lienages of 
holobionts. Suppose that we have a population of hosts H1, H2, H3, with an 
associated microbiome composition m1, m2, m3, and such that H3 is the genetic 
variant with more control over microbiome composition, and with a higher 
susceptibility to infection, and such that m2, is the variant that increases more 
the survival of the host it associates with. Initially, by assumption, m2, appears 
in H2, but then it can spread in the population of hosts. Assuming that H3 is also 
the variant with higher rate of survival (assuming that the host do not interaction 
with the microbiome), then what is expected from a MLS1 perspective is that H3 
will increase its presence in the population of hosts. But, additionally, H3 will 
tend to create an association with the functional microbiome m2 that, because of 
that, would increase its presence in the population. Notice that the increase of 
both types is not necessarily a consequence of H3-m2 individuals forming 
parent-offspring lineages. On the contrary, what is expected to happen is that 
the benefit of each ‘type’ will spread across the population, and the two fitter 
types will fuse with each other in the long term. As, ex hypothesi, H3 is the fitter 
type and the one with higher degree of H2c, natural selection will tend to favour 
the formation of H3-m2 individuals in the long term, other things being equal. If 
this happens, this would be a consequence of the action of MLS1 on holobionts. 
                                                          
157 It is thus a question of causality, and thus selection, rather than mere sorting. 
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If, on the contrary, this does not happen, then holobiont selection is not 
occurring or it is too weak in relation to selection at lower levels.158 
 
In conclusion, both phylosymbiosis and H2c can be conceptualized as 
proxies for detecting selection on holobionts of MLS1 type, and thus they 
become two relevant concepts to argue that holobionts are units of selection. 
 
4. The holobiont as a unit of selection from a MLS2 perspective: some 
suggestions 
 
So far, I have argued that holobiont evolution can be explained in terms of 
MLS1 by appealing to the concept of SoT as a way of developing the concept of 
the holobiont that I introduced in chapter IV. However, a question now arises: is 
it also possible to apply MLS2 by appealing to the functional definition of 
holobionts that I put forward? In other words, is there a way of finding a 
consistent pattern of parent/offspring regression among functional holobionts to 
argue that holobionts can be units of selection from a MLS2 perspective? And, if 
so, how would this pattern look like? In this section, I will suggest that there are 
some mechanisms that could account for the existence of parent/offspring 
regression among holobionts conceived as functional units, i.e. conceived as 
units formed by a host plus the traits endoded in its microbiome, rather than by 
a collection of genomes. In that vein, it is coherent to think that at least some 
holobionts can be units of selection from a MLS2 perspective. Or, in other 
words, I will argue that there are reasons to think that it is plausible to find some 
biological mechanisms that guarantee that parent-holobiont/offspring-holobiont 
functional similarity is higher than the functional similarity between random 
holobionts in the same population (Figure 29).  
 
                                                          
158 Of course, my account here assumes that host-microbiome relations are linear, and different 
effects might arise if, in fact, there is some non-linearity going on. As my case was only to 
illustrate a conceptual possibility, rather than to develop a mathematical model that takes these 
complexities into account, I will not consider these cases here. Thanks to Caglar Karaça for 
making this point to me. 
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Figure 29. The holobiont as a unit of selection from a MLS2 perspective, according to the SoT 
account. 
 
These mechanisms constitute a form of extended inheritance, i.e. they are non-
Mendelian mechanisms through which inheritance can be channelled leading to 
parent/offspring regression (Jablonka and Lamb 2005, for the concept of 
‘extended inheritance’). It goes without saying that these mechanisms do not 
necessarily guarantee the same degree of parent/offspring similarity as 
conventional Mendelian mechanisms. But notice that this is not problematic, for 
as I argued in chapter III, the first inheritance mechanisms must have been 
very unrealiable. Furthermore, epistemologically, the process view (plus the 
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non-nested nature of the hierarchy) suggests that the discovery of inheritance 
mechanisms is always posterior to the discovery of the patterns of similarity. It 
is now time to see how the patterns of similarity that are observed in natural 
populations, and that I reviewed in chapter IV, could be transgenerationally 
realized through parent/offspring lineages. To do so, I will first review the 
evidence that I consider relevant to make my case, and I will later introduce a 
conceptual argument that makes use of that evidence to support the 
consideration of holobionts as units of selection from a MLS2 perspective. 
 
4.1. Hosts as ‘niche constructors’, the role of the host in the acquisition of 
the microbiome, and the role of the microbiome as ‘hot spots’ for 
horizontal gene transfer 
The type of evidence I review in this section has not been so far related in any 
consistent manner to the possibility of MLS2 selection among holobionts. I will 
only introduce it here as a basis to support the conceptual framework for MLS2 
selection among holobionts that I will introduce in the next section. Notice that 
the argument I will introduce will be about the conceptual possibility of 
holobionts being units of selection in virtue of the existence of some biological 
mechanisms that could guarantee a certain degree of transgenerational 
preservation, i.e. in virtue of the existence of some mechanisms that support the 
existence of host-functional microbiome parent/offspring regression. It will 
therefore be conceptual, and it should be taken as a suggestion about what 
biologists should look for to investigate the degree of parent/offspring similarity 
among holobionts. 
 
 The first mechanism I will mention is the role of hosts as niche 
constructors (Oddling-Smee et al. 2003; Laland et al. 2016). Concretely, about 
the role that hosts play in spreading their microbiome in their environment. The 
holobiont is known to be an ‘open system’, where microorganisms can enter 
and leave. In a very interesting paper entitled ‘Transmission of the gut 
microbiome: spreading of health’ (see also the references in there), Browne et 
al. (2017) suggest the existence of several mechanisms that guarantee the 
survival of different elements of the micobiome outside their hosts. These 
microorganisms can use different reservoirs, and can be in a sort of ‘latent’ 
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state until they can find a new host to infect. Interestingly, hosts that live longer 
will have more opportunities of spreading their ‘health’ to the environment, and 
thus the density of the microbes that increase their fitness could increase. 
Notice that the increase in the microbial density does not need to be an 
increase in the density of the microbial species, but an increase in the microbes 
that bear the appropriate types of traits, i.e. those that have been selected due 
to their effects in the fitness of the host (MLS1). 
 
 Second, and not less important for the way in which this phenomenon 
can be related to the former as a mechanism that supports the existence of 
MLS2 among holobionts, some current evidence suggests that the host is 
partially in control of the acquisition of its microbiome (again, H2c). For instance, 
Goodrich et al. (2014, 2016a) and Turpin et al (2016) have recently discovered 
that the acquisition of the microbiota might be sometimes regulated by the 
influence of the genetics of the host, so that part of the variation in microbiome 
composition might be dictated by genetic factors. Second, the immunological 
system of the host has been hypothesized, and empirically proven, as being 
one of the main sources that shapes the microbiome of the holobiont, i.e. the 
immune system plays a basic role in regulating the microorganisms that will be 
part of the host’s microbiota, as well as those that will be excluded (Rakoff-
Nahoum et al. 2004; Cullen et al. 2015). 
 
Finally, as I already explained in section 3.2, some recent empirical data 
demonstrates the existence of a high level of functional redundancy (or 
‘degeneracy’) in the microbiome (Boon et al. 2014; Vieira-Silva et al 2016), 
which suggests that a holobiont with the same traits might be biologically 
possible without any single species of the original microbiome reappearing in 
the next generation. In addition, our current evidence also indicates that the 
level of HGT among microorganisms is higher between those microorganisms 
that compose a host’s microbiome, than between free-living microorganisms 
(Liu et al. 2012; Lerner et al. 2017). HGT is well known for being the main 
mechanism of genetic exchange among bacteria, being one of the main 
mechanisms involved in bacterial adaptation and acquisition of new functional 
capabilities. Thus, if one species spends a longer time in a host’s microbiota, 
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the likelihood that it will acquire the functional factors responsible for the 
reconstruction of the traits of the holobiont will in principle increase. This would 
reinforce the existence of a functional redundancy in the microbiome as well as 
decrease the necessity of the host association to concrete bacterial species to 
acquire the traits that are being selected for, and this could even increase 
exponientally, if the effects of HGT are noticeable.  
 
4.2. On the possibility of holobiont lineages. A conceptual suggestion for 
MLS2 selection among holobionts 
Based on the previous evidence, I will now argue that there are modes of 
‘extended inheritance’ that guarantee that the probability that the offspring of a 
holobiont that bears the traits that have been selected for in its population P 
also bears those traits is higher than the probability that a random member of P 
bears those traits, other things being equal.159 The argument I will present here 
does not aim to be exhaustive. I will only suggest there are reasons to think that 
these mechanisms can lead to a situation in which holobionts are units of 
selection from a MLS2 perspective, and that thus this possibility should not be 
discarded a priori. In addition to that, the argument only aims to show how SoT 
would account for the role of holobionts as units of selection from a MLS2 
perspective, and how it is different from other conventional approaches to 
holobiont evolution that require genotype-to-genotype transmission, including 
the work by Doolittle and Booth (2017), and by Roughgarden et al. (2017).160 
                                                          
159 Notice that, in agreement with the holobiont account presented in chapter IV, holobiont 
populations are identified as host populations since, as I argued there, the proper trajectory of 
evolution of hosts is qua holobionts. Furthermore, the problem will be how to discover that the 
transmission of the functional microbiome acroos host generations is reliable enough, so that 
the same ‘functional holobionts’ are transgenerationally formed. Thus, the discussion will be 
about the mechanisms of microbiome transmission, and I will take for granted that the 
mechanisms of host transmission are well known (Mendelian inheritance). 
160 Roughgarden et al. (2017), Lloyd (2017b), and Lloyd and Wade (2019)’s models of holobiont 
evolution are, in reality, MLS1 models, as they are grounded on Drawn et al. (2013) and Drawn 
and Wade (2014). But they assume that SoS holds (or can hold), and do not make the 
conceptual distinction between traits and species (and, consequently, between cospeciation 
and coevolution) that I advocate here, and thus they have still failed to make the step forward to 
characterize holobiont evolution in terms of MLS2 (see also Suárez 2018c). In addition to that, 
their models aim to explain, among other things, how different types of microbiome transmission 
could evolve, so that the transition from horizontal to vertical transmission becomes expectable, 
for example. Notice that none of this is required in my model, as I presuppose that traits will 
travel faster than the species that bear them, and thus the evolution of species-transmission 
modes might be highly irrelevant for holobiont evolution, and might be indeed not expected in 
many cases (namely, those where the trait can be disconnected from the bacterial genome 
more easily than vertical modes of transmission can evolve) (check later in this section). Thanks 
to the fantastic feedback I have received from Lisa Lloyd, Seth Bordenstein, Ehud Lamm, Ford 
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The argument will thus be grounded on a functional conception of the holobiont, 
i.e. it will be grounded on a view of the holobiont according to which the 
microbiome composition is functionally determined, and thus what becomes 
relevant is how SoT is transgenerationally preserved from parent-holobiont to 
offspring-holobiont. 
 
The recruitment of the microbiome across different generations of the 
holobiont to guarantee SoT might take several forms. On the one hand, it can 
occur through direct transmission, as in cases of vertical transmission or 
transmission during birth (in mammals); on the other hand, the recruitment 
might occur through environmental acquisition, especially through parental 
feeding, daily contact with the family members, social interaction with other 
members of the group, or diet (Figure 30). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Doolittle, and Pierrick Bourrat, who very recently helped me see the key difference between our 
models, and to illuminate how the SoT model, properly characterized, was an original model 
that went somehow beyond theirs. 
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Increases the 
probability of 
transgenerational 
SoT 
 
Increases the 
probability of 
transgenerational 
SoS 
 
DIRECT 
TRANSMISSION 
Vertical parent-
offspring 
transmission 
YES YES 
Transmission at 
birth (birth channel) 
YES SOMETIMES 
 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACQUISITION 
Parental feeding 
(coprophagy, 
breast milk) 
YES NO 
Daily contact YES NO 
Social interaction YES, UNDER 
CERTAIN 
CONDITIONS* 
NO 
Diet NO 
 
Figure 30. Possible scenarios under which SoT would lead to a higher parent-offspring 
similarity with respect to a trait Ta than the similarity of the offspring to an average member of 
the population for the same trait, and comparison with SoS. See text for the discussion of the 
cases of social interaction and diet. 
 
The cases of direct transmission pose no problem to explain the routes how 
traits might get transgenerationally transmitted, as in most cases that 
transmission would occur simply by species transmission (thus, also satisfying 
SoS). For instance, in the species where there is a certain form of vertical 
transmission across host generations, like the cases of the organelles in 
eukaryotic cells, B. aphidicola among aphids, Wolbachia among flies, etc., 
vertical transmission constitutes the main source of recruitment of the 
components of the microbiome that guarantee trait-recurrence. Second, many 
of those elements will be transmitted either during birth, or through the vaginal 
channel (Funkhouser and Bordenstein 2013; Bäckhed et al. 2015; Chu et al. 
2017). In these two cases, especially in the case of vertical transmission, it is 
likely that the same species will be transgenerationally acquired, thus both SoS 
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and SoT would be satisfied. However, notice that even if in any of these cases 
SoS were not satisfied, the possibility that SoT is satisfied would be higher, and 
thus the probability of parent/offspring regression would be higher. How? 
Because the high degree of functional redundancy in the microbiome, together 
with the abundance of HGT, would increase the probability that the same 
functional microbiome will be passed on, despite not passing on the same 
taxonomic microbiome. As what needs to be reconstructed transgenerationally 
in MLS2 is the functional holobiont, functional redundancy and HGT will be 
enough to guarantee that, through direct contact, the same functional 
microbiome will be passed on to the offspring with enough fidelity.  
 
The cases of environmental acquisition present their own problems, 
though, because our current evidence suggests that microbiome species 
composition is transgenerationally disrupted (thus, SoS is not satisfied). 
However, as in the case of direct transmission, our current evidence also 
suggests that the traits might be transgenerational-ly preserved. The risk of 
horizontal acquisition, however, is that it might disrupt parent/offspring 
regression, and thus it could disrupt MLS2 selection. That is to say, that the 
‘benefits’ of a ‘fitter’ functional microbiome could be shared among all the 
members of P, and not only between the offpring of the fitter holobiont.161 Even 
while this is true, I will argue that our current evidence can be interpreted 
suggesting that the similarity of traits is in most cases higher between holobiont 
parent/offspring generations than it is with any other random member of the 
population, thus allowing a MLS2 interpretation. Let us see how. 
 
Environmental acquisition comes in a spectrum that involves many 
different forms of microbe acquisition: firstly, direct acquisition of the microbiota 
from the mother through feeding, as it happens in case of coprophagy, a 
standard phenomenon of microbiome acquisition among many animals (koala-
bears, rabbits, elephants, hippos, iguanas, etc.; see e.g. Osawa et al. (1993); 
Kovacks et al. (2006)), or in the case of brest feeding (Funkhouser and 
Bordenstein 2013). Secondly, by direct daily contact (e.g. acquisition of the 
                                                          
161 Remember that MLS2 selection requires the existence of collective parent/offspring lineages, 
that is, the existence of a form of inheritance. 
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microbiome as a consequence of the relationship with close members of the 
family; see e.g. Song et al. (2013); Nayfach et al. (2016)). Thirdly, through 
social interaction with other members of the population (see e.g. Tung et al. 
(2015); Moeller et al. (2016)). Fourthly, through diet (see e.g. Leff and Fierer 
(2013); Lang et al. (2014)). Drawing on the mehcanisms I mentioned in section 
4.1, I will now suggest that MLS2 selection is possible, and plausible, if what is 
required is transgenerational host-functional microbiome matching through 
SoT.162 The argument I introduce here is more powerful for the situations of 
parental feeding and daily contacts with the family members, where the 
likelihood that the hosts acquire microbial components that lead to the 
acquisition of the same traits as their parents is increased for the duration of the 
contact. However, it also works in the situations where the microbial 
composition is driven by diet or by social interaction with other members of the 
population. 
 
Let us imagine a situation where, by random acquisition of certain 
microbial members of the environment (M1, M2), a holobiont X in a population P 
acquired a trait Ta that increases its fitness with respect to the fitness of other 
members of P. As Ta increases the fitness of X, it will be expected that: (1) X 
survives longer than an average member of P; and (2) X produces more 
offspring than an average member of P.163 As a consequence of (1), it is 
expected that the relative population of M1 and M2 in the bacterial pool will 
increase, due to the possibility of reproducing within X and getting transferred to 
the environment through X’s depositions; second, it is expected that M1 and M2 
will engage in more relations of HGT with other members of X’s microbiome 
than the average member of M1 and M2 living non-symbiotically. Therefore, it is 
expected that the relative numbers of M1 and M2 in the environmental bacterial 
pool increases and that new members of the bacterial pool (M3, M4) will acquire, 
                                                          
162 Notice that, in contrast with e.g. Rosenberg and Zilber-Rosenberg (2016, 2018), the account 
I will present here depends on a functional (SoT), and not a structural (SoS) conception of the 
holobiont. 
163 I am conscious that an immediate objection would be that natural selection does not predict 
what could happen to a particular individual, but what would happen to the trait distributions in a 
population, provided that there’s heritable variance in fitness (e.g. Sober and Lewontin 1982; 
Sober 1984). However, the problem with holobionts is that we would need to prove, first, that 
there’s inheritance. In other words, we need to prove first that the mechanisms aforementioned 
lead to parent/offspring regression. So, the argument is just an idealization to prove that this 
could be so, regarding our current evidence. 
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through HGT, the trait Ta, and thus the capacity of transmitting Ta to other 
holobionts in P as an effect of niche construction. If this is so, then the 
probability of Ta reappearing in future generations of holobionts in P, provided 
that new hosts can acquire the microorganisms that bear Ta, will increase and, 
what’s more important, will increase as a consequence of Ta being naturally 
selected for in the holobiont, rather than in any of the M1-M4 microorganisms 
that bear the trait. 
 
However, this situation will increase the probability of Ta reappearing for 
any member of P, not necessarily for X’s offspring and, therefore, as I argued in 
section 3.2, it would be a case of MLS1. Is there a possibility of making this a 
case for MLS2? Or, in other words, is there some mechanism to guarantee that 
the benefits of Ta are not shared among all the members P, but restricted to the 
host/holobiont lineage? I think that there are reasons to believe that this might 
be so. Let me mention three mechanisms and how these could determine the 
existence of MLS2, despite the environmental acquisition of the microbiome. 
 
1. Influence of the host genetics in the acquisition of the functional 
microbiome. If this is the case, it will be expected that the offspring of 
X—as it is genetically related to X—will probably acquire M1 and M2, 
or any of its functional equivalent variants, more easily than any 
random member of P. 
2. Influence of the host immunological properties in the acquisition of the 
functional microbiome. If this is the case, it will be expected that the 
offspring of X, as it will probably have similar immunological features 
to X—due to the genetic relationship between the hosts—will probably 
acquire M1 and M2 more easily than any random member of P. 
3. Host contact with an environment where M1 and M2, or any of their 
functional equivalent variants are present. If this is the case, the 
expectation for the offspring of X to be more likely to acquire M1 and 
M2 will depend on the breeding conditions of the host that composes 
X. 
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3.a. If the host nurtures and raises its offspring for a long time, the 
probability of its offspring acquiring M1, M2 or any other element of 
its microbiome that causally brings about Ta will be greater than 
the probability of any random member of P. 
3.b. Otherwise, the probability of X’s offspring acquiring Ta to be 
similar to the probability of any random member of P, and thus 
MLS2 selection will be hampered.  
 
The argument presented here is purely conceptual and merely illustrative of 
how some currently known biological mechanisms could lead to MLS2 among 
holobionts. However, these types of conceptual framework have some clear 
limitations, as under a closer mathematical scrutiny they might prove mistaken. 
And, furthermore, even these mathematical models would need a close 
empirical scrutiny, because what might seem caonceptually and/or 
mathematically plausible, might be biologically impossible.  
 
For now, the only population biologists who, to my knowledge, have tried 
to model a similar scenario have been Devin M. Drawn and Michael J. Wade 
(Drawn et al. 2013; Drawn and Wade 2014).164 In Drawn et al. (2013), the 
authors analysed how a case of an obligate symbiont that is horizontally 
acquired can evolve into a case of vertical transmission and concluded that 
epistasis for fitness between host and fitness genes was a precondition for this 
to happen. A limitation of their model, though, was that it did not include the 
possibility of HGT guaranteeing that the epistasis could be transgenerationally 
maintained despite the lack of vertical transmission. Or, in other words, they did 
not consider a possible scenario in which the existence of an epistasis between 
symbiont genes and host genes could lead to the HGT of the symbiont genes to 
other symbionts of different taxa, so that the epistatic relationship would be 
                                                          
164 Since I wrote this section, a new paper has appeared that modelled the same scenario, 
Lloyd and Wade (2019). Interestingly, their paper put the emphasis on what I have been putting 
the emphasis all this chapter, namely, that what matters to decide whether holobionts are units 
of selection is not species coevolution, but coevolution of traits. They do not use, however the 
evidence that I use here to argue that coevolution of traits can be disconnected from 
coevolution of species for the taxa that compose the host microbiome. In fact, their examples 
presuppose that the species are transgenerationally preserved, which I think is arguably 
sufficient for holobiont evolution, but it is definitely not necessary. 
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transgenerationally maintained despite the lack of the vertical transmission of 
the different taxa—that is to say, their research depended on the assumption of 
SoS.165 In Drawn and Wade (2014), they proved that the genes adapting to a 
biotic heritable environment (such as the case of epistasis) can make the 
selection process self-accelerating. In other words, they prove that selection on 
one gene that stays in epistatic relationships with a set of genes in its 
environment—i.e. genes to which the first one is not physically bounded in the 
same genome—leads to an increase in the genetic environment where the 
gene is selected for. If their model were applicable the case of hosts and their 
functional microbiomes, it could show that, indeed, the possible generation of 
extra-genomic regulatory networks can lead to MLS2 selection among 
holobionts, as selection for some hosts would lead to selection for the functional 
microbiomes where these hosts are favoured.166 
 
On the empirical side, experiments do not yet exist, since, to my 
knowledge, no experiment has been able to demonstrate the existence of MLS2 
for certain functional microbiomes associated to a host. Nonetheless, as it 
happens in biology in general, if some cases of this were discovered, their value 
would be discretional. That is to say, the discoveries would be valid for the 
focus organisms that biologists are studying, but nothing would guarantee that 
they will necessarily apply to any other organism. In any case, the evidence of 
‘extended inheritance’ mechanisms I have reviewed here should serve to 
suggest that holobiont selection could be glossed in MLS2 terms for some 
organisms, and that this possibility should not be excluded simpy a priori. 
 
                                                          
165 I have been asked a few times, when I introduce HGT, how HGT can guarantee that the 
symbiont is transferred to the right host, so that it is possible to detect parent-offspring lineages, 
and thus MLS2. The key, of course, is that if ‘the right symbiont’ means the right taxa, then HGT 
does not guarantee it. But notice that the SoT model requires that any of the taxa that bears the 
trait is transferred to the right host. In this case, it becomes quite evident why HGT plays a key 
role in guaranteeing that this is so. 
166 Notice that their model, if extended to host-microbiome interactions, could be used to 
conceptualize Burcker and Bordenstein´s experiment on the Nasonia wasps. See chapter 1, 
section 3.4.4. 
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5. Differences between the stability of traits account and Doolittle and 
Booth’s ‘song not singer’ model 
 
To date, the only account of the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection in 
functional terms has been presented by Ford Doolittle and his collaborators, in 
three different papers: Doolittle (2017), Doolittle and Booth (2017), and Doolittle 
and Inkpen (2018). Doolittle’s account is presented under the explicit mission of 
not ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater’ (Doolittle and Booth 2017: 10), 
i.e. to save what is conceptually valuable in HCE, while getting rid of the main 
postulates of the hypothesis. In their view, the holobiont is the biological entity 
that performs a set of biological processes, including metabolic, 
immunologically, or developmental processes, among others, in virtue of the 
existence of networks of functional genes whose interactions cause these 
processes. These processes have a high degree of transgenerational stability 
and can result from the interaction of different lineages (or taxa) of bacterial 
species, provided that the lineages that interact transgenerationally can carry 
out the same biological function as their predecessors—or, in other words, 
provided that the interacting taxa bring the same functional genes, thus giving 
rise to the creation of the same networks (chapter I, section 5; Figure 13). I 
think Doolittle’s account of the holobiont captures part of the intuition that is 
behind the proposal of HCE. However, I suspect his proposal does, in fact, 
through out the baby with the bathwater. Let me explain why.  
 
 As I argued several times, HCE was a proposed as a hypothesis to 
explain why hosts, or macrobes, bear certain phenotypic traits whose 
maintainance was unexplainable if it had to be accounted for solely in terms of 
the genetics of the host. This evidence included the ability of corals to get rid of 
the infection caused by V. shiloi, the mating preferences in D. melanogaster, the 
hybrid incompatibility in Nasonia wasps, etc. Each of these phenomena 
constitutes an evolved host phenotype that results, allegedly, from the 
interaction between the host and its functional microbiome. I introduced the 
hypothesis of the non-nested nature of the biological hierarchy with the aim of 
explaining each of these cases. Doolittle’s song/singer account, on the contrary, 
loses track of the significance of each of these evolved states for the host, 
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because in his view, what matters are the ‘songs’, or patterns of interaction that 
somehow ‘emerge’, rather than their ‘singers’. That is to say, what matters is 
how certain genetic networks are formed so that some patterns of interaction 
(metabolic, structural, developmental) obtain, no matter the lineages where they 
obtain. But, obviously, if the lineages do not matter at all, then the host lineage 
does not matter at all either. The only thing that is relevant and should be 
studied is, say, the metabolic pattern, the developmental pattern, the structural 
pattern, etc. And each of these patterns will obviously be multiply realizable in 
many different types of hosts. In other words, the host where the pattern of 
interaction obtains is as irrelevant as each of the bacterial species is.167  
 
I recognise that, seen in this in this way, Doolittle’s account has some 
merit. Of course, there is a scientifically legitimate question about how certain 
patterns of interaction evolve. However, the account is also problematic. First, it 
is not clear what these patterns might be, or how they could be individualized. 
He mentions general patterns such as homeostatic processes and 
biogeochemical cycles, and even goes on to extend his idea to Gaia (Doolittle 
2018). I think in doing so Dollittle is substituting an obscure concept (HCE, 
when the hypothesis is conceptualized as asserting that the whole set of 
species of the microbiome gets transmitted) for one that is even more obscure. 
Interaction patterns, as an abtract concept that is not linked to a particular 
recurrent structure, are impossible to detect, since we lack every kind of 
diagnostic criteria for identifying them.168 Second, but related, I cannot see in 
any way how Doolittle’s account could avoid ‘throwing out the baby’, to use his 
expression. What would be the exact role of the host species in his story? If the 
aim is to explain the evolution of some patterns regardless of the lineages that 
create them, then no feature of the host lineage could be explained. It seems to 
me that this is really throwing out the baby, as this is, in my opinion, the key 
discovery of HCE, namely, that the microorganisms that interact with a host 
                                                          
167 A very recent and long discussion both by email and in ISHPSSB in Oslo with Ehud Lamm 
made me realize that the key distinction between SoT and Doolittle’s account can be fleshed out 
by saying that my account of the holobiont assumes that the holobiont includes the host singer 
plus the songs that are sung in the microbiome. I think that analogy is really good to capture my 
intituion, and I would really like to thank Ehud for suggesting it to me. Furthermore, I would also 
like to thank Ford Doolittle for his generosity, as he has also dedicated some time to discuss my 
ideas and the differences between our accounts in ISHPSSB. 
168 As I explained before, a diagnostic criterion is a basic identification method of the form ‘the 
entity whch is in <x, y> at time t’.  
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have more influence on its evolution than a random non-biotic environmental 
factor. Discovering how this influence actually occurs is the key to HCE, and it 
would be the right way of ‘elucidating’ the meaning of the hypothesis. The 
song/singer account, unfortunately, is far from doing so.  
 
Finally, there is another substantial problem with Doolittle’s account, 
which I anticipated in chapter I, section 5.1. The song/singer model seems to 
me completely based on Dawkins/Hull’s interactor/replicator model of the units 
of selection. In fact, Doolittle explicitly recognizes that his is an account of how 
holobionts could be interactors in virtue of certain sets of regulatory genetic 
networks being their replicators. At this point, it must be clear to the reader why 
the interactor/replicator framework is inadequate to capture the essence of the 
units of selection debate, so I will not repeat the arguments here (chapter III, 
section 3.3). In any case, his account has one virtue. If, indeed, if it’s true that 
these regulatory networks exist and work as replicators, then it would be a 
strong proof to support the claim that holobionts have been units of selection. 
Nonetheless, as I argued, a MLS framework would be preferable, since it would 
allow us to disentangle the properties that the units that we call holobiont have, 
both as partially ‘cohesive units’ (MLS1), and as units that can get their 
properties ‘reproduced’ transgenerationally (MLS2). Assuming, on the contrary, 
that we should only focus on highly evolved states commits the mistake of 
forgetting about the diachronic dimension of the units of selection debate. 
 
6. Brief summary of chapter V: The holobiont is a unit of selection 
 
In this chapter, I have articulated my account of the role of the holobiont as a 
unit of selection, which was my way of ‘uploading’ HCE, so that it scores the 
empirical evidence. To do so, I have departed from the non-nested nature of the 
biological hierarchy and argued that it could be applied to holobionts via a MLS 
approach. After that, I have argued why the criticism to HCE based on the 
notion of SoS does not work. First, I have argued that it reduces discussions 
about holobiont evolution to discussion about the replicator. Second, I have 
argued that reducing the debate about the units of selection that way is 
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illegitimate, as it puts the cart before the horses. Therefore, I have argued, SoS 
must not be the condition that holobionts need to satify to be considered units of 
selection from a MLS approach. Drawing upon my criticism of SoS, I have 
elaborated a MLS1 account of holobiont evolution where, I argued, the ‘particle 
types’ that get multiplied and that increase their presence in future generations 
are either host variants, or the traits that are encoded by the microbiome. By 
contrast with SoS, I called my approach SoT, for in my account what needs to 
be counted is how traits increase their presence, rather than how microbial 
species increase their frequency. Secondly, I have presented some notes to 
suggest how a MLS2 approach would look, and I have contrasted MLS1 and 
MLS2, to show what the difference between the twe approaches is. Finally, I 
have distinguished between my account and Doolittle and Booth’s ‘it’s the song, 
not the singer’ account.  
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Global Summary 
 
‘The holobiont as a unit of selection. A non-nested 
metaphysics for the biological hierarchy’ 
 
 
 
1. General reflection and concluding remarks 
 
This thesis was about the hologenome concept of evolution. I started making 
clear that HCE was the project of understanding the features that made 
holobionts biological individuals, and units of selection. Was there a possible 
argument to support the claim that the symbiotic assemblages composed by a 
macrobe (host) and a collection of microbes (symbionts) are biological 
individuals in a significant sense? That is, was there a way of fleshing out the 
biological properties of that specific type of communities, apart from the very 
basic ‘diagnostic criteria’? And, if so, would this entail a change in some of the 
basic metaphysical commitments generally assumed by evolutionary biologists 
and philosophers of biology? The response to these questions has been driven 
by a sort of ‘processual’ view of the biological world—widely inspired by the 
recent work of John Dupré and the rest of the members of his ERC project: ‘A 
process ontology for contemporary biology’—which has been combined with a 
particular view of the topic of scientific explanation—as this has been developed 
in my research group in Barcelona, under the financial support of the MINECO 
project: ‘Laws, explanation, and realism in the physical and biomedical 
sicences’. More importantly, these two views have been embedded within the 
wider framework of John Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’, the view that scientific 
classification is always done by scientists (human beings) in a goal-oriented 
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fashion, and those classifications that are chosen are the ones that serve the 
purposes of the scientists—in Spanish, promiscuous realism could be 
presented by summarizing it under the (in)famous motto: ‘vale quien [lo que] 
sirve’.169  
 
With this framework in mind, the project has achieved a double goal. 
First, it has diagnosed the ontological committments that underlay the rejection 
of HCE. At this stage I want to make a point clear. I have never said—and 
would never dare to do so—that those scientists that rejected HCE were not 
doing science, or were not doing it properly, or rigurously. I indeed think they 
were making fair points and criticisms to some ways of understanding HCE that 
were empirically questionable. They were behaving as scientists behave, and 
how scientists deal with scientific controversies. Given a scientific controversy, 
what does the empirical evidence say? But, importantly, I applied the same 
charity principle to those scientists defending HCE. What is there of value in the 
scientific evidence that they have been collecting? How is it best to represent it? 
However, the thesis is a philosophy thesis; that is, it has a philosophical nature. 
Thus, my purpose was neither limited to certify that there was a disagreement—
that is rather obvious—nor to scour the evidence to see which of the sides in 
the controversy was, so to speak, ‘winning’. That would have been a valuable 
goal but, in my view, not a philosophical goal. My purpose was rather to 
investigate which were the metaphysical (conceptual) assumptions that 
underlay the disagreement. It is now a good moment to restate Samir Okasha’s 
advice, that I used as a guide to open my doctoral project. 
 
‘Obviously, empirical data is crucial for resolving the levels-of-selection 
question, as for all scientific questions; but conceptual clarity is a 
prerequisite too. Unless we can agree on what it means for there to be 
selection at a given hierarchical level, on what the criteria for individuating 
“levels” are, on whether selection at one level can ever be “reduced” to 
selection at another, on how multi-level selection should be modelled, and 
                                                          
169 ‘Purposes’ should not be understood in a phychological or sociological way. According to 
Dupré, the classifications are choosen if they serve the epistemological purposes of the 
scientists, that is, if they achieve the epistemic goals that the scientist aims to achive (tracing 
phylogenies, discriminating flavours, etc.). 
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on whether there is always “one true fact” about the level(s) at which 
selection is acting, then there is little prospect of empirical resolution, 
however much data we collect. Focusing on conceptual questions such as 
these is not meant to downplay the significance of empirical data, but rather 
to help provide the clarification needed for addressing the issues 
empirically.’ (2006: 2) 
 
The whole project has been inspired by that dictum plus a key idea about the 
nature of philosophical inquiry that I learnt during my B.A. degree at University 
of Oviedo, namely, that every view on a concrete scientific matter will 
necessarily be embedded in a metaphysical framework, in a particular way of 
seeing the ‘deep structure’ of the world, even when this is (most times) not 
explicit. In this thesis, I claimed to have found one of these commitments in the 
current debate about the status of the holobiont as a unit of selection. The 
guiding commitment that both sides followed was a commitment to the nested 
nature of the biological hierarchy, followed by a commitment to a view of the 
process of natural selection that depended on nestedness. That commitment 
grounded why both defenders and detractors of HCE were assuming that a very 
strict condition about species co-transmission needed to be established to 
prove HCE. The thesis has shown that this is a metaphysical commitment, and 
that precisely some of the evidence gathered by HCE defenders supported a 
different version of HCE than the one they assumed. Namely, it supported a 
version of HCE in which the host and its functional microbiome coevolve, rather 
than one in which the host and its microbiome cospeciate. In other words, what 
coevolves is the family of functional traits that the holobiont expresses, and that 
could have their origin either in the host genome, or in its microbiome. 
Recognizing that this is so, while at the same time accepting the existence of a 
biological hierarchy, plus the requirement of studying each level of the hierarchy 
according to the processes that entities at that level engage in, lead me to 
propose the non-nested nature of the biological hierarchy. 
 
 Secondly, I have explored the consequences of a non-nested hierarchy 
to the debate about the units of selection and have provided a multilevel 
selection account of the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection. I have 
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argued that the empirical evidence strongly supports the claim that holobionts 
are units of selection from a multilevel selection 1 perspective, provided the 
microbiome is adequately individuated (i.e. functionally, not taxonomically). 
Also, I have suggested a possible framework to conceive holobionts as units of 
selection from a multilevel selection 2 perspective. The latter framework, 
however, still needs more development, so I have only been able to sketch the 
main ideas, to argue what biologists should look for if they want to prove the 
existence of a form of extended inheritance among holobionts.  
 
 To conclude, my doctoral project has served four key purposes. First, to 
uncover a ‘hidden’ metaphysical assumption that could mask what could be 
worth developing in HCE. Second, to propose an alternative framework to save 
what was valuable from HCE without renouncing to what is also valuable from 
alternative perspectives. Third, to propose an alternative framework to concive 
the role of the holobiont as a unit of selection. Fourth, to prove the usefulness of 
philosophical reflection in enriching and making clearer some current scientific 
debates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
• Adair KL & AE Douglas (2017) Making a microbiome: the many determinants 
of host-associated microbial community composition. Curr opin microbiol 35: 
23-29. 
• Ariew A & RC Lewontin (2004) The confusions of fitness. Br J Philos Sci 55: 
347-363. 
• Bäckhed F, J Roswall, et al. (2015) Dynamics and stabilization of the human 
gut microbiome during the first year of life. Cell Host Microbe 17: 690–703.  
• Bapteste E & J Dupré (2013) Towards a processual microbial ontology. Bio 
Philos 28 (2): 379-404. 
• Bapteste E, MA O’Malley, et al. (2009) Prokaryotic evolution and the tree of 
life are two different things. Biol Direct 4: 34. 
• Bennett GM & NA Moran (2015) Heritable symbiosis: the advantages and 
perils of an evolutionary rabbit hole. PNAS USA 112: 10169-10176.  
• Birch J (2012) The negative view of natural selection. Stud Hist Philos Sci C 
43(2): 569-573. 
• Blow F, A Gioti, et al. (2019) Functional genomics of a symbiotic community: 
shared traits in the olive fruit fly gut microbiota. Cold Spring Harbor 
Laboratory. https://doi.org/10.1101/590489.   
• Boon E, CJ Meehan, et al. (2014) Interactions in the microbiome: 
communities of organisms and communities of genes. FEMS Microbiol Rev 
38: 90–118.  
• Booth A (2014) Symbiosis, selection and individuality. Bio Philos 29: 657-
673.  
• Bordenstein SR & KR Theis (2015) Host biology in light of the microbiome: 
ten principles of holobionts and hologenomes. PLoSBiol 13.8: e1002226. 
246 
 
• Bouchard F (2018) Symbiosis, Transient Biological Individuality, and 
Evolutionary. In Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of 
Biology. D Nicholson & J Dupré (eds.). Oxford University Press. 
• Bourrat P & PE Griffiths (2018) Multispecies individuals. Hist Phil life sci 40 
(2): 33. 
• Brandon R (1982) The levels of selection. PSA: Proceedings of the biennial 
meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1(1): 315-323. 
• Brandon R (1985) Adaptation Explanations: Are Adaptations for the Good of 
Replicators or Interactors? In Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology 
and the New Philosophy of Science. David J. Depew & Bruce H. Weber 
(eds.). The MIT Press. 
• Brandon R (1988) The levels of selection: A hierarchy of interactors. In The 
Role of Behaviour in Evolution. HC Plotkin (ed.). The MIT Press. 
• Brandon R & G Ramsey (2006). What’s wrong with the emergentist statistical 
interpretation of natural selection and random drift. In The Cambridge 
companion to philosophy of biology. M Ruse & D Hull (eds.). Cambridge 
University Press. 
• Bright M & S Bulgheresi (2010) A complex journey: transmission of microbial 
symbionts. Nat Rev Microbiol 8: 218–230.  
• Brooks AW, Kohl KD, et al. (2016) Phylosymbiosis: relationships and 
functional effects of microbial communities across host evolutionary 
history. PLoSBiol 14 (11): e2000225. 
• Browne HP, BA Neville, et al. (2017) Transmission of the gut microbiota: 
Spreading of health. Nat Rev Microbiol 15: 531–543. 
• Brucker RM & SR Bordenstein (2012a) Speciation by Symbiosis. Trends Ecol 
Evol 27 (8): 443–451 
• Brucker RM & SR Bordenstein (2012b) The roles of host evolutionary 
relationships (genus: Nasonia) and development in structuring microbial 
communities. Evolution 66 (2): 349-362. 
• Brucker RM & SR Bordenstein (2013a). The capacious 
hologenome. Zoology 116 (5): 260-261. 
• Brucker RM & SR Bordenstein (2013b) The hologenomic basis of speciation: 
gut bacteria cause hybrid lethality in the genus Nasonia. Science: 1240659. 
247 
 
• Brucker R M & SR Bordenstein (2014). Response to Comment on “The 
hologenomic basis of speciation: gut bacteria cause hybrid lethality in the 
genus Nasonia”. Science 345(6200): 1011-1011. 
• Bulgarelli M, R Garrido-Oter, et al. (2015) Structure and Function of the 
Bacterial Root Microbiota in Wild and Domesticated Barley. Cell Host 
Microbe 17(3): 392–403.  
• Burke C, P Steinberg, et al. (2011) Bacterial community assembly based on 
functional genes rather than species. PNAS USA 108 (34): 14288–14293.  
• Buss LW (1987) The Evolution of Individuality. Princeton University Press. 
• Cáceres-Vázquez E & C Saborido (2018) ¿Realmente mató la bacteria al 
coronel? Perspectiva sistémica, causación internivélica e intervalos de cuasi-
descomponibilidad en las explicaciones mecanísticas. Theoria 33 (1): 129-
148. 
• Calcott B & K Sterelny (2011) Major transitions in evolution revisited. The 
MIT Press.  
• Catania F, U Krohs, et al. (2016) The hologenome concept: we need to 
incorporate function. Theory Biosci 136 (3-4): 89-98. 
• Chandler J & M Turelli (2014) Comment on “The hologenomic basis of 
speciation: gut bacteria cause hybrid lethality in the genus Nasonia”. Science 
345(6200): 1011. 
• Charbonneau M (2014) Populations without reproduction. Philos Scie 81 (5): 
727–740. 
• Chiu L & G Eberl (2016) Microorganisms as scaffolds of host individuality: an 
eco-immunity account of the holobiont. Bio Philos 31(6): 819-837. 
• Chu DM, J Ma, et al. (2017) Maturation of the infant microbiome community 
structure and function across multiple body sites and in relation to mode of 
delivery. Nat Med 23(3): 314–326.  
• Clark KA, DK Howe, et al. (2012) Selfish little circles: Transmission bias and 
evolution of large deletion-bearing mitochondrial DNA in Caenorhabditis 
briggsae nematodes. PLoS ONE 7: e41433.  
• Clarke E (2010) The problem of biological individuality. Biol Theory 5(4):312–
325.  
• Clarke E (2013) The multiple realizability of biological individuals. J Philos CX 
(8): 413–435.  
• Clarke E (2014) Origins of evolutionary transitions. J Biosci 39(2):307–317.  
248 
 
• Clarke E (2016) Levels of selection in biofilms: multispecies biofilms are not 
evolutionary individuals. Biol Philos 31: 191-212. 
• Cullen TW, WB Schofield, et al. (2015) Gut microbiota. Antimicrobial peptide 
resistance mediates resilience of prominent gut commensals during 
inflammation. Science 347 (6218):170–175.  
• David LA, CF Maurice, et al. (2014) Diet rapidly and reproducibly alters the 
human gut microbiome. Nature 505:559–563.  
• Dawkins R (1976/2006) The Selfish Gene. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
• Dawkins R (1982a) The extended phenotype. Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
• Dawkins R (1982b) Replicators and vehicles. In King’s College Sociobiology 
Group 1982: 45-64. 
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/dawkins_replicators.html  
• De Queiroz, K. (2005a) A unified concept of species and its consequences 
for the future of taxonomy. Proc Cal Acad Sci 56: 196-215. 
• De Queiroz, K. (2005b) Different species concepts and their resolution. 
BioEssays 27 (12): 1263-1269. 
• De Queiroz, K (2007) Species concepts and species delimitation. Syst Biol 
56: 879-86. 
• De Sousa R (2005) Biological individuality. Croat J Philos 14: 195-218. 
• DeMonte S & PB Rainey (2014) Nascent multicellular life and the emergence 
of individuality. J Biosci 39(2):237–248.  
• Derrien M & JET van Hylckama Vlieg (2015) Fate, activity, and impact of 
ingested bacteria within the human gut microbiota. Trends Microbiol 
23(6):354–366.  
• Dethlefsen L, M McFall-Ngai, et al. (2007) An ecological and evolutionary 
perspective on human–microbe mutualism and disease. Nature 449:811–
818.  
• Deulofeu R & J Suárez (2018) When mechanisms are not enough. The origin 
of eukaryotes and scientific explanation. In Philosophy of Science. A 
Christian, D Hommen, N Retzlaff & G Schurz (eds.). European Studies in 
Philosophy of Science, vol 9. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
72577-2_6.  
249 
 
• Deulofeu R, J Suárez & A Pérez-Cervera (2019) Explaining the behaviour of 
random ecological networks. The stability of the microbiome as a case of 
integrative pluralism. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02187-9.  
• Díaz JS (2015) El mecanismo evolutivo de Margulis y los niveles de 
selección. Contrastes XX(1): 7–24. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/Contrastescontrastes.v20i1.2298.  
• Díez J (2014) Scientific w-explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding: 
A neo-Hempelian account. Erkenntnis 79: 1413–1443. 
• Díez J & P Lorenzano (2013) Who got what wrong? Fodor and Piattelli on 
Darwin: guiding principles and explanatory models in natural selection. 
Erkenntnis 78(5): 1143-1175. 
• DiFrisco J (2017) Kinds of biological individuals: Sortals, projectability, and 
selection. Br J Philos Sci.  
• Dodd DMB (1989) Reproductive isolation as a consequence of adaptive 
divergence in Drosophila pseudoobscura. Evolution 43.6: 1308-1311. 
• Dominguez-Bello MG, EK Costello, et al. (2010) Delivery mode shapes the 
acquisition and structure of the initial microbiota across multiple body habitats 
in newborns. PNAS USA 107: 11971-11975.  
• Doolittle WF (2013a) Is junk DNA bunk? A critique of ENCODE. PNAS USA 
110(14): 5294-5300. 
• Doolittle WF (2013b) Natural selection through survival alone. Biol Philos 
29(3):415–423.  
• Doolittle WF (2017) Darwinizing Gaia. J Theor Biol 434:11–19.  
• Doolittle WF & A Booth (2017) It’s the song not the singer: an exploration of 
holobiosis and evolutionary theory. Biol Philos 32:5–24.  
• Doolittle, WF & SA Inkpen (2018). Processes and patterns of interaction as 
units of selection: An introduction to ITSNTS thinking. PNAS USA 115(16), 
4006-4014. 
• Doolittle, WF & C Sapienza (1980) Selfish genes, the phenotype paradigm 
and genome evolution. Nature 284: 601-603. 
• Douglas AE (2010) The symbiotic habit. Princeton University Press.  
• Douglas AE & JH Werren (2016) Holes in the hologenome: why host-microbe 
symbioses are not holobionts. mBio 7(2): e02099-15.  
• Drown DM & MJ Wade (2014) Runaway coevolution: adaptation to heritable 
and nonheritable environments. Evolution 68(10): 3039-3046. 
250 
 
• Drown DM, PC Zee, et al. (2013) Evolution of transmission mode in obligate 
symbionts. Evol Ecol Res 15:43-59.  
• Dunbar HE, Wilson ACC, Ferguson NR, Moran NA (2007) Aphid thermal 
tolerance is governed by a point mutation in bacterial symbionts. PLoS Biol 
5(5): e96.  
• Dupré J (1993) The Disorder of Things. Harvard University Press. 
• Dupré J (2010) The polygenomic organism. Sociol Rev 58 (s1):19-30.  
• Dupré J (2012) Processes of life: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
• Dupré J (2017) The metaphysics of evolution. Interface focus 7:20160148. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2016.0148   
• Dupré, J and MA O'Malley (2007) Metagenomics and biological ontology. 
Stud Hist Philos Sci C 38: 834-846. 
• Dupré J & MA O’Malley (2009) Varieties of living things: life at the 
intersection of lineage and metabolism. PTPBio 1 (December).  
• Dupressoir A, C Lavialle, & T Heidemann (2012) From Ancestral Infectious 
Retroviruses to Bona Fide Cellular Genes: The Role of Captured Syncytins in 
Placentation. Placenta 33(9): 663–671. 
• Duron O, D Bouchon, et al. (2008) The diversity of reproductive parasites 
among arthropods: Wolbachia do not walk alone. BMC Biol 6:27.  
• Eberl G (2016) Immunity by equilibrium. Nat Rev Immunol 16(8): 524. 
• Elwick J (2017) Distrust that particular intuition: Resilient essentialism and 
empirical challenges in the history of biological individuality. In Biological 
Individuality. Integrating Scientific, Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. 
Scott Lidgard, and Lynn K. Nyhart (eds.). The University of Chicago Press. 
• Ereshefsky M & M Pedroso (2013) Biological individuality: the case of 
biofilms. Biol Philos 28(2): 331-349. 
• Ereshefsky M & M Pedroso (2015) Rethinking evolutionary individuality. 
PNAS USA 112(33): 10126-10132. 
• Ereshefsky M & M Pedroso (2016) What biofilms can teach us about 
individuality. In A Guay & T Pradeu (eds.) Individuals across the sciences. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press: 103-122.  
• Fraune S & TC Bosch (2007) Long-term maintenance of species-specific 
bacterial microbiota in the basal metazoan Hydra. PNAS USA 104(32): 
13146-13151. 
251 
 
• Fernández L, S Langa, et al. (2013) The human gut microbiota: origin and 
potential roles in health and disease. Pharmacol Res 69:1-10.  
• Fitzpatrick BM (2014) Symbiote transmission and maintenance of extra-
genomic associations. Front Microbiol 5: 46. 
• Folse HJ & J Roughgarden (2010) What is an individual organism? A 
multilevel selection perspective. Q Rev Biol 85:447-472.  
• Fontana W & LW Buss (1994) “The arrival of the fittest”: Toward a theory of 
biological organization. Bull Math Biol 56 (1): 1-64. 
• Frank SA (2014) Somatic mosaicism and disease. Curr Biol 24:R577-R581.  
• Funkhauser LJ & SR Bordenstein (2013) Mom knows best. The universality 
of maternal microbial transmission. PLOS Biol 11(8):e1001631.  
• Gage DJ (2004) Infection and invasion of roots by symbiotic, nitrogen-fixing 
rhizobia during nodulation of temperate legumes. Microbiol Mol Biol Rev 68: 
280-300.  
• Garcia-Suárez A (2011) Modos de significar. Una introducción temática a la 
Filosofía del lenguaje. Tecnos. 
• Gilbert SF (2017) Biological individuality. A relational reading. In Biological 
Individuality. Integrating Scientific, Philosophical and Historical Perspectives. 
Scott Lidgard, and Lynn K. Nyhart (eds.). The University of Chicago Press. 
• Gilbert SF & L Chiu (2015) The birth of the holobiont. Multispecies birthing 
through mutual scaffolding and niche construction. Biosemiotics 8 (2): 191-
210. 
• Gilbert SF, E Rosenberg, et al. (2017) The holobiont with its hologenome is a 
level of selection in evolution. In SB Gissis, E Lamm & A Shavit (eds.) 
Landscapes of collectivity in the life sciences. London, The MIT Press: 305-
324.  
• Gilbert SF, J Sapp, et al. (2012) A symbiotic view of life: We have never been 
individuals. Q Rev Biol 87(4): 325-341.  
• Gilbert SF & AI Tauber (2016) Rethinking Individuality: The Dialectics of the 
Holobiont, Biol Philos 31(6): 839-853. 
• Godfrey-Smith P (2000) The replicator in retrospect. Biol Philos 15: 403-23. 
• Godfrey-Smith P (2009) Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford 
NY, Oxford University Press.  
252 
 
• Godfrey-Smith P (2013) Darwinian Individuals. In From group to individuals: 
evolution and emerging individuality. F Bouchard & P Huneman (eds.). The 
MIT Press. 
• Godfrey-Smith P (2015) Reproduction, symbiosis, and the eukaryotic cell. 
PNAS USA 112 (33):10120-10125.  
• Gómez A, JM Rothman, et al. (2016) Temporal variation selects for diet-
microbe co-metabolic traits in the gut of Gorilla spp. ISME Journal 10:514-
526.  
• Gontier N (2010) Evolutionary epistemology as a scientific method: a new 
look upon the units and levels of evolution debate. Theory Biosci 129.2-3: 
167-182. 
• Goodrich JK, Davenport ER, et al. (2017) The relationship between the 
human genome and microbiome comes into view. Annu Rev Genet 51: 413-
433. 
• Goodrich JK, ER Davenport, et al. (2016a) Genetic determinants of the gut 
microbiome in UK twins. Cell Host Microbe 19:731-743.  
• Goodrich JK, ER Davenport, et al. (2016b) Cross-species comparisons of 
host genetic associations with the microbiome. Science 352(6285): 532-535.  
• Goodrich JK, JL Waters, et al (2014) Human genetics shapes the gut 
microbiome. Cell 159:789-799.  
• Gould SJ (1977) Caring groups and selfish genes. Nat Hist 86(10): 20-24. 
• Gould SJ (2002) The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Harvard University 
Press. 
• Gould SJ & E Lloyd (1999) Individuality and adaptation across levels of 
selection. How shall we name and generalize the unit of Darwinism? PNAS 
USA 96 (21): 11904-11909. 
• Griesemer J (2000a) The units of evolutionary transition. Selection 1 (3): 67-
80.  
• Griesemer J (2000b) Development, culture, and the units of inheritance. 
Philos Sci 67:2348-2368.  
• Guerrero R, Margulis L & M Berlanga (2013) Symbiogenesis: the holobiont 
as a unit of evolution. Int Microbiol 16:133–143 
• Hallen-Adams HE & MJ Suhr (2017) Fungi in the healthy human 
gastrointestinal tract. Virulence 8(3): 352-358. 
253 
 
• Hester ER, KL Barott, et al. (2015) Stable and sporadic symbiotic 
communities of coral and algal holobionts. The ISME Journal 10:1157-1169.  
• Hey J (2001) The mind of the species problem. Trends Ecol Evol 16(7): 326-
329. 
• Hull DL (1980) Individuality and Selection. Annu Rev Ecol Evol Syst 11:311–
332.  
• Hull DL (1981) Units of evolution: A metaphysical essay. In Jensen UJ, Harré 
R (eds.) The Philosophy of Evolution. Harvester Press, pp. 23-44.  
• Hull DL (1988) Science as a Process. University of Chicago Press. 
• Huneman P (2012) Natural Selection: A Case for the Counterfactual 
Approach. Erkenntnis 76(2): 171-194. 
• Hurst GDD (2017) Extended genomes: symbiosis and evolution. Interface 
Focus 7: 20170001.  
• Jablonka E & M Lamb (2005) Evolution in four dimensions. The MIT Press. 
• Jaenike J, R Unckless, et al. (2010) Adaptation via symbiosis: recent spread 
of a Drosophila defensive symbiont. Science 329:212-215.  
• Jakobsson HE, AM Rodríguez-Piñero, et al. (2015) The composition of the 
gut microbiota shapes the colon mucus barrier. EMBO Reports 16 (2): 164-
177. 
• Jantzen BZ (2017) Kinds of process and the levels of selection. Synthese. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1546-1. 
• Janzen DH (1977) What are dandelions and aphids? Amer Naturalist 111 
(979): 586-589. 
• Karaça C (2019) Relational basis of the organism’s self-organization. PhD 
Dissertation. University of Exeter. https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/ 
10871/37126. Accesed 30 June 2019. 
• Kettlewell HD (1958) A survey of the frequencies of Biston betularia (L.)(Lep.) 
and its melanic forms in Great Britain. Heredity 12(1): 51. 
• Klein J (1982) Immunology: The Science of Self-Nonself Discrimination. 
Wiley. 
• Knowlton N & F Rohwer (2003) Multispecies microbial mutualisms on coral 
reefs: the host as a habitat. Amer Naturalist 162(S4): S51-S62. 
• Koga R, T Tsuchida, et al. (2003) Changing partners in an obligate 
symbiosis: a facultative endosymbiont can compensate for loss of the 
254 
 
essential endosymbiont Buchnera in an aphid. Proc R Soc Lond B 270: 
2543–2550.  
• Kovacs M, Z Szendro, et al. (2006) Effect of nursing methods and faeces 
consumption on the development of Bacteroides, Lactobacillus and Coliform 
flora in the caecum of the new-born rabbits. Reprod Nutr Dev 46: 205-210.  
• Kushmaro A, Rosenberg E, Fine M & Y Loya (1997) Bleaching of the coral 
Oculina patagonica by Vibrio AK-1. Mar Ecol Progr Ser 147: 159-165. 
• Laland K, B Matthews & MW Feldman (2016) An introduction to niche 
construction theory. Evol Ecol 30: 191-202. 
• Lamm E (2018) Big Dreams for Small Creatures: Ilana and Eugene 
Rosenberg’s path to the Hologenome Theory. In Oren Harman & Michael 
Dietrich (eds.) Dreamers, Visionaries, and Revolutionaries in the Life 
Sciences. Chicago University Press. 
• Lang JM, JA Eisen, et al. (2014) The microbes we eat: Abundance of 
taxonomic microbes consumed in a day’s worth of meals for three diet types. 
Peer J 2: e659.  
• Lederberg J (2000) Infectious history. Science 288: 287-293.  
• Lederberg J & AT McCray (2001) “Ome sweet omics”: A genealogical 
treasure of words. Scientists 15: 8.  
• Leff JW & N Fierer (2014) Bacterial communities associated with the 
surfaces of fresh fruits and vegetables. PLoS ONE 8:e59310.  
• Leggat W, T Ainsworth, et al. (2007) The hologenome theory disregards the 
coral holobiont. Nat Rev Microbiol 5(10). 
• Lemanceau P, M Blouin, et al. (2017) Let the core microbiota be functional. 
Trends Plant Sci 22(7): 583-595.  
• Lerner A, T Matthias, et al. (2017) Potential Effects of Horizontal Gene 
Exchange in the Human Gut. Front Immunol 8: 1630.  
• Lewens T (2009). The natures of selection. Br J Philos Sci 61(2): 313-333. 
• Lewontin RC (1970) The units of selection. Annu Rev Ecol Evol Syst 1: 1-18.  
• Lewontin RC (1985) Adaptation. In The Dialectical Biologist. R Levins & RC 
Lewontin. Harvard University Press.  
• Ley RE, M Hamady, et al. (2008) Evolution of mammals and their gut 
microbes. Science 320 (5883): 1647-1651. 
• Lidgard S & LK Nyhart (2017a) Biological Individuality. Integrating biological, 
historical, and philosophical perspectives. The University of Chicago Press. 
255 
 
• Lidgard S & LK Nyhart (2017b) The work of biological individuality. Concepts 
and contexts. In Biological Individuality. Integrating biological, historical, and 
philosophical perspectives. S. Lidgard & LK Nyhart (eds.). The University of 
Chicago Press. 
• Lipnicki LL (2015) The role of symbiosis in the transmission of some 
eukaryotes from aquatic to terrestrial environments. Symbiosis 65: 39-53.  
• Liu L, X Chen, et al. (2012) The human microbiome: a hot spot of microbial 
horizontal gene transfer. Genomics 100 (5): 265-270.  
• Lloyd E (1988) The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory. 
Princeton University Press. 
• Lloyd E (1992) Units of selection. In Keywords in Evolutionary Biology. EF 
Keller & E Lloyd. Harvard University Press. 
• Lloyd E (2001) Units and Levels of Selection: An Anatomy of the Units of 
Selection Debates. In Thinking about evolution. SS Rama, CB Krimbas, et al. 
(eds.). Cambridge University Press. 
• Lloyd E (2017a) Units and Levels of selection. In EN Zalta (ed.) Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/selection-
units/.  Accessed 15th May 2019. 
• Lloyd E (2017b) Holobionts as units of selection: Holobionts as interactors, 
reproducers, and manifestors of adaptation. In SB Gissis, E Lamm & A 
Shavit (eds.) Landscapes of collectivity in the life sciences. London, The MIT 
Press: 351-367.  
• Lloyd E (2017c) A glimpse of philosophy of biology and collectivities today. 
In: Gissis SB, Lamm E, Shavit A (eds) Landscapes of collectivity in the life 
sciences. The MIT Press, London, pp 291–301. 
• Lloyd E & MJ Wade (2019) Criteria for holobionts from community genetics. 
Biol Theory. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-019-00322-w.  
• Louca S, SMS Jacques, et al. (2016) High taxonomic variability despite 
stable functional structure across microbial communities. Nat Ecol Evol 1:15.  
• Love AC & I Brigandt (2017) Philosophical dimensions of individuality. In S 
Lidgard & LK Nyhart (eds.) Biological individuality: Integrating scientific, 
philosophical and historical perspectives. Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press.  
256 
 
• Lynch KE, Parke EC, O’Malley MA (2019, forthcoming). How causal are 
microbiomes? A comparison with the Helicobacter pylori explanation of 
ulcers. Bio Philos. 
• Marchesi JR & J Ravel (2015) The vocabulary of microbiome research: A 
proposal. Microbiome 3(31).  
• Margolis E & S Laurence (2014) Concepts. In EN Zalta (ed.) Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/. 
Accessed 15th May 2019. 
• Margulis L (1990) Words as battle cries: Symbiogenesis and the new field of 
endocytobiology. Biosci 40(9): 673-677.  
• Margulis L (1991) Symbiogenesis and symbioticism. In L Margulis & R Fester 
(eds.) Symbiosis as a source of evolutionary innovation.  London, The MIT 
Press: 1-14.  
• Margulis L (1998) Symbiotic planet. A new look at evolution. Basic books. 
New York.  
• Margulis L (2010) Symbiogenesis. A new principle in evolution. Paleontol J 
44(12): 1525-1539. 
• Margulis L & D Sagan (2001) The beast with five genomes. Nat hist 110 (5): 
38-41.  
• Margulis L & D Sagan (2002) Acquiring genomes. A theory of the origin of 
species. Basic Books, New York. 
• Margulis L & R Fester (eds) (1991) Symbiosis as a source of evolutionary 
innovation. The MIT Press, Cambridge. 
• Martin BD & E. Schwab (2012) Current usage of symbiosis and associated 
terminology. Int J Biol 5(1): 32. 
• Matthen M & A Ariew (2002) Two Ways of Thinking About Fitness and 
Natural Selection. J Philos 99(2):55-83.  
• Mazel F, Davis KM, et al. (2018) Is Host Filtering the Main Driver of 
Phylosymbiosis across the Tree of Life? mSystems 3(5): e00097-18. 
• Maynard-Smith J (1991) A Darwinian view of symbiosis. In L Margulis & R 
Fester (eds.) Symbiosis as a source of evolutionary innovation.  London, The 
MIT Press: 26-39. 
• Maynard-Smith J (1987) Evolutionary progress and levels of selection. In: 
Dupré J (ed) The latest on the best: essays on evolution and optimality. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, pp 119–131 
257 
 
• Maynard-Smith J & E Szathmary (1995) The Major Transitions in Evolution. 
Oxford. Oxford University Press.  
• Mazmanian SK, JL Round, & DL Kasper (2008) A microbial symbiosis factor 
prevents intestinal inflammatory disease. Nature 453: 620-625 
• McFall-Ngai M (2015) Giving microbes their due – animal life in a microbially 
dominant world. J Exp Biol 218:1968-1973.  
• McFall-Ngai M (2002) Unseen forces: the influence of bacteria on animal 
development. Dev biol 242(1): 1-14. 
• McFall-Ngai M, MG Hadfield, et al. (2013) Animals in the bacterial world, a 
new imperative for the life sciences. PNAS USA 110(9):3229-3236.  
• McShea DW & C Simpson (2011) The miscellaneous transitions in evolution. 
In The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited. B Calcott & K Sterelny (eds.). 
The MIT Press. 
• Mendoza MLZ, Z Xiong, et al. (2018) Hologenomic adaptations underlying 
the evolution of sanguivory in the common vampire bat. Nat Ecol Evol 2: 659-
668. 
• Michod RE (1999) Darwinian Dynamics. Evolutionary Transitions in Fitness 
and Individuality. Princeton University Press. 
• Michod RE & D Roze (2001) Cooperation and Conflict in the Evolution of 
Multicellularity. Heredity LXXXVI(1):1-7.  
• Mitchell SD (1987) Competing units of selection? A case of symbiosis. Phil 
Sci54(3): 351–367. 
• Miura T, C Braendle, et al. (2003) A comparison of parthenogenetic and 
sexual embryogenesis of the pea aphid Acyrthosiphon pisum (Hemiptera: 
Aphidoidea). J Exp Zool 295B:59-81.  
• Moeller AH, S Foerster, et al. (2016) Social behavior shapes the chimpanzee 
pan-microbiome. Sci Adv 2:e1500997.  
• Mogensen AL (2016) Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a 
mistake about evolutionary explanations? Phil Studies 173(7): 1799-1817. 
• Moran N & DB Sloan (2015) The Hologenome Concept: Helpful or Hollow? 
PLoS Biol 13(12): e1002311.  
• Moreno A & M Mossio (2015) Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and 
Theoretical Inquiry. Dordrecht: Springer. 
• Morris JJ (2018) What is the hologenome concept of 
evolution? F1000Research 7. 
258 
 
• Nyholm SV & MJ McFall-Ngai (2004) The winnowing: establishing the squid–
Vibrio symbiosis. Nat Rev Microbiol 2: 632-642.   
• Ochman H, Worobey M, et al. (2010) Evolutionary relationships of wild 
hominids recapitulated by gut microbial communities. Plos Biol 
8(11):e10000546.  
• Odling-Smee FJ, KN Laland, MW Feldman (2003) Niche construction: the 
neglected process in evolution. In Monographs in population biology, vol 37. 
Princeton University Press 
• Okasha S (2001) Why won’t the group selection controversy go away? Br J 
Philos Sci 52(1): 25-50. 
• Okasha S (2006) Evolution and the levels of selection. Oxford. Oxford 
University Press.  
• Okahsa S (2011) Biological ontology and hierarchical organization: A 
defence of rank freedom. In The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited. B 
Calcott & K Sterelny (eds.). The MIT Press. 
• Okahsa S (2018) The strategy of endogeneization in evolutionary biology. 
Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1832-6.  
• Oliver KM, PH Degnan, et al. (2009) Bacteriophages encode factors required 
for protection in a symbiotic mutualism. Science 325:992-994.  
• Olszak T, Di An, et al. (2012) Microbial exposure during early life has 
persistent effects on natural killer T cell function. Science 336: 489–493. 
• O’Malley MA (2014) Philosophy of microbiology. Cambridge University Press. 
• O’Malley MA (2016) Reproduction expanded: Multigenerational and 
multilineal units of evolution. Phil sci 83:835-847.  
• O’Malley MA (2017) From endosymbiosis to holobionts: evaluating a 
conceptual legacy. J Theor Biol 434:34–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.008 
• O’Malley MA & J Dupré (2007). Size doesn’t matter: Towards a more 
inclusive philosophy of biology. Biol Philos 22:155–191.  
• Osawa R, WH Blanshard, et al. (1993) Microbiological studies of the 
intestinal microflora of the koala, Phascolarctos cinereus. II. Pap, a special 
maternal faeces consumed by juvenile koalas. Aust J Zool 41:611–620.  
• Osborne SE, YS Leong, et al. (2009) Variation in antiviral protection 
mediated by different Wolbachia strains in Drosophila simulans. PLoS 
Pathog 5: e1000656. (doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1000656).  
259 
 
• Osmanovic D, Kessler DA, Rabin Y & Y Soen (2018) Darwinian selection of 
host and bacteria supports emergence of Lamarckian-like adaptation of the 
system as a whole. Biol direct 13(1), 24. 
• Paul, SS., & A Dey (2015) Domesticated Rare Animals (Yak, Mithun and 
Camel): Rumen Microbial Diversity. In Rumen Microbiology: From Evolution 
to Revolution. A Puniya, R Singh, & Devki Kamra (eds). Springer. 
• Pedroso M (2017) Inheritance by recruitment. A reply to Clarke’s “Levels of 
selection in biofilms”. Biol Philos 32:127-131.  
• Pepper JW & MD Herron (2008) Does biology need an organism concept? 
Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 83 (4): 621-627. 
• Phillips CD, Phelan G, et al. (2012) Microbiome analysis among bats 
describes influences of host phylogeny, life history, physiology and 
geography. Mol ecol 21(11): 2617-2627. 
• Pollock FJ, McMinds R, et al. (2018) Coral-associated bacteria demonstrate 
phylosymbiosis and cophylogeny. Nat commun 9(1): 4921. 
• Pound R (1893) Symbiosis and mutualism. Am Nat 27(318): 509–520. 
• Pontarotti G (2016) Extended inheritance as reconstruction of extended 
organization: the paradigmatic case of symbiosis. Lato Sensu 3(1): 93-102. 
• Pradeu T (2010) What is an organism? An immunological answer. Hist Phil 
Life Sci 32 (2-3): 247-267. 
• Pradeu T (2012) The Limits of the Self: Immunology and Biological Identit. 
Oxford University Press.  
• Pradeu T (2016a) The many faces of biological individuality. Biol Philos 31: 
761-773.  
• Pradeu T (2016b) Organisms or biological individuals? Combining 
physiological and evolutionary individuality. Biol Philos 31:797-817.  
• Pradeu T & E Vivier (2016) The discontinuity theory of immunity. Science 
immunology 1(1). 
• Queller DC & JE Strassmann (2009) Beyond society: The evolution of 
organismality. Philos Trans Royal Soc B 364: 3143-3155.  
• Queller DC & JE Strassmann (2016) Problems of multispecies organisms: 
endosymbionts to holobionts. Biol Philos 31:855-873.  
• Rainey PB & B Kerr (2011) Conflicts among levels of selection as fuel for the 
evolution of individuality. In The Major Transitions in Evolution Revisited. B 
Calcott & K Sterelny (eds.). The MIT Press. 
260 
 
• Rakoff-Nahoum S, J Paglino, et al. (2004) Recognition of commensal 
microflora by toll-like receptors is required for intestinal homeostasis. Cell 
118(2):229-241.  
• Raychoudhury, R., C. A. Desjardins, et al. (2010) Behavioral and genetic 
characteristics of a new species of Nasonia. Heredity 104: 278-288. 
• Reeve HK & Hölldobler B (2007) The emergence of a superorganism through 
intergroup competition. PNAS USA 104(23):9736-9740.  
• Reshef L, Koren O, Loya Y, Zilber‐Rosenberg I & E Rosenberg (2006) The 
coral probiotic hypothesis. Environ Microbiol 8(12): 2068-2073. 
• Richards RA (2010) The Species Problem. A Philosophical Analysis. 
Cambridge University Press. 
• Rohwer F, Seguritan V, Azam F & N Knowlton (2002) Diversity and 
distribution of coral-associated bacteria. Mar Ecol Progr Ser  243: 1-10. 
• Rosenberg E, Sharon G & I Zilber‐Rosenberg (2009) The hologenome theory 
of evolution contains Lamarckian aspects within a Darwinian 
framework. Environmental microbiology 11.12: 2959-2962. 
• Rosenberg E & I Zilber-Rosenberg (2014) The Hologenome Concept. 
London, Springer.  
• Rosenberg E & I Zilber-Rosenberg (2016) Microbes drive evolution of 
animals and plants: the hologenome concept. mBio 7(2): e01395-15. 
• Rosenberg E, O Koren, et al. (2007a) The role of microorganisms in coral 
health, disease and evolution. Nat Rev Microbiol 5(5): 355. 
• Rosenberg E, O Koren, et al. (2007b) The hologenome theory disregards the 
coral holobiont: reply from Rosenberg et al Nat Rev Microbiol 5(10). 
• Roughgarden J, Gilbert SF, et al. (2017). Holobionts as Units of Selection 
and a Model of their Population Dynamics and Evolution. Biol Theory. 
• Round JL, SM Lee, et al. (2011) The Toll-like receptor 2 pathway establishes 
colonization by a commensal of the human microbiota.” Science 332: 974–
977. 
• Round JL & SK Mazmanian (2009) The gut microbiota shapes intestinal 
immune responses during health and disease. Nat Rev Immunol 9: 313–323 
• Ruiz-Mirazo K, et al. (2000) Organisms and their place in biology. Theory 
Biosci 119: 209. 
261 
 
• Sanos SL, VL Bui et al. (2009) RORγt and commensal microflora are 
required for the differentiation of mucosal interleukin 22–producing NKp46+ 
cells. Nat Immunol 10 (1): 83-91. 
• Santelices B (1999) How many kinds of individuals are there? Trends Ecol 
Evol 14: 152-155. 
• Sapp J (2003) Genesis: the evolution of biology. Oxford University Press. 
• Sapp J (2004) The dynamics of symbiosis: an historical overview. Can J 
Bot 82(8): 1046-1056. 
• Shapira M (2016) Gut microbiotas and host evolution: Scaling up symbiosis. 
Trends Ecol Evol 31(7):539-549.  
• Sender R, Fuchs S & R. Milo (2016) Revised estimates for the number of 
human and bacteria cells in the body. PLoS biology, 14(8), e1002533. 
• Sharon G, Segal D, Ringo J, et al. (2010). Commensal bacteria play a role in 
mating preference of Drosophila melanogaster. PNAS USA 107(46): 20051-
20056. 
• Shigenobu S & ACC Wilson (2011) Genomic revelations of a mutualism: the 
pea aphid and its obligate bacterial symbiont. Cell MolLife Sci 68(8): 1297-
1309.  
• Shigenobu S, H Watanabe, et al. (2000) Genome sequence of the 
endocellular bacterial symbiont of aphids Buchnera sp. Nature 407:81-86.  
• Shropshire JD & SR Bordenstein (2016) Speciation by symbiosis: the 
microbiome and behavior. mBio 7(2): e01785-15.  
• Skillings D (2016) Holobionts and the ecology of organisms: Multi-species 
communities or integrated individuals? Bio Philos 31:875-892.  
• Smith PM & WS Garrett (2011) The gut microbiota and mucosal T cells. 
Front Microbiol 2: 111. 
• Sober E (1984) The nature of selection. Evolutionary theory in philosophical 
focus. University of Chicago Press. 
• Sober E & Lewontin RC (1982). Artifact, cause and genic selection. Phil 
Sci 49(2): 157-180. 
• Sober E & Wilson DS (1994) A critical review of philosophical work on the 
units of selection problem. Phil Sci 61(4): 534-555.  
• Sober E & Wilson DS (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of 
Unselfish Behaviour. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.  
262 
 
• Sober E & DS Wilson (2011) Adaptation and Natural Selection revisited. 
Journal of Evolutionary Biology 24 (2): 462-468. 
• Sommer F, M Stahlman, et al. (2016) The gut microbiota modulates energy 
metabolism in the hibernating brown bear Ursus arctos. Cell Reports 15 (7): 
1655-1661. 
• Souza DT, Genuário DB, et al. (2017) Analysis of bacterial composition in 
marine sponges reveals the influence of host phylogeny and 
environment. FEMS microbiol ecol 93 (1). 
• Stappenbeck TS, LV Hooper, et al. (2002) Developmental regulation of 
intestinal angiogenesis by indigenous microbes via Paneth cells. PNAS 
(USA) 99:15451–15455. 
• Stegmann U (2010) What can natural seletion explain? Stud Hist Philos Sci 
C 41(1): 61-66. 
• Stencel A (2016) The relativity of Darwinian populations. Biol Philos 31(5): 
619-637. 
• Stencel A & AM Proszewska (2017) How Research on Microbiomes is 
Changing Biology: A Discussion on the Concept of the Organism. Found Sci 
23(4): 603-620.  
• Stencel A & DM Wloch-Salamon (2018) Some theoretical insights into the 
hologenome theory of evolution and the role of microbes in speciation. 
Theory Biosci 137(2): 197-206. 
• Sterner B (2015) Pathways to pluralism in biological individuality. Biol Philos 
30 (5): 609-628. 
• Sterner B (2017) Individuating population lineages: a new genealogical 
criterion. Biol Philos 32: 683-703. 
• Suárez J (2016) Bacterial species pluralism in the light of medicine and 
endosymbiosis. Theoria 31 (1): 91-105. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.13242.  
• Suárez J (2018a) The importance of symbiosis in philosophy of biology: an 
analysis of the current debate on biological individuality and its historical 
roots. Symbiosis 76: 77-96. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13199-018-0556-1.  
• Suárez J (2018b) Review of Biological Individuality. Integrating scientific, 
philosophical, and historical perspectives, by Scott Lidgard and Lynn K. 
Nyhart. Hist Phil Life Sci 40 (67). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0233-y.  
263 
 
• Suárez J (2018c) Review of Landscapes of Collectivity in the Life Sciences, 
by SB Gissis, E Lamm and A Shavit. Hist Phil Life Sci 40 (37). 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-018-0202-5.  
• Suárez J & V Triviño (2019) A metaphysical approach to holobiont 
individuality. Holobionts as emergent individuals. Quaderns de Filosofia 
VI(1): 59-76. https://doi.org/10.7203/qfia.6.1.14825.  
• Tauber AI (2016) Immunity in Context: Science and Society in Dialogue. 
Theoria. 31(2): 207–24. 
• Taxis TM, S Wolff, et al. (2015) The players may change but the game 
remains: network analyses of ruminal microbiomes suggest taxonomic 
differences mask functional similarity. Nucleic Acids Res 43(20): 9600-9612.  
• Theis KR, Dheilly NM, et al. (2016) Getting the hologenome concept right: an 
ecoevolutionary framework for hosts and their microbiomes. mSystems 
1(2):e00028-16.  
• Triviño V & L Nuño de la Rosa (2016) A causal-dispositional account of 
fitness. Hist Phil Life Sci 38 (6). 
• Tsuchida T, R Koga, et al. (2010) Symbiotic bacterium modifies aphid body 
color. Science 330:1102-1104.  
• Tung J, LB Barreiro, et al. (2015) Social networks predict gut microbiome 
composition in wild baboons. eLife 4:e05224.  
• Turpin W, O Espín-García, et al. (2016) Association of host genome with 
intestinal microbial composition in a large healthy cohort. Nat Genet 48 
(11):1413-1417.  
• Valdés-Villanueva LM (2005) La búsqueda del significado: Lecturas de 
filosofía del lenguaje. Tecnos. 
• van Opstal EJ & SR Bordenstein (2015) Rethinking heritability of the 
microbiome. Science 349:1172-1173.  
• Veigl SJ (2017) Use/disuse paradigms are ubiquitous concepts in 
characterizing the process of inheritance. RNA Biology 14(12): 1700-1704. 
• Veigl SJ (2019) Seeing “Lamarckian” More Positively: The Use/Disuse 
Paradigm Increases Understanding. BioEssays 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bies.201900054.  
• Vieira-Silva S, G Falony, et al. (2016) Species–function relationships shape 
ecological properties of the human gut microbiome. Nat Microbiol 1:1-8.  
264 
 
• Visscher PM, WG Hill & NR Wray (2008). Heritability in the genomics era—
concepts and misconceptions. Nat Rev Genet 9 (4): 255. 
• Vrba ES & SJ Gould (1986) The hierarchical expansion of sorting and 
selection: sorting and selection cannot be equated. Paleobiology 12 (2): 217-
228. 
• Walsh D, Lewens T, & A Ariew (2002). Trials of life: Natural selection and 
random drift. Phil Sci 69: 452-473. 
• Werren JH, L Baldo, et al. (2008) Wolbachia: master manipulator of 
invertebrate biology. Nat Rev Microbiol 6:741-51.  
• Westra U, RR Rivera, et al. (2010). Neuronal DNA content variation (DCV) 
with regional and individual differences in the human brain. J Comp Neurol 
518(19): 3981–4000.  
• White JA (2011) Caught in the act: Rapid, symbiont-driven evolution. 
BioEssays 33:823829. 
• Wilkins JS & P Bourrat (2018) Replication and reproduction. In The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. EN Zalta (ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ 
replication/. Accessed 29th May 2019. 
• Williams GC (1966) Adaptation and Natural Selection. Princeton University 
Press. 
• Wilson DA & E Sober (1989) Reviving the superorganism. J Theor Biol 
136(6): 337-356. 
• Wilson J (2000) Ontological Butchery: Organism Concepts and Biological 
Generalizations. Phil Sci 67: S301-S311. 
• Wilson RA & M Barker (2013) The Biological Notion of Individual. In The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. EN Zalta (ed.). 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biology-individual/. Accessed 29th May 
2019. 
• Wolfe CT (2010) Do organisms have an ontological status? Hist Phil Life Sci 
32 (2-3): 195-231. 
• Zilber-Rosenberg I & E Rosenberg (2008) Role of microorganisms in the 
evolution of animals and plants: the hologenome theory of evolution. FEMS 
Microbiol Ecol 32.5: 723-735. 
• Zheng Y, PA Valdez, et al. (2008) Interleukin-22 mediates early host defence 
against attaching and effacing bacterial pathogens. Nat med 14 (3): 282-289. 
 
265 
 
 
 
